PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1941

The Myth of the Continents	*Eugene Staley*	481
Germany Strategy: 1914 and 1940	*X*	495
Food as a Political Instrument in Europe	*Karl Brandt*	516
Demosthenes Redivivus	*Frederick H. Cramer*	530
Liberalism in Japan	*Sir George Sansom*	551
New York Looks Abroad	*Hamilton Fish Armstrong*	561
War by Radio	*John B. Whitton*	584
Our Heritage from the Law of Rome	*C. H. McIlwain*	597
The Mexican Army	*Virginia Prewett*	609
Stalemate in China	*Owen Lattimore*	621
The I.L.O. in Wartime and After	*John G. Winant*	633
The Industrial Power of the Nazis	*Louis Domeratzky*	641
Britain's Colonies in the War	*W. E. Simnett*	655
Berlin to Baghdad Up-to-date	*Philip Willard Ireland*	665
Marshal Pétain and the "New Order"		671
Recent Books on International Relations	*Robert Gale Woolbert*	674
Source Material	*Denys P. Myers*	690

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

ISAIAH BOWMAN
GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE
JOHN W. DAVIS
STEPHEN DUGGAN
ALLEN W. DULLES
HARRY A. GARFIELD
EDWIN F. GAY
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
CHARLES SEYMOUR

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 Ferry Street, Concord, N. H. Editorial and Business Offices, 45 East 65th Street, New York, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $5.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

VOL. 19, No. 3. Copyright 1941, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in U. S. A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

EUGENE STALEY, Professor of International Economic Relations, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; author of "Raw Materials in Peace and War," "World Economy in Transition" and other works * * * *X*, anonymous * * * *KARL BRANDT*, formerly Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Berlin; Economist, Food Research Institute, Stanford University * * * *FREDERICK H. CRAMER*, Assistant Professor of History, Mount Holyoke College * * * *SIR GEORGE SANSOM*, Visiting Professor of Japanese Studies at Columbia University; formerly Counsellor of the British Embassy in Tokyo; author of "Japan: A Short Cultural History" and other works * * * *HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG*, Editor of FOREIGN AFFAIRS * * * *JOHN B. WHITTON*, Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University; founder of the Princeton Listening Center; author of several books on international relations * * * *C. H. MCILWAIN*, Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Harvard University; former President of the American Historical Association; author of "The American Revolution," "The Growth of Political Thought in the West" and other works * * * *VIRGINIA PREWETT*, an American newspaper woman recently in Spain and Mexico; author of "Reportage on Mexico" * * * *OWEN LATTIMORE*, Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, the Johns Hopkins University; for several years engaged in travel and in writing in the Far East; author of "Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict," "Inner Asian Frontiers of China" and other works * * * *JOHN G. WINANT*, American Ambassador at the Court of St. James'; Director of the International Labor Office, 1939–1941 * * * *LOUIS DOMERATZKY*, Chief of the Division of Regional Information of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, Washington; author of several works on international economic problems * * * *W. E. SIMNETT*, founder and for many years editor of the *Crown Colonist;* author of "The Colonial Empire" and other works * * * *PHILIP WILLARD IRELAND*, Instructor in Government at Harvard University; author of "'Iraq: A Study in Political Development."

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 19 APRIL 1941 No. 3

THE MYTH OF THE CONTINENTS

By Eugene Staley

IN earlier writings as well as in his latest book Charles A. Beard reads from (or into?) American history the lesson that "continentalism" represents the predestined course of our foreign policy. Jerome Frank, writing a chapter on "Disintegrated Europe and Integrated America," argues that the basic issue in Europe, and the cause of unfortunate developments in Germany and Italy, has been "the absence of continental integration." In America, he continues, we have continental integration, "and therefore the possibility of relative self-sufficiency." Stuart Chase embroiders still further Frank's theme of "disintegrated Europe, integrated America," collects figures to explore the possibilities of various "continental economic units," and, in the last sentence of his book, urges the United States to avoid economic and political entanglements in the affairs of other nations which, "in the nature of their geographical deficiencies, must quarrel, until some day they too achieve continental unity." [1]

The Western Hemisphere complex, so conspicuous in discussions of American foreign policy, has often been associated with ideas of "continental" unity and "continental" solidarity. A noteworthy instance occurred in a symposium at the meeting of the American Political Science Association a year ago where Clarence Streit's plan for Interdemocracy Federal Union was up for discussion. A distinguished political scientist — a student of municipal government — based his criticism on the view that the natural political and economic grouping is the "continental" one. He therefore favored solidarity with Latin American countries as against overseas countries.

[1] Charles A. Beard, "A Foreign Policy for the United States" (New York: Knopf, 1940); Jerome Frank, "Save America First" (New York: Harper, 1938); Stuart Chase, "The New Western Front" (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is, of course, a tremendous literature on the theme that "Europe" must unite. Coudenhove-Kalergi's *Pan Europe;* the efforts of practical statesmen like Briand, Herriot and others to promote European union; and more recently a new flood of books, articles, plans and speeches advocating a "United States of Europe" or some sort of European federation all carry a continental emphasis. Sometimes there is an explicit argument to explain why continents, as such, must be united. Thus, H. N. Brailsford writes, "Air power has made inevitable the unification of continents." [2] More often than not, however, this point is simply taken for granted.

On the other hand, there are strong trends in current political action and thought, as well as existing economic and political connections, which cut directly across continental lines. Public opinion and official policy in the United States are today influenced very decidedly by the realization that our own ability to defend ourselves depends in no small measure on what happens in Europe and Asia. The British Commonwealth of Nations, so long as it stands, will continue to be a practical challenge to the thesis that continental units are the natural ones. The war emergency has publicized the fact that the economic affiliations of much of South America, as well as the cultural affiliations of Latin America in general, are with Europe — distinctly un-continental. In the realm of thought about the future, particularly in the discussion of war and peace aims, continental lines are being as regularly disregarded by some as they are being emphasized by others. Proposals like "Union Now," and the more moderate proposals of those who, while doubting the feasibility of complete federal union, nevertheless envisage some kind of a permanent bond between the United States and other democratic nations, reject the continental principles in favor of an ocean-linked unity.

One general theme runs like a red thread through most of these discussions, by continentalists and non-continentalists alike. That is the conviction that the day of the small, completely independent, sovereign national state is past. There will be in the future — and ought to be — *larger* politico-economic units of some kind. This, in the view of the present writer, has to be accepted as unquestionably sound. But is the natural progression from small, sovereign states to *continental* groupings? There is

[2] H. N. Brailsford, "From England to America: A Message." New York: Whittlesey House, 1940.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reason for making an examination of this question now, for the words "continent" and "continental" seem to be acquiring strong emotional and symbolic values which may even affect policy. Is this a well-founded development, or have we here an instance of the fascination (not to say the tyranny) of certain words? What are the general characteristics that mark off continental from non-continental, overseas, or maritime groupings? What is to be said for permanent supra-national groupings of a continental sort as compared with non-continental, maritime, or oceanic groupings? With respect to the defense problem of the United States, what are the relative virtues of a policy which stresses "continental" defense lines (admitting aid to Britain largely because it buys time for preparation), as against a policy which allies us with overseas friends in all-out resistance to the totalitarian challenge and in joint maintenance of dominant world sea power? [3]

II

There is only one universal characteristic which distinguishes continental from non-continental groupings — the existence of land connections (or barriers) instead of sea connections (or barriers) between the members of the group. What political or economic consequences, if any, follow from this difference?

Distance has human significance only in terms of the barriers it interposes against the exchange of messages (communication), the movement of persons (travel), and the movement of goods (transport). How does *over-land* distance compare with *over-water* distance in these three respects?

Obviously, the answer depends on the character of the particular lands and seas involved (land areas differ more than sea areas in the obstacles they offer) and on the technology of the times. Nowadays, communication, which permits exchange of intelligence, impressions and feelings, takes place over water and over land with practically the same speed, cost and convenience. Radio waves and the air mail pay little attention to continental lines. So far as travel is concerned, surface travel on land today is swifter where there are good railway lines and highways than surface travel by ship, and it is hard to generalize about the

[3] Wherever "sea power" is mentioned in this article the term must be understood to *include* the necessary complement of air-power required under modern conditions in order to hold command of the surface of the seas and in order to defend the bases — military and industrial — on which sea power rests.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

differences in expense and convenience. But if one travels by air — and that will surely be the standard method of long-distance travel in the future — there is no important difference even today between over-land and over-water distance. Stratosphere flying will probably soon abolish what little difference does now exist. This leaves land and water distances about equally significant, in human terms, except for transportation of goods.

The transport of goods (freight) should certainly not be ranked below communication or travel in its fundamental importance for determining the "naturalness" of economic connections between different places. If freight can move easily and cheaply between two regions their economies are much more likely to become integrated, interdependent and complementary than if the movement of goods between them is difficult and costly. Now, it happens that for heavy, bulky goods, which are the staple items of inter-regional trade, water transport is much cheaper than land transport over equal distances. This has been true for centuries. It is one of the reasons why the great trading centers of the world are typically located on rivers, or lakes, or on the seacoast. It is still true today. Rumanian oil, in time of peace, moves to Germany by the long overseas route around Spain to Hamburg, instead of over the much closer "continental" connection. Italy, though linked by several railway lines to continental Europe, imported 20,000,000 tons of goods by sea in 1938 and only 4,000,000 tons by land. Coal from Germany moves overseas to Italy when there is no blockade. South American international trade, even to places on the same continent, is largely by sea.

Let us compare, in practical terms, the cost-distance from such a center as New York City to inland "continental" points and to overseas points. Using prewar rates in all cases (effective as of August 1, 1939), the "wheat-distance" between Kansas City and New York, expressed as the cost of shipping 100 pounds of wheat in carload lots, was 33½ cents to 42½ cents, while it was only 13 cents from New York to Liverpool. In mileage, Liverpool was three times as far as Kansas City; but Kansas City was nearly three times farther than Liverpool when it came to economic relations in wheat. The overseas route from Singapore to New York is more than twenty-five times longer, in miles, than the rail route from New York to Akron, Ohio. Yet the distance measured in freight cost for transporting a 240 pound bale or case of crude rubber was $1.50 from Singapore and $1.03 to Akron.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In other words, Akron was two-thirds as far away from New York as Singapore, in "crude-rubber distance." [4]

In summary, for two places a given number of miles apart it makes very little difference under modern conditions whether land or water stretches between them, so far as communication and travel are concerned. For the transportation of heavy goods, however, which is a major aspect of economic connections, the two places would be effectively closer to each other, measured in "cost-distance," if there were water between them than if there were land. *Given the same separation in miles, there is less economic distance across water than across land.*

But are not places on the same continent or in the same "hemisphere" closer to each other in miles than places on different continents or in different "hemispheres"? It is a temptation to suppose so. Ex-Governor Philip La Follette of Wisconsin warned his countrymen not long ago to beware lest we find ourselves fighting "not in this hemisphere where we can be supreme, but fighting with expeditionary forces four thousand miles away in Europe and six thousand miles away in Asia." Will the reader at this point be good enough to examine a globe? [5] Attach a string to a pin at Madison, Wisconsin — Governor La Follette's home town — and measure how far from home he might have to go if he were sent to defend important points "in this hemisphere where we can be supreme," as compared with other points on the supposedly distant continents of Europe and Asia. Note the following facts:

It is farther from Madison to Buenos Aires in a direct line ("great circle" distance) than from Madison to Bengasi. Ankara is about as far as Buenos Aires. Actually, by the regularly travelled routes, Buenos Aires is considerably farther away than either of these points in Africa or Asia, because of the "bulge" of Brazil.

No capital in Europe, including Moscow, is as far from Madison as is Buenos Aires, and only one European capital (Athens) is as far as Rio de Janeiro. Again, this is direct-line distance, and by actually travelled routes Europe is relatively closer.

Gibraltar is closer to Madison than is the capital of Bolivia, closer than Tacna or Arica, and closer than any major city in Brazil or any place at all in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, or Uruguay.

Gibraltar, incidentally, is not merely closer to the entire South Atlantic coast of South America than is Madison, but is closer by sea than the *nearest*

[4] I am indebted to Mr. William M. Gavigan, of Funch, Edye and Company, steamship agents and ship brokers, for the rate data used in these comparisons.

[5] This is not a rhetorical request; it is meant seriously. Illusions persist in the minds of all of us from the old school-book device of flat maps which break the world into "hemispheres" that have no objective existence whatever in nature.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

point in the United States (Miami). In the same way, advanced European bases at Dakar, Bathurst, and Freetown on the coast of Africa are nearer to southern South America than our most advanced Caribbean bases.

If the Nazis were to capture the British naval base at Scapa Flow in Scotland they would be closer to Madison than if they were established at Lima, Peru.

As for Asia, Manchukuo is closer to Madison than is Buenos Aires. For those to whom "continental" land connections seem especially important, it may be added that a Japanese flying over the shortest route from Manchukuo to Madison (a great circle via Bering Strait) need hardly lose sight of land.

Points on the same land-mass may be as far apart in miles as places on opposite sides of an ocean, and may be still farther apart in economic distance measured by transport costs. On the other hand, there is likely to be a greater continuity of human habitation between them than between the overseas points. How shall we weigh this characteristic in appraising the significance of continental as opposed to overseas politico-economic groupings? One might argue that the continuity permits conquest and culture to spread by easy stages, and hence that each land-mass could be expected to have more political and cultural unity, more history and tradition in common, than would exist between places on separate continents. Actually, every continent has natural barriers — deserts, mountains, swamps, jungles — which are almost uninhabited and which may be more difficult to cross than the ocean. The sea, especially in earlier centuries, has offered one of the main means of contact between peoples on the same continent, so that the peripheral areas often developed more traits in common with each other and with other continents than with land-locked regions. Thus, the political and economic system of the coastland states of Europe spread more effectively to relatively vacant areas like America and Australia than to parts of eastern and southern Europe.

It is no accident that early civilizations developed in river valleys and that the great center of ancient times is spoken of as "the Mediterranean world" and not the European or the African world. Nor is it without significance that Europe, having the most broken coastline, best adapted for sea-borne traffic, became the originator of modern world culture and world politics, while Africa, most "continental" of all land areas because of its smooth contours and difficulty of access by sea, remained the "Dark Continent." [6] In short, land connections, which would

[6] For each mile of coastline Europe has 289 square miles of surface, North America 407, Australia 534, South America 689, Asia 763, Africa 1420. (Derwent Whittlesey, "The Earth and the State: A Study of Political Geography." New York: Henry Holt, 1939, p. 308.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

appear to establish easy contact between peoples on the same continent, may be barriers as well as connections, while bodies of water, appearing superficially on the map as barriers, may actually be most important connecting links. Because this has been so distinctly true in the past, the existing patterns of culture, tradition, political affiliation, and economic interdependence which confront us in the world of today are as often oceanic as they are continental.

III

We in this country can give the "continental" doctrine an immediate and practical test by applying it to the grand strategy of United States defense. In general, the same people who talk about "continental integration" draw a line around the so-called Western Hemisphere and refuse to concede that the United States has any vital interest outside — except that limited aid to Britain may be desirable in order to gain time for perfecting defenses within the "hemisphere." It should be noted, however, that our relations with the Western Hemisphere countries to the south of us are not really "continental" in any significant practical sense. A land connection is afforded by the Isthmus of Panama, but no one ever travels, or sends messages, or transports goods between North and South America *overland*. In fact, all Latin America, not merely South America, is overseas to us, with the partial exception of Mexico. Latin America is susceptible of defense by the United States only if the United States controls the sea routes, including routes which are problems of high-seas defense.

If the Western Hemisphere, then, is to be considered as one unit for defense purposes, or for other purposes, it provides an instance not of continental but of *maritime* solidarity. The practical issue today, in reality, is between two kinds of maritime solidarity. Some would make our area of maritime solidarity quasi-continental — that is, confined to North and South America and their immediate vicinities — while others would team up with Britain in a world-girdling maritime defense group.

Which grouping offers us the best line of defense? The technology of warfare and the nature of the enemy's strategy in attack have an important bearing on that question. Recent developments in warfare include far more than the efficient use of machines. The "extended strategy" of the Nazis — to use their own term — involves: (1) isolating the opponent by outmanœuvring

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him on the chessboard of international politics, placing him, without allies, in front of vastly superior economic and military force; (2) creating confusion and fomenting an uprising from within; (3) undermining the enemy's will to resist, by propaganda stressing the goodness of Nazi purposes, the hopelessness of resisting, and by fear — the "war of nerves"; (4) last of all, outright military attack. Against this strategy there must likewise be an "extended defense"! What grouping is best for the purpose?

Certain basic facts about the problem of defending the Western Hemisphere are now fairly well known. The American people have realized with a shock that the Monroe Doctrine has rested in the past not merely on our own power, but on the existence and the friendliness of the British Navy. If the British Navy were to be captured, or sunk, or scattered, we would face a combined Axis naval superiority that might amount to two or three to one against us. The "two-ocean navy" our Congress has voted cannot be completed before 1946. Furthermore, can we assume that a victorious Axis would be unable to match our new vessels, or to outmatch them? The estimated annual shipbuilding capacity of countries now under Nazi rule (Germany, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France), plus that of Japan, plus that of Italy, was about 3,200,000 gross tons at the outbreak of war. In the event of a Nazi conquest of the British Isles, additional equipment rated at an annual capacity of about 2,500,000 gross tons would be in the hands of the totalitarians. The grand total so amassed is 5,700,000 gross tons, as of September 1939. It seems reasonable to assume that since then new installations and destruction by bombing may have offset each other. Over against this annual capacity of nearly 6,000,000 gross tons the United States had an estimated shipbuilding capacity (including navy yards) of perhaps 800,000 gross tons at the outbreak of war, and this had been pushed up to 1,500,000 gross tons as of January 1, 1941. Experts hold that by building new yards we can probably increase this capacity at the rate of about 1,000,000 tons a year. If that is a good estimate, it would take us more than four years to overtake totalitarian shipbuilding capacity, *supposing that they stood still.* In the meantime, we should start with something like a 4 to 1 shipbuilding ratio against us. This must be a most disquieting fact if we hope to defend, single-handed, distant overseas areas like the South Atlantic coast of South America.

The power of a naval force decreases with the distance it must

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operate from its bases. Recall, then, what was pointed out above: that the sea-distance from the southeastern coast of South America (including important cities like Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires) is shorter to Gibraltar than to Miami, shorter to Dakar than to our most advanced Caribbean base at Trinidad. Furthermore, look on the globe at the British islands in the South Atlantic — Ascension, St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha, the Falklands — which might become Axis outposts in case Britain lost control of the seas around Europe.

But why plan to defend southern South America, since it is so far away? If Britain should be conquered, why not "write off" that part of the Western Hemisphere, let the Axis take it if they want it, and retire to a shortened defense line running across the continent at the equator or at the level of the "bulge"? We might actually have to give serious consideration to this scheme of "quarter-sphere" defense if Britain were defeated. But there are grave weaknesses in such a defense line.

First, the tradition that the Monroe Doctrine applies to the whole of both Americas is so strong that it might not be feasible to reconcile public opinion in the United States to such a policy.

Second, this retreat from our often-announced intention to keep trespassers off both the Americas would be a psychological defeat of the first magnitude, important in the war of nerves.

Third, we should be abandoning as potential allies the most developed and progressive countries in South America, the only ones capable of contributing largely to a common defense.

Fourth, these countries exercise important leadership throughout Latin America. By abandoning them we should forfeit whatever good will and friendly coöperation we might otherwise expect from Latin American countries closer home, and we should present the Axis with unexcelled political and cultural outposts for penetration into the vital Caribbean area, which everybody agrees we must defend at all costs. This is important, in view of the fact that the most effective "secret weapon" of the Nazis thus far has been internal dissension and fifth-column activities.

Fifth, strategic raw materials like Brazilian manganese and Bolivian tin lie south of such a "quarter-sphere" defense line, and this would be an important consideration if the world oceans were closed to us — which we would have to expect, unless we yielded to Axis demands.

Sixth, and finally, if we allow the Axis to establish strong posi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions "below the bulge," connected to Europe by the sea-lanes of the South Atlantic which they would control, aviation bases could be pushed northwest across the continent to threaten directly the most vital and vulnerable link in our ability to defend North America — the Panama Canal. Already, in fact, Axis-dominated "commercial" companies, according to a revealing article in the last issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, are pushing in this very direction, into remote areas that offer little commercial traffic, but might provide numbers of secret landing fields.[7] Relatively small Axis forces, hopping over the jungles in the air, could conceivably establish such a serious menace to the Canal that we would be forced to send an expeditionary force to root them out. And what permanent security would this bring us, supposing we were successful, unless we were prepared to maintain forces throughout a large part of South America?

In sum, South America is overseas to us, and important parts of it are farther from our bases than from the bases of European powers. The problem of defending South America is a *maritime*, not a continental problem, and if command of the seas in the South Atlantic passes to hostile powers we could neither establish bases there ourselves nor prevent them from ensconcing themselves on the Continent. Once they were there, only a major expeditionary force could root them out or prevent them from gradually working northward by successive jumps overland. Those soporific calculations about the number of ships an invader would have to have in order to send an expeditionary force from Europe to the United States, and about the perils to which such a force would be exposed from land-based defenders, *would apply to us in reverse, once command of the South Atlantic had passed to the Axis*. For strategy of the Nazis could place us before the dilemma, either of trying to drive them out of South America, or of letting them work northward to the Canal. In fact, the Nazis would know how to create a situation, after taking over important Latin American countries by "consent," without using any military force at all, where we would have to be the attackers.

Colonel Lindbergh testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that aviation has increased the vulnerability of any country to attack from forces on the same continent, but has decreased the vulnerability of a whole continent to attack from

[7] Melvin Hall and Walter Peck, "Wings for the Trojan Horse," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1941.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without — that is, by way of the seas. Presumably, this was intended to support the isolationist thesis that the United States has little to fear regardless of who wins in Europe. The hollowness of the argument is exposed by the considerations advanced above. The advantage of land-based aviation against sea attack would be our advantage only if we can assume that the United States can count on getting and holding and supplying bases in that distant overseas territory on the east coast of South America, and that we can prevent the Axis from doing so. This is a most unlikely assumption, if control of the high seas, and especially of the South Atlantic, passes to the Axis by the defeat of Britain. In other words, once control of the high seas passed from our friends to our enemies we would eventually be exposed to land-based, *continental* attacks by relatively small units of the *Luftwaffe* on the Panama Canal region, which is vital to the naval power on which defense of our own coast depends. On our side, we could find a remedy only by a major effort involving probably the transport of troops a long distance *overseas* in an area where the advantage of established positions and nearness to bases might be all against us.

These doubts about the security of a defense system limited to the Western Hemisphere are strengthened by consideration of the economic problems of defending against totalitarian attack. The great bargaining weakness of a Western Hemisphere economic bloc as over against an Axis-dominated world would arise from the surpluses of products competitive with our own which are produced in Latin America, especially in the temperate climate of southern South America.[8] In 1937 continental Europe and the United Kingdom absorbed considerably more than two billion dollars' worth of Western Hemisphere exports, principally petroleum, cotton, wheat, copper, meats, corn, tobacco and linseed. Important Latin American groups depend for their income on selling such goods abroad. It is easy to write glibly about diverting production to products needed in the United States, disposing of surpluses by hemisphere stamp plans, raising living standards throughout the hemisphere by fostering industrial development, and creating cartels to limit production and to barter with Hitler. These are the things we must try to do if Britain collapses and we have to make a stand on the line of hemisphere defense. Some of them are worth doing anyway. But rechanneling of production

[8] Cf. Alvin H. Hansen, "Hemisphere Solidarity," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1940.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

takes time, and it meets social and political resistances. Messrs. Bidwell and Upgren have rightly emphasized that by stimulating Bolivian tin-mining or Brazilian rubber production we would not automatically reëmploy the gauchos of the Argentine pampas, or the wheat farmers of Alberta and Saskatchewan, or the tobacco growers in Virginia and North Carolina.[9]

It is not at all clear that the Latin American countries would feel inclined to undergo difficult economic readjustments for the sake of fitting into the defense plan of the United States and thereby antagonizing the Axis. Hitler, if he had defeated Britain, could probably offer them more than we could, while demanding less from them in the way of readjustment of established patterns of production, and he could also threaten them more effectively.

If Britain can be kept in the picture, on the other hand, even if Hitler manages to hold what he has in Europe (in some kind of a stalemate or truce), the economic problem of defending the Americas becomes much more manageable. The reason is that a large volume of foodstuffs and raw materials of a sort competitive with United States production, and which we therefore do not care to import, regularly flows from such countries as Argentina and Uruguay to Britain, to be paid for by goods and services which Britain furnishes to Empire countries and to others. Some of these countries in turn sell large export surpluses in the United States (for example, rubber and tin from the East Indies), and the United States sells more than it buys in Argentina. Britain is the pivot of this triangular and multi-angular trade on which the disposal of a considerable part of South American surpluses depends. Let Britain's economic life be destroyed, or let it come under the domination of Hitler's New Order, and the effect on the economic defense of the Americas is analogous to the effect the sinking or capture of the British fleet would have on the naval defense of the Americas.

A defense area limited to the Western Hemisphere has another important economic disadvantage as compared with a world-girdling defense area based on joint British and American sea power. *We* would be the blockaded party. The Nazis, controlling the overseas trade routes of the world, except those in the immediate vicinity of our bases, would have on their side the quiet, undramatic, but steady weight of advantage in economic power

[9] Percy W. Bidwell and Arthur R. Upgren, "A Trade Policy for National Defense," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1941.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for defense or aggression conferred by the ability to draw upon the best and cheapest sources of materials in Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and the islands of the seas, and probably portions of South America. We, and not they, would have to waste part of our productive power making substitutes and adapting our industry to inferior materials. To be sure, the United States, together with the adjacent areas that our navy could protect, is better equipped than any other region to withstand a siege. But the engineers, mechanics, machine-tools, materials and inventors used to build synthetic rubber plants, or to establish our own tin smelters, or to develop *Ersatz* materials could not be used at the same time for producing planes and tanks, nor for producing civilian goods. The side which controls the world oceans, and which thus enjoys access by sea to allies and neutrals alike, has an inestimable long-run advantage in the scales of economic power.

Recently the editors of *Fortune* captioned a pair of world charts: "U.S.A. — Compact, Easily Defended; British Empire — Diffuse, Vulnerable." The theory implied in these captions has certain commonly accepted elements of truth. But in them may also lurk a dangerous fallacy — particularly dangerous under new techniques of warfare used so skillfully by the totalitarian Powers. The "diffuse, vulnerable" area, *if its communications can be maintained by dominant sea power*, is in a position to unite its allies and divide its enemies. It can nip in the bud, so to speak, threats to its position which may arise from any one of many different quarters — provided it acts resolutely and in time. The "compact, easily defended" area, on the other hand, may not be able to take action against the increasing power of a potential enemy until every ally has been "mopped up," until the enemy has gathered his forces without interference and has chosen the most advantageous moment for attack. The "diffuse-vulnerable" area, always supposing it holds command of the seas, can base its military effort on the economic resources of most of the world, including the materials and the industrial man-power of allied and non-belligerent countries far out of reach of the adversary. Finally, compactness may be no particular advantage, and even a great disadvantage, in the psychological phases of modern warfare. There is an important psychological as well as material difference between surrounding the enemy and being surrounded by the enemy. In the case of the United States, this is the difference between joining with allies from all the rest of the world to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

help keep Hitler caged in Europe and trying to resist a Hitler who controls all the world except our immediate neighborhood. "Compact — easily defended; diffuse — vulnerable" tacitly assumes that the land connects, that the sea divides. Such a slogan dramatizes inaccuracies of thinking that might prove as dangerous to us as the "Maginot mentality" proved to France, as little conducive to survival as the rigid strength of the mastodon in competition with the flexibility and adaptability of other animals and man.

Incidentally, if we were forced to defend the Western Hemisphere against attack by an Axis-dominated world, and if we were successful in fighting off the attack, what would be the next move for us? Would we ever again feel secure? Would we ever again be able to organize our life on anything but a military basis from top to bottom? Would we ever be able to devote less than a quarter or a third or a half of our national income to defense purposes, unless we were able to put the enemy back across the water, to reconquer the strategic strong-points commanding access to the seas of the world, and, in effect, to reconstitute the command of the world's oceans which we now have if we act together with Britain?

The Western Hemisphere defense plan is a static plan, and either the hemisphere or the "quarter-sphere" defense lines would, on the whole, be weak compared with the maritime defense line available to us so long as Britain survives. The United States should regard Western Hemisphere defense lines as distinctly secondary, to be prepared for emergency use if the first line breaks and we are forced to fall back for a last-ditch stand. It is less risky to stand now for all-out defense, together with Britain, of the seas and the strong-points commanding the seas of the whole world — Singapore, Hawaii, Panama, Gibraltar, Suez, and Britain itself — than to let Britain go down and then to try to defend the Western Hemisphere practically alone.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMAN STRATEGY: 1914 AND 1940

By X

A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF is not in a position to begin a war as a chess player may begin a game with a new gambit. He has to take over a play which has been opened by others, that is, the statesmen, and then carry it through according to the rules of the game. His strategical opportunities are thereby limited. In the long history of war more campaigns have been lost on account of a wrong political start than by subsequent strategical mistakes. More wars have been won by the *élan*, the passion, and the will to sacrifice of whole nations than by the genius of commanders.

It is in the political preparations and the use of political opportunities that we find the outstanding distinctions to be made between the strategical situation which faced Germany in 1914 and that which faced her in 1940. The German Army and German leaders of 1940 profited by mistakes of the past even more fully in the political field than they did in the field of purely military operations.

In 1914 the war began with the political odds against Germany. Close collaboration between the Chancellor and the Chief of the General Staff was needed urgently after the Bülow period, but it did not exist. The Chancellor, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, clung to the hope of reaching an understanding with England. The Chief of the General Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, had no such hope. He had no political imagination and he lacked the ability to foresee the psychological and political effects of his strategical manœuvres. He wavered between the fear that the Austro-Hungarian Empire might break up if the war were postponed and the fear that the German Army would not be ready for its superhuman task before 1916. He was perturbed by the shift of the French General Staff in 1911 from a defensive to an offensive strategy. His only idea of parrying this threat was to speed up mobilization and to plan to attack Liège on the fifth day after mobilization. His whole plan was rigid and bound to a strict timetable. His army commanders likewise became academicians. No last-minute change to meet unforeseen alterations of the political scene was possible.

In the summer of 1914 the rulers of Germany were not able to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

show any flexibility of mind in meeting the changed conditions created by the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and by the early Russian mobilization. Neither the Chief of the General Staff nor the Chancellor was able to take advantage of Britain's hesitation to define her obligation under the Belgian Neutrality Pact of 1839. If the British Cabinet had decided that the German passage through the valleys of the Meuse and Sambre did not violate that Treaty, then General von Moltke would have been justified, at least politically, in carrying out the plan to attack Liège on the fifth day after the beginning of mobilization. Since a majority of the British Cabinet decided for the opposite interpretation, as any good judge of the prevailing temperament could have foreseen, the premature attack on Liège became a major political mistake even though only a minor military one. It took the Chancellor by surprise. Germany was brought into a disastrous impasse, diplomatically and politically, without gaining any decisive military advantage.[1]

The combination of constructive military and political imagination in one and the same man is extremely rare in history. Frederick the Great had it. Napoleon had it. In 1866 and 1871 no one man in Prussia had it. However, William I managed to prevent the frequent differences of Bismarck and Moltke from attaining serious proportions. Again in 1914, as we have just seen, no one German had it. In France, too, in 1940, there was no such combination in one person, and no personality capable of enforcing close collaboration between the political and army leaders.

There is a striking parallel between the way in which the strategical position of Germany slowly deteriorated before 1914 and that in which France's did before 1940. In each case the process was due to neglect of political opportunities. It seems to be an inevitable psychological sequence that the fibre of a victorious nation softens in time, while that of a defeated nation stiffens. No statesman or general can isolate himself from the mentality which surrounds him. In the words of Moltke, an army is never so weak as on the evening of the day when it has been victorious. The same holds true for a nation which assumes that a lasting political superiority can be guaranteed by a "total peace." Such a nation underestimates the jealousy of former allies and neutrals. It will try to postpone new military risks at all costs. It will accept a series of diplomatic defeats. But even-

[1] *Cf.* General Wilhelm Groener, "Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen," p. 216.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tually there will be a violent reaction within the nation itself which may force the political and military leaders to give battle at a moment when it would be wiser to accept one more diplomatic defeat.

Of course, there is no comparison in magnitude between the diplomatic defeats of France in the decade preceding this war and those of Germany in the two decades before 1914. The descent of French power and prestige in the years before 1939 was without parallel in its swiftness. In the summer of 1931 Germany still was totally disarmed, Great Britain had voluntarily disarmed, and all Europe, with the exception of France, was near economic collapse. At that moment France's military alliances with the Little Entente and Poland made her appear so overwhelmingly strong that the French thought it possible to dictate their own financial and political terms to the rest of Europe. Here was the beginning of the estrangement of Anglo-Saxon public opinion from France. At the same time the countries of southeastern Europe began to realize that their economic future lay not in France but in Germany. The European financial debâcle, for which French politics were partly responsible, was bound to have repercussions in France as well. Nations which face the consequences of such crises immediately and courageously, in spite of violent internal reactions, will be stronger in the end than those which try to escape by purely monetary expedients.

The fall of the Doumergue Cabinet in 1934 and the failure to pass urgent reforms were symptomatic of the illness from which France was suffering. Everywhere on his diplomatic tour of Europe Barthou encountered skepticism regarding France's ability to solve her internal problems and to meet her military obligations to her allies. This skepticism was increased by France's failure to oppose the military reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936. The sacrifice of Locarno was a turning point in European history. The French General Staff hesitated to act unless the Government authorized a full mobilization. The mere order for total mobilization would have been sufficient at that moment to bring about the collapse of the Hitler régime. From then on the deterioration of the European order was rapid. The sanctions against Italy left Mussolini dependent on Germany for economic support. The financial consequences of the Spanish war, and the German occupation of Austria, increased this de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pendence. Germany's rearmament proceeded at full speed. Britain and France still procrastinated.

The German occupation of Austria directly threatened the strategical position of Czechoslovakia, and hence the existence of the Little Entente. Instead of facing the facts, the French indulged in utopian legislative controversies and changes of government. The consequence was social unrest among all classes of the population, a condition unfavorable for any military action in a modern war. On the basis of our present knowledge, we cannot say definitely that France, Britain and Czechoslovakia were in a military position to make war successfully at the time of Munich. From the purely military point of view it would certainly not have been wise to start the war only to save a few Sudeten German counties for Czechoslovakia. But the Siegfried Line had not yet been completed. For the Allies to sacrifice half Czechoslovakia's military strength to the Nazis, and then to await the completion of the Siegfried Line, was tantamount to suicide.

The final occupation of Prague completely altered the military balance of power in Europe. Five Czechoslovak *panzer* divisions, and forty other Czechoslovak divisions, disappeared from the list of potential Allied forces in the event of war with Germany. With the Czech arms thus acquired, Germany was able to arm forty divisions which until then not only had not been well trained but had not even been fully equipped. The actual shift in favor of Germany in the military balance was therefore equivalent to eighty divisions. Nor was that all. Poland's strategical position became precarious. France, which four years earlier could have mobilized half of continental Europe against Germany, was thus isolated. In case war came before 1941, she now could rely only on the Poles putting up a desperate struggle for a short while and on weak assistance from Great Britain. From this moment European politics were a race for time. The Chief of the French General Staff must indeed have been depressed as he counted over how many of his military trumps had been discarded in the vacillations of French and British politics.

The breakdown of the Locarno guarantees had already created for the French Chief of Staff conditions similar to those which faced the German Chief of Staff in the decade before the war of 1914. It narrowed the scope and possibilities of strategical action by France and Great Britain. Thus General Gamelin must have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seen that in the event of war he was like a chess player who has lost his queen. After the occupation of Prague and the completion of the Siegfried Line he must have been fully aware that an offensive against Germany was no longer feasible. He knew, too, that he was unable to bring any decisive support to the last remaining pillar of the French system of continental alliances, Poland. It would be interesting to know positively whether General Gamelin favored giving guarantees to Rumania and Poland in the spring of 1939, or whether he was opposed. If, aware that he could not bring any effective help to save Poland from destruction, he did not foresee the disastrous consequences of the guarantee which Britain and France gave her, he is primarily responsible for his own subsequent defeat.

To guarantee the frontiers of Poland and Rumania, and *then* to start negotiations in Moscow, was a slap in the face for any Russian Government. No Russian Government could have omitted to utilize the opportunity of a war between Germany and Poland in order to recover Bessarabia, the Baltic countries, and the Curzon Line in Poland. In case of war, whether or not Great Britain and France had given the guarantees in question, Russia would certainly have been forced, with or without Hitler's consent, to occupy Poland up to the Curzon Line and at least some of the Baltic areas. Of course, lacking a previous agreement with Germany, she might have hesitated to march into Finland or Rumania. The point is that for Britain and France to guarantee Poland and Rumania, without simultaneously mobilizing British and French forces, could not save Poland and could not ward off the danger of a Russian agreement with Germany.

Why did the Polish General Staff decide not to retreat at once from the Corridor salient to the Rawka-Bzura-Pilica line? Was the Chief of the French General Staff told that Polish strategy had been shifted to the offensive? Was he aware that the Poles did not have enough military strength to carry offensive operations through without a simultaneous French offensive? He could at least have ordered the bombing of the armament plants in western Germany, for which the airdromes in eastern France offered excellent bases. He could also have harassed the Siegfried Line more seriously than was actually done. He should have threatened to resign if the British and French Governments were not willing to bring all possible pressure to bear on the Belgian Government to permit the occupation of the Belgian fortifica-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions by combined French and British troops. Polish neutrality having been violated, the violation of Belgian neutrality would no longer have meant very much in the moral judgment of the world. Instead, the French left the German Army more or less unmolested, and Germany gained time to build up her armaments and increase enormously the number of her divisions. In the Allied camp nobody had imagination enough to foresee the consequences of a simple technical differential. Germany's war production had been in high gear for two years. That of France and England had not. The Allies were not able to bring their production to full capacity even in the eight months following the outbreak of war. Between the end of the Polish campaign and May 1940 each month added three times as much to the German armament output as to that of the Allies.

II

The topographical conditions of northwestern Europe do not admit many variations in war between Germany on the one side and Great Britain and France on the other. But the complete change in the meaning and importance of space and time in military strategy as a result of the development of mechanized warfare greatly reduced the chances of an Allied victory unless Allied troops had already occupied Belgium before Germany could shift her whole military strength to the West. When the German General Staff struck in the spring of 1940 their numerical and geographical advantages had reached their highest point.

No German commander since the Napoleonic wars had enjoyed such favorable conditions for undertaking an offensive against France. No danger threatened from the East, as had been the case in 1914. Strategically, Germany can survive a European war only because she has the "inner line." In 1914 she began to make full use of it only after the first battles had been waged in France. In 1940, as a result of preceding diplomatic moves, the German General Staff was able to reap all the advantages of the inner line even before the Battle of France started. The maximum number of divisions was available, ready for attack on any given day. The road to Russia and the Balkans remained open, so that the Allied blockade could not be truly effective. Once the Allied Supreme War Council had decided against occupying Belgium while the Polish campaign was still in progress, even the best French military plans might have ended in failure. Because the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French and British Governments had followed such an unimaginative policy in recent years General Gamelin was compelled to make a "back to the wall" fight, just as, for similar reasons, the German Army had been forced to do in 1914. If Britain and France, together with Poland and Czechoslovakia, had been prepared for modern warfare and had struck in 1938, Germany's position would have been utterly hopeless, as her armament industry was exposed to air attack from all directions. She would have been the besieged fortress from the very beginning of the war. The policy of the Allies, however, permitted the reverse to occur.

Only with this fact in mind can we make a fair comparison between 1914 and 1940 in their purely military aspect. The limited strategical possibilities in northwestern Europe have been studied many times. There is no leading General Staff officer in France or Germany who does not know by rote all the major and minor variations of a campaign in that eternal battlefield. Thus the actual lines of the German Army's advance in Holland and Belgium and France could not have surprised anybody. The accounts of brilliant German strategy in Belgium might be justified if they were restricted to the efficiency of the German organization, the daring of the troops, and the fact that the German General Staff had profited by the mistakes of 1914. But beyond that they are a myth.

There can be no doubt that the French General Staff, in the general disposition of their forces, foresaw the possible lines of advance as clearly as the German General Staff did. Both were aware of the fact that fortifications of the type which existed along the Dutch and Belgian frontiers facing Germany could not resist for more than a few days. Only a Maginot Line from Utrecht to Montmédy, strongly manned, could have resisted for a longer period. It is always possible to filter even large forces through fortifications of the Liège type. Thus the main questions posed for the Chief of the Allied forces were these: "How long can these fortifications resist? What will be the probable daily rate of advance of the German divisions after they have filtered or broken through? After that has happened, when and where will it be most opportune for us to meet them?" The questions were the same, with a few notable exceptions, in 1914 and 1940. In 1914 the German Commander-in-Chief had to take into consideration a French offensive southeast of Metz. In 1940 a French

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

offensive in that area was impossible. Furthermore, the transference of reconnoitering from the cavalry to the air forces, and the mechanized speed of the spearhead forces, had made the time factor much more decisive in 1940 than it had been in 1914.

After operations had begun in 1914 between Metz and the Scheldt, even a break-through by one army would not necessarily have meant a major defeat for the other. In 1940, however, the audacious use of mechanized divisions could prevent a retreating army from undertaking a successful reorganization within a distance of one hundred miles. Joffre won the Battle of the Marne because he had an opportunity to retreat far enough, the pursuer being unable to follow at the same pace. Ludendorff in August 1918, facing for the first time a modern combined air and tank attack, failed to see that a retreat undertaken for the purpose of regrouping his armies had to be a long one if it was to be successful. In Joffre's case, a retreat of one hundred miles was sufficient to gain decisive strategical advantages. To achieve the same results in 1940, a commander would have had to retreat until the inherent weakness of *panzer* and motorized divisions — namely, their length on the road (four times that of a normal division) and the enormous difficulties of fuel supply — slowed down the pursuit or halted it.

Mechanized warfare is not a German invention. The British developed it at the end of 1917, and the classic exposition of it was made by Field Marshal Lord Milne in 1927 in an address to the officers of the British Tank Corps. Italian and French generals as well have written understanding essays about it. No more astute analysis of the problems involved in this new type of warfare exists than was presented in a series of articles by a French General Staff officer which appeared in *Le Temps* between November 1939 and February 1940. These articles, dealing with the Polish campaign, sharply criticized the Polish General Staff for their failure to understand the full significance of the new type of attack. It is all the greater mystery that the mistakes made in Poland were repeated a few months later in France.

With the caution due in the absence of really detailed and authentic documentation, we can yet say one thing about the strategy of General Gamelin and, afterwards, of General Weygand. They did not fully appreciate the importance of the change in the time factor introduced by mechanization. The German

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Army had an immense advantage in that none of its generals had ranked higher than staff captains or battalion commanders in 1917 and 1918. They had fought in the front line and seen with their own eyes the effect of the combined air, tank and artillery attack of the British at that time. They knew from personal experience that one cause for the German disaster was the fact that even divisional commanders were too far behind the lines and



that the transmission of information and orders by radio was still undeveloped. This time the divisional commanders rode in the first groups of attacking tanks, where they were able to utilize sudden opportunities as they were presented and at the same time could keep the commanders of the armies constantly informed. In contrast, General Gamelin, though he himself was in the right position, received information of the serious extent of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the break-through at the Meuse only after a delay of 24 hours. Regardless of all this, the fact remains that, due to the nature of the available terrain, neither side produced any strategy which ought to have come as a surprise to anyone who had followed the evolution of military thought in the years since the last war.

With the exception of Bohemia, France has the best natural strategical frontiers in continental Europe. The only weak part is between the Meuse and the Channel. Invasion is extremely difficult in either direction in the Rhine valley if that sector is defended. A French advance would pile up at the Black Forest; a German one at the Vosges. The creation of the Maginot Line made even a German occupation of the plains of Alsace-Lorraine out of the question. The possibility of a German break-through between the Vosges and the Ardennes as far as Montmédy could be dismissed for the same reasons. But deep fortifications of the Maginot type are impossible between the Sambre and the Lys, a tributary of the Scheldt, because of the nature of the soil. Criticism of the failure to extend the French Maginot Line to the coast, therefore, is not well founded. It is correct, however, if it is restricted to the line of the Meuse between Sedan and Givet. This line, with the exception of certain densely wooded areas, should have been thoroughly fortified. The experience of 1914 ought to have made this absolutely clear. But even such fortifications would not have been adequate without an extension into Belgian territory between Givet and Namur. If the Meuse had been fortified in this sector the Germans would have been forced to concentrate their attack on the fifty mile gap between Namur and Antwerp. A line of fortifications along those fifty miles, though it would have been difficult to build at certain points because of the nature of the soil, would of course have provided an ideal basis for a purely defensive war, even if Holland were overrun. It would have been shorter by fifty miles than any line along the French-Belgian frontier. But political obstacles — among them Belgian timidity and naïve optimism — prevented the construction of such a line in peacetime. The same political obstacles operated to prevent its construction and occupation by French and British troops after the war had started.

Specific figures of the strength of the Allied and German Armies on May 10, when the attack in the Low Countries began, are not yet available. The maximum strength of the western German armies was hardly greater than it had been in 1914, that of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French troops probably about the same as it had been then. But since 1914 the French line had been extended by the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. In a way the Maginot Line made up for the longer frontier. On the other hand, the immobilization of an important part of the French Army so far to the east left the Germans a good chance of being able to wheel the bulk of their army through Belgium and northern France into the rear of the Maginot Line — a better chance than had attended their similar attempt in 1914.

III

The political prestige of having military control of Alsace-Lorraine has always been the bait which has lured the French out of their best strategical lines of defense. It was so in 1870 and again in 1914. This point must be clearly understood. General von Schlieffen[2] was willing in case of war to allow the French to occupy the whole of Alsace-Lorraine. General Groener, a member of the General Staff in 1914 who had been in close contact with Schlieffen, and later Minister of Communications and Minister of National Defense in the German Republic, went even further and advised allowing the French the Saar and the whole Palatinate so that the bulk of the French troops should be immobilized there. In this way the chances for the successful execution of the ideal plan for a war in France — that is to say, the bottling up of the whole French Army from the rear in the fortified area of Lorraine — would have been greatly increased.[3]

To ward off such a danger the French High Command had to do everything possible to strengthen their centre and left wing. Two alternatives were open. The French troops along the French-Belgian frontier could remain on the defensive or they could advance to meet the German attack on the Antwerp-Namur-Sedan line. The first course was preferable, but it would leave the Belgian Army to its fate. We may fairly assume that General Gamelin would have preferred this alternative, but that the Supreme War Council could hardly allow him to adopt it. A

[2] Chief of Staff of the German Army, 1891–1907. His military writings between the time of his retirement and his death in 1913 were published in that year under the title, "Gesammelte Schriften."

[3] In 1940 French territory extended much farther to the east than it had in 1914. This fact operated to produce exactly the same effect as the French offensive had in 1914, namely to reduce the number of French troops available for the defense of the line Antwerp-Montmédy. Joffre's decision to carry out an offensive in Lorraine forced him to give up the idea of occupying the line Antwerp-Namur. *Cf.* Groener, "Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German occupation of the Dutch and Belgian Channel ports would have been of vital concern to Great Britain. Nevertheless, the second alternative, if it had been taken at the very beginning of the war, might have saved the Channel ports as well as the Belgian Army. But to carry it out after the German armies had begun the invasion of Holland and Belgium was tremendously risky. General Gamelin must have known it. The advance into Belgium could have succeeded only if the first line of French-Belgian and Dutch fortifications had held up the invader for at least four days, or if the French had had available another strong army to advance from the south, through the Ardennes towards the Meuse.

The Dutch provinces of Limburg and North Brabant and the Belgian Ardennes are topographically the two areas which condition the speed of any German advance through Belgium. The Liège area is of only secondary importance. The speedy capture of Liège in 1914 was a great and daring feat, but strategically it was not decisive. Unless the German right-wing army infringed the neutrality of Holland it was confined to the few roads in the ten-mile strip between the northern outskirts of Liège and the southern frontier of Dutch Limburg. This retarded the advance of the army, which had to cover greater distances than any of the other German armies wheeling around the hinge of Metz. The roads through the Liège area itself had to be reserved for the Second German Army, on the southern flank of the First Army.

The careful wording of General Groener's studies[4] does not permit us to say definitely whether his own strategical ideas in 1914 were influenced also by political considerations. But his strong condemnation of the attack on Liège for political as well as military reasons suggests certain definite conclusions. He preferred to mass even stronger forces than Schlieffen planned all along the frontier of Dutch Limburg, in the belief that such a threat would force the French to invade Belgium before the Germans. Once Belgian neutrality had been violated by the Allies, there need no longer have been any hesitation on the part of the Germans to march through Dutch Limburg. This would have given General von Kluck, the commander of the north-wing army, strongest of all the German armies, the possibility of advancing on a broad front. Instead, Kluck was unable to de-

[4] *Op. cit.*, also "Der Feldherr wider Willen," 1931.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

ploy until after his army had passed in deep formation through the narrow strip between Liège and Maastricht. Had he been able to use the Limburg route, he would have gained three precious days and thus have been well in advance of the Allied schedule. In consequence he might have enveloped the northern wing of the Allied Armies at Mons and prevented them from escaping to the south.

The true students of Schlieffen, most notably General Groener, without losing sight of their object of luring the French Army back into the fortified area of Lorraine, advised cutting off segments of the Allied armies in the course of the grand manœuvre. That aim was not achieved in 1914. But the lessons of the failure influenced the dispositions of the German General Staff in 1940.

Dutch Limburg is like an appendix hanging down from the southeastern corner of Holland. Opposite Maeseyck, the vital point in crossing the Meuse, it is barely three and one-half miles wide; yet its length is such that a whole army can pass across it on a broad front. A break-through into Belgium via Dutch Limburg reduces the importance of the fortified Liège area, including one of the strongest fortifications in Europe, Fort Eben Emael, as well as of the whole Albert Canal. A break-through therefore might endanger also the best line of defense for a Belgian-British-French army, the so-called K-W Line between Antwerp and Namur -- unless, that is, it has been occupied soon enough by Allied troops. On account of the geographical configuration of Limburg, the Dutch have no chance whatsoever of holding a German army there for more than a few hours. In September 1938 they fortified a marshy strip a mile wide along the northern bank of the Meuse with a bunker line. The bunkers, on account of the nature of the soil, had to be raised well above ground. They could be destroyed by direct fire from the sandy hills on the German side at the very moment when motorized German troops crossed the frontier. So, indeed, it happened. The Meuse bridge at Maeseyck was captured by motorcyclists fifteen minutes after the beginning of the German advance. A few hours later, even before Eben Emael was captured, the bulk of the German troops were streaming into Belgium towards the Albert Canal, and the following day they crossed the Canal at several points. On the first day, too, German motorized troops crossed the line of the Meuse further north. This movement proved to be decisive in the conquest of Holland; it also endan-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gered the fortified area of Antwerp. The complete occupation of Holland by the Nazis was a threat against Britain. Actually it had little or no significance for the decisive campaign in France.

Thus the march through Dutch Limburg and Brabant reversed the situation of 1914, given the fact that the British and French decided to occupy the Antwerp-Namur line after the beginning of the German invasion. In 1914 the right wing of the German Army had to go as far as Mons in order to overtake the main forces of the Allied left wing. In 1940 the Germans contacted them as early as the third day. Thus the German lines of communication on this occasion were much shorter than they had been in 1914, a decided advantage. But if the German General Staff expected to envelop the Allied forces in eastern Belgium, making escape through Dunkerque impossible, they failed, as neither side moved fast enough. General Gamelin might even have profited from the only military advantage to be gained by moving into Belgium, namely the use of the Belgian divisions intact on the shortest possible front, if he had been able to attack the left flank of the German troops advancing through the Belgian Ardennes.

Whether or not the Allies moved into Belgium, their decisive manœuvre to check the Germans would have been to attack from the south into the German flank in the Ardennes. Apparently the French General Staff did not even consider such a move. Why? In 1914 the advance of the French Fourth Army in that direction contributed more to slowing up the German advance than Joffre realized at the time. Postwar German studies demonstrate this very clearly. But General Gamelin could call upon only nine British divisions (in addition, in case he advanced to occupy the Antwerp-Namur line, he could expect the support of a dozen Belgian divisions). Thus he might well have hesitated to start a flank attack in the Ardennes, which would have called for at least ten first-class divisions. Perhaps he did not expect a thrust of *panzer* divisions through the Ardennes. The Ardennes present a densely wooded mountainous terrain, most unfavorable to the passage of *panzer* divisions, and there are few east and west roads. The country is such that if the Allies had had superiority in the air the advance of the *panzer* divisions there would have ended in a German catastrophe. The French, however, failed to reconnoitre properly, either in the air or by means of ground troops. The small detachments of light motorized cavalry which they sent forward were easily dispersed by the Germans. On account

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of this failure the advance of the strong *panzer* divisions remained unknown to the French General Staff until too late.

This neglect by the French command is the more remarkable in the light of General Groener's postwar writings. He considered the sharp southward turn of the German army in the Ardennes in 1914 one of the fatal mistakes of the last war. In his view, it should have held its westward course and thus insured a general southwestern direction of the main body of the German armies marching through Belgium. In fact, his chart of such an advance is a preview of the whole scheme of invasion in 1940. General Groener made this plan even though he could not have foreseen that the French would leave the Meuse passages insufficiently covered at some of the very same points which had been unprotected in 1914.

In articles published in January and February 1940, the military correspondent of *Le Temps*, basing his prognostications on General Groener's principal ideas, though without fully understanding them clearly, predicted the main lines of the German advance. He assumed that three German army groups would invade Belgium — a very strong one with *panzer* divisions would force the defenses of the Albert Canal, a second would advance slowly between Luxembourg and Liège, a third, again with very strong armored forces, would move through Luxembourg and the Ardennes to the Meuse. He perceived that both wings would be exposed to the counter-attacks of French-British forces. The provisions made by the French High Command to repulse the attack of the northern German army group undoubtedly met this situation fairly. The advance by French *élite* troops and one or two large motorized units from between Lille and the Channel was well timed and well organized. But it remains a mystery how the long-anticipated thrust through southern Belgium could have been met by counter-attacks (as the contributor to *Le Temps* predicted that it would) on the basis of the dispositions actually made by the French General Staff. The only possible explanation is that the French High Command did not take into account the possibility of the daring advance of German *panzer* divisions along the southern road from Luxembourg to Sedan, paralleling the Maginot Line at a distance often of no more than ten miles.

This failure will remain one of the most amazing facts in modern military history. Articles published in the official organ of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German Army as late as the spring and summer of 1939 expressed apprehension about the risks which German motorized forces might run in advancing on that line. Even hastily constructed field fortifications twenty miles north of the Maginot Line, strengthened by sufficient field batteries, could have stopped the German advance in that region, or at least have slowed it down. This would have permitted General Corap's army to arrive in time to close the gap between Namur and Montmédy. There has been much discussion of the disastrous psychological effect of the Maginot Line on French strategy. It seems to be justified only when it refers to events in this area. Some French army group and divisional commanders plainly forgot the necessity of keeping permanent contact with the enemy at all points, and of trying to harass him. Even if such activity had resulted only in securing a clear picture of the strength and direction of his advance, the benefits would still have been very great.

IV

Did the German High Command foresee the ease with which their troops would cross the Meuse south of Namur and at Sedan? Did the actual crossing change their plans? We still do not know. We do know, however, that the organization of the entire German Army from Montmédy to Antwerp into two army groups prevented a repetition of the mistakes which occurred in 1914 as a result of a lack of cohesion between the Fifth, Fourth and Third Armies and General von Bülow's army group on the extreme right wing. The German commanders were over-worried, on that occasion, about a possible French counter-attack from the south into the Belgian Ardennes. They tried to meet this danger by a tactical frontal attack. In wheeling to the south they neglected the central operative idea.

General Groener had contemplated the possibility of achieving a main break-through at the Meuse in a western direction; but since he could not count on large armored units he discounted its practicability.[5] Nevertheless, his plan to hold all the German armies west of Metz to a strictly southwesterly direction, despite the danger of a French counter-attack from the south into the Belgian Ardennes, left the way open for the execution of such a manœuvre should the opportunity arise. This was the significant advance of the German General Staff over the original Schlieffen plan.

[5] *Cf.* Groener, "Der Feldherr wider Willen," p. 239.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1914 the German cavalry failed utterly to fulfill its task. In 1940 the *panzer* and motorized divisions seem to have been under a unified command within each of the two army groups. This arrangement, and not simply the perfect composition and the new tactics of these modern cavalry units, was responsible for their decisive successes. The French do not seem to have understood all the possibilities of the new arm. Their tanks were not concentrated under a single command, but were placed in relatively small units at the disposal of divisional and army group commanders.

The initial successes of the German *panzer* and motorized divisions enabled them to advance in the two directions where they could make use of their striking power to the fullest extent. Topographically speaking, there are two lines of advance into France which present hardly any obstacles to motorized divisions once they have crossed the Meuse. The area between the Argonne and the Seine is open country, and so is the area between the Meuse and Abbeville. Both regions offer ideal conditions for operations (such as the military correspondent of *Le Temps* described in February 1940) by autonomous mechanized divisions fighting in isolation from the main armies.

Exactly what happened in the first two days following the rapid destruction of General Corap's army is not yet known. The Allies' only possible chance of recovery was to retreat at almost any price from Belgium to the lower Somme and simultaneously to attack from the Verdun area towards Rethel, into the flank of the German army group advancing directly towards Laon. The first manœuvre risked losing the entire British Expeditionary Force. The second was impossible because there was no reserve army available for the purpose. Even two modern tank divisions in reserve south of Montmédy could have dealt a shattering blow to the German advance. They were lacking. The inability of the French High Command to execute either of these manœuvres should have convinced it, at the latest by May 24, fourteen days after the beginning of the German attack, that desperate decisions were necessary.

The plan of General von Schlieffen was that the German armies should arrive in full force at the Abbeville-Verdun line on the seventeenth day after the beginning of the attack. In 1940, although the bulk of the German Army was unable to reach the Abbeville-Verdun line on the seventeenth day in accordance with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Schlieffen plan, motorized divisions had already advanced beyond that line and had cut off large detachments of Allied troops.

The French replaced General Gamelin by General Weygand on May 19. They were unfortunate even in their choice of the moment to change the High Command. The shift entailed a four-day lull in planning operations at a decisive time, and the time lost was never made up. When General Weygand finally found himself able to issue new orders it was already too late to withdraw the French left wing to the lower Seine. The Somme-Aisne-Montmédy line was actually the shortest line of defense. But when General Weygand had failed to halt the Germans by May 25 only one manœuvre remained feasible — to retreat all the way back to the line Loire-Dijon-Belfort. That would have meant sacrificing Paris and the Maginot Line, with an enormous amount of immovable artillery. Such a long retreat might have had a disastrous effect upon French morale. But the choice was between certain disaster and possible survival, and the risk would have been worth taking. General Weygand's decision to make his new stand on the Seine turned the Maginot Line from an advantage to France into a disadvantage.

After the surrender of Belgium and the escape of the British and French forces from Dunkerque, though without their arms, the further advance of the German armies proceeded exactly in accordance with the ideal Schlieffen plan as developed by General Groener. He had taken into account the possibility of a resumption of French resistance along the line Seine-Oise-Verdun.[6] He presupposed that the French would protect the crossings of the lower Seine with relatively weak forces. In his view, the weakest link in the French line would be the Oise flank, despite its support by the fortress of Paris. He thought the Germans ought to attack across the Oise and across the Seine at the same time. If in meeting these attacks the French were to weaken their front further to the east, along the Aisne, then the Germans could break through on that front between Soissons and Rheims. If the French neglected to strengthen the Oise-Aisne front, the breakthrough could be made between Soissons and Creil.

Here we reach a very important point in General Groener's calculations. In order to carry out their manœuvre successfully, the Germans had to be on the heels of the French at the Aisne, but

[6] "Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen," p. 228 *et seq.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they must be careful not to attack prematurely.[7] In the Groener plan the German cavalry would reach Rouen and Les Andelys (on the Seine) on the twenty-fourth day of the attack. They would be followed by the infantry, spreading west to Beauvais and beyond. On the twenty-seventh day they would cross the Seine at those points. At the same time, an attack on the fortified Lorraine area from the east would be begun. In the actual event — in the Battle of France, 1940 — Beauvais was reached on the twenty-fourth day of the attack. On the twenty-seventh day, the lower Seine was crossed at Rouen and Les Andelys, the points indicated by General Groener.

The French decision to make a final stand on the line Seine-Oise-Verdun came, as already mentioned, too late. Looking ahead, General Groener believed that under conditions like those which prevailed in 1940 even the Marne line would not be tenable. He envisaged a wheeling movement of the German right wing, south and southeast through Dreux and Chartres, and then turning eastward to cut off Paris from Orléans. The plan was carried out to the letter in 1940.

General Groener foresaw that the French Commander-in-Chief would then face a desperate decision. Would he defend the upper Seine, a decision which offered certain advantages if coupled with an attack on the German right wing from the Loire? Or would he sacrifice the whole fortified area in Lorraine and retreat to the Loire and a line running across to the Jura Mountains on the Swiss-French frontier? The decision would depend upon his temperament. A French counter-attack centering on Chartres could slow up the German advance, but Groener was doubtful whether one could be made because of the probable inability of the French to concentrate sufficient forces for the purpose. He thought the best strategy for France would be to take up the Loire-Jura line, as the German armies would be approaching exhaustion and would have to allow the French a breathing-spell in which they might reorganize their forces. In any case, France would be in a stronger position to negotiate an Armistice.

V

In this article we have mentioned the difficulties of supplying

[7] Evidently when the manœuvre was actually carried out the French General Staff did not understand what was going on. On May 25 the official report regarding the situation on the Aisne read, "Since yesterday we have dominated the enemy."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the enormous quantities of fuel required by motorized divisions. But no attempt has been made to evaluate the effect of German air attack on the French morale or the French lines of communication. Nor is any opinion offered regarding the activities of the Fifth Column. A comparative study of strategy, based on exact data, leads one to conclude that these factors have been overestimated in their actual bearing on the outcome of the war in France.

French strategy was under an evil star before the war began. If it is true that General Gamelin sent an ultimatum to the Belgians via the Quai d'Orsay the middle of January 1940, to the effect that the Allies should either be permitted to occupy Belgium at once or should plan not to enter Belgium at all, then he foresaw all. If he expected to await the German attack on the French-Belgian frontier, without preparing an attack from the south into the flank of the German columns proceeding across the Belgian Ardennes, then he faced carrying on a sterile defensive. But in that event, even though the Germans might have broken through at the Meuse or elsewhere, thus creating disorder in the Allied lines, the envelopment of the British and French forces in Belgium might have been prevented. Probably it would have been necessary to sacrifice the Channel ports; but though that would have been a serious blow to Britain it need not have greatly affected the campaign in France.

Afterwards, an early retreat to the Seine-Oise-Aisne-Montmédy line, and the concentration meanwhile of strong reserve armies in Paris and between the Marne and Verdun, might have set the stage for holding up the German advance. To retreat to the Loire and to abandon Paris and the Maginot Line would have injured a French commander and French prestige. Yet that became precisely what had to be done. This was the innate danger in the French strategical position. The French Army clung to the Maginot Line and became too extended, with too few men per kilometer.

The Germans won not simply because they possessed superior numbers and had mastered a more modern tactical use of mechanized forces in the air and on land. The political mistakes of the Allies had lost them the war in France even before it began. Moreover, the German High Command and the Army Commanders, most of whom had received their previous promotions from General Groener while he was Minister of National Defense

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from 1928 to 1932, avoided all the major mistakes of 1914.[8] There was a clear strategical plan. There was a logical subdivision of the army into groups suitable to the new type of warfare. In the mechanized divisions, further, there was daring as well as a capacity to check it when this became necessary in the orderly development of the general plan of operations. In all these particulars the situation of the German Army was the reverse of what it had been in 1914.

German strategy in France, as conceived by General von Schlieffen and developed by General Groener, was completely successful. If the Germans had captured the entire body of French and British troops at the Channel ports, instead of their arms only, the outcome of the war would very likely have been decided last summer. We should refrain from vilifying the leaders of the French Army, or from questioning the gallantry of the common French soldiers, whose exploits in isolated detachments are among the most heroic in history. France was not lost mainly through her army. France was lost mainly through her politics in the period between the two wars. The events still to come will prove whether the Channel is to be a second Marne, and whether France is still to be saved through the resistance of Britain.

[8] General von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army in 1940, was a Staff Captain in 1914, and was selected for vital liaison work between Generals von Kluck and von Bülow. *Cf.* Reichsarchiv, *Der Weltkrieg*, p. 353.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOOD AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT IN EUROPE

By Karl Brandt

TO Americans the word "food" has fairly simple connotations. Food satisfies man's most basic and urgent need, and so seems eminently an affair of civilian economy. It is "our daily bread" of the Lord's prayer — the stuff that keeps people from going hungry. Whether a person gets his share or not generally depends upon his income and food prices. For two decades, moreover, our government has been worried by the presence of too much rather than too little food. It has tried to master the unwieldy food surplus in order to help the farmer, and has made a virtue of necessity by distributing surplus supplies free of charge among the needy and unemployed.

In the course of the public debate in this country regarding the European food problem Americans have shown that they are thinking too largely in conventional physical terms. They speak about shortages created by the hostilities on land and sea, about food losses and destruction, about the consequent threat of famine to civilians, and about how to transfer enough from our land of plenty to relieve the stricken areas. Such thinking is natural enough in a democratic country where there is an abundance of the consumer goods typical of a competitive price economy. But the resulting picture is incomplete. The American public is not yet aware of the full implications of what is really going on in connection with Europe's production, distribution and consumption of food.

II

In the totalitarian state food has ceased to be simply food as we all know it — a commodity of civilian origin and destination. It has acquired new and different aspects. It has become a complete chest of tools in the workshop of the modern tyrant. Even statistically food has been driven underground. Information on how much is harvested, imported, exported, lost or fed to the people is now a military secret, guarded almost as carefully as the blueprints of a new bomber. Hence, a survey of Europe's food situation cannot at the present time be nearly so accurate as one compiled before the war. The economist must patch together

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

incomplete statistics and bits of circumstantial evidence drawn from a multitude of unconventional sources.

In this total war, every nation considers food and feed essential factors in their struggle for eventual victory, along with coal, oil, electric energy, fibres, minerals and metals. They know that thrift and foresight must be used in connection with them all. The German totalitarian state in particular, in preparing for war, made its food control a model system for all the phases of its rigid, thoroughgoing, centralized, planned economy.[1]

From the moment the Nazis seized the reins in Germany they copied the Soviets in transforming food from an economic end into a political means. Food became an instrument for executing domestic policies, for forcing the integration of the race, for persuading farmers to coöperate, for breaking the backbone of processing industries, for weaning a "degenerate" and miseducated people away from luxuries and unheroic attitudes. The granting of food became a premium for accomplishment and the withholding of it became a punishment for failure or dissent. Food could establish equality or set up distinctions, it could "liquidate" inferior individuals and groups, it could play Santa Claus or the big bad wolf. Since food is an inescapable necessity for the human animal, the Nazis saw what a beautiful instrument it could be for manœuvring and disciplining the masses. Their control of food put their thumb at the throat of every man and woman, of children as well as of the aged.

During the Third Reich's six years of peace and eighteen months of war numberless legislative and administrative decrees have given effect to this new concept of food as an all-round political instrument. The concept is entirely harmonious, of course, with the philosophy underlying the totalitarian state. If man's destiny lies in the survival of the fittest group in perennial warfare, and if his virtues flower under the enforced discipline of military command rather than in a harmonious relaxation of self-respecting citizens, then obviously it becomes a postulate of statesmanship that food is a political and military instrument. Once this idea has been conceived, it is only a matter of time before the Lord's gift of bread turns into Mephisto's rod, coaxing or cajoling, crushing or breaking, in the hands of der Führer, Il Duce, El Caudillo and the master of the Kremlin.

[1] Karl Brandt, "The German Fat Plan and Its Economic Setting." Stanford University, California: Food Research Institute, 1938.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the struggle of the democratic nations to survive they must understand all the techniques of their opponents, including their food policy. They must, so long as the war continues, resist aggression in every field by taking countermeasures in that same field. To fight the war strictly as gentlemen may mean the death of all gentlemen.

III

The result of efficiently engineering a nation's food policy is to give the entire food economy unprecedented elasticity. It is freer than in a "free economy," because it is relatively well protected against disturbance and can ignore both increasing costs of production and popular resentment arising from higher prices and consumer controls. Today, it is safe to say, the Germans are fairly well-fed, despite a lack of some commodities; and they will probably continue to be well-fed so long as they do not lose control of the conquered continent.

The Nazi régime started its *Erzeugungsschlacht*, or battle of production, in 1934, in imitation of Mussolini's earlier *battaglia del grano*. Food imports were curtailed, farm prices for food were raised, dealers' margins were narrowed, and consumer prices were raised moderately. Agriculture, the food processing industries, and trade were studied and reassembled in accordance with the blueprint of the food cartel. Every living soul, whether farmer or laborer, grain dealer or milk retailer, thereby became a soldier in the Reich Food Estate, subject to the equivalent of martial law and bound to obey it on penalty of losing his freedom or his neck.

This revolutionary reconstruction of the Food Estate was undertaken to prepare it to withstand the test of war. The next step was to condition the consumer psychologically, to change his eating habits and the customs of kitchen management. The masterminds who planned total war anticipated shortages and hardships. Hence, they put their best nutrition specialists, dieticians, economists and psychologists to work to devise a streamlined rationing system that would feed the people sufficiently well, that would permit the regulation of the carry-over through a tightening or loosening of the national belt, and that would be proof against bootlegging. On the morning of the day the war against Poland began, September 1, 1939, ration cards were distributed to the German population. Rationing had been tried out long before with textiles and all sorts of other materials, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

animal husbandmen had been subjected to feed rationing. In Germany, rationing is not an indication of existing real shortages of foodstuffs. It is an engineering and political science.

Addressing the German workers at the Rheinmetall-Borsig works in Berlin on December 10, 1940, Hitler [2] elaborated on the food rationing system. "We want to avoid one person having more of the most vital commodities than another," he said. "Not everybody is in a position to buy a Titian, even if he had the money." And he added: "But in the case of food, everybody must be served." This is the socialistic refrain. But although such an égalitarian policy aims at preventing the rich from gorging or hoarding food, it establishes a class distinction between the various groups of recipients of rationing cards. First comes the "warrior caste," embracing the armed forces, the Gestapo, and to some extent the party militia. Next come the most skilled and essential laborers. Further down the scale come the unemployables, the aged, the incurably sick. At the bottom come those to whom it is an act of grace to give any rations at all: prisoners, inmates of insane asylums and concentration camps, and Jews. Food cards express the quotation of the utility of citizens to Leviathan.

Allotments of higher rations are one means of promotion. They signify approval for laborers who pass from the unskilled to the skilled category, or from easier to harder work. One of the basic considerations is, of course, the actual caloric requirement for maintenance of any useful person's physical fitness. But a multitude of entirely different and partly contradictory calculations — including consideration of larger economic problems and astute political estimates — also come into play.

Rations may be lowered simply to accumulate greater reserves. Temporary limitations may be used to impress the people with the seriousness of the general situation, even when actual supplies on hand would allow more generous rations. Or extra rations may be granted to bolster morale in a difficult moment, even though stores thereby are drastically reduced. Cutting off luxuries prepares the people for being thankful later when a trickle of them reappears — some coffee, a little whipped cream, candies or chocolate. After the French collapse, when the German masses remained apathetic, special rations of modest luxuries were distributed to create an atmosphere of cheer and enthusiasm.

[2] *Facts in Review*, January 20, 1941, p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When the Ministry of Propaganda or the Gestapo deems it advisable to play a more radical tune it turns the wrath of the masses against the "capitalists" by starting single meal campaigns. Or a plan for compulsory public kitchens turns up, with the hint that a Spartan cuisine would have a good educational influence on epicureans. Hoarding or bootlegging food, or violation of the rationing laws, carries the death penalty, or in minor cases a term in a concentration camp.

IV

Food has also served the Nazis as an instrument for outmanœuvring their political opponents in neutral countries and for exacting complaisance. In fact, control of foodstuffs, including annual staple crops such as grain and sugar, or perishables such as milk, eggs, meat, fruits and vegetables, is the main way in which the Nazis overcome patriotic resistance. It works particularly well in agricultural countries. Agriculture is relatively less elastic than industry. If the demand slumps, prices crash and farmers default on taxes and interest. Countries with a large agricultural export are therefore most vulnerable in the game of squeeze, and the Nazi strategists have exploited the fact.

The technique used to force an agricultural country to yield, first to economic domination and later to military and political domination, is incredibly adaptable. One method is to concentrate in one hand all the foreign food purchases for the whole German nation, 80-million strong. This single authority offers to buy a gigantic volume of goods in the country in question at fairy-tale prices; it sets the conditions, political or otherwise; it sees that its tempting offers become known through agents and by radio and the newspapers; and then it sits back to wait for the farmers to "turn the heat" on their governments, knowing that in all agrarian export countries the farm bloc is the most powerful of all political pressure groups. Payment is arranged through a clearing arrangement with the national bank, which has to provide the interim payments to the farmers in national currency. Once the nation in question is in the grip of a big and powerful debtor it has to do as it is told — or lose everything.

Knowing the inner structure of their victims, all their weak spots, the German experts in foreign trade, food and feedstuffs have had an easy time preparing for "peaceful conquest." By outbidding competing countries with arbitrarily chosen higher

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prices; by granting subsidized credits and clearing agreements; by buying on a national scale in certain selected transactions; and by the simultaneous use of diplomatic and military pressure, Germany succeeded, between 1933 and 1939, in forcing the proportion of exports taken by her from Bulgaria, Greece, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary and Turkey from a former low of 15 percent to a high of 40 percent. Simultaneously she forced these countries to raise the percentage of their purchases in Germany, so that instead of representing 19 percent of their imports [3] these represented 46 percent.

Since actual warfare began, these forms of pressure have been supplemented by various schemes resulting in the inflation of the currencies of the neutral or conquered countries. The ratio between the mark and the currencies in question is arbitrarily fixed, and so are the prices offered by the German Government for foodstuffs. Indeed, nominally neutral countries like Hungary and Bulgaria which have a food surplus have established rationing in order to force larger exports of food to Germany. Thus you may live in a neutral country that has food aplenty, but this does not guarantee that you will be allowed to eat it. If the food squeeze exercised from Germany becomes strong enough, not only the urban population but even the farmers themselves may have to suffer from malnutrition due to an unbalanced diet (though perhaps sufficient in calories), until for some reason of strategy the pressure is relaxed.

All the Balkan countries which, as I write, are still neutral — Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the European part of Turkey — are in the same boat so far as food is concerned. If they resist Germany, their food surpluses will cause them grave trouble; if they play ball with her their bread basket still will be hung high. Sweden and Switzerland are in a better strategic position, even though from a military standpoint they are at Germany's mercy, because both are food deficit countries. Switzerland will be able to adjust her agricultural production. And Sweden is so important both as a source of industrial raw materials and as a purchaser of German industrial goods that certain needed food imports are permitted by the Germans to pass from occupied Denmark into Sweden. Moreover, as neutrals, both Switzerland and Sweden benefit from receiving British navicerts and from German willingness to let them import through the blockade.

[3] *Wochenberichte*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, XIII, September 3, 1940, page 105.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Incidentally, if this German technique were ever tried against the Latin American countries, it would work magnificently in most cases. It also would work well against Canada, Australia, New Zealand. If Hitler should occupy the British Isles, thereby gaining control over Europe's normal purchases, amounting to an average of 2.5 billion dollars a year in the Western Hemisphere alone, he could throw every one of those countries into political convulsions and stir up violent hatred against the United States. To do this he would not need to make a single military move.

V

It is in the conquered and occupied countries, of course, that the totalitarian food strategy is applied in its fullest extent. Central Poland, before the war part and parcel of an agricultural surplus producing country, is exposed to the worst suffering. The hatred and contempt which the Germans feel for the Poles has led them deliberately to aim at wiping Poland out as a national entity. This central area has been severed from the annexed parts of West Poland, and into it are being dumped increasing numbers of people considered undesirable. The food situation there, as a result, grows worse and worse. Only the large potato crop and American relief activities prevent complete disaster.

Czechoslovakia, with its strong industrial backbone, receives different treatment, because it belongs in the orbit of the "Greater Reich." In fact, the food situation in the Czech and Slovak areas does not differ much from that in the Reich and Austria.

Norway has had a hard time because its supplies of grain, leguminous vegetables, sugar, fats and fruits are short under the blockade, even though in normal times she is able to export annually 200,000 tons of fats, 85 percent of her catch of fish and 65 percent of her potato crop. Her fisheries still yield enough for her to send train loads daily to the Reich.

Denmark fares best among all the occupied nations. Although the Danes still stubbornly maintain their tariff border, the area is, for all practical purposes, incorporated into the Reich. Food and feed are rationed. In 1940 chickens and pigs were cut down to half. Cattle were also cut heavily, though the herd of dairy cows was kept almost normal. All the butter, bacon, eggs, and cattle that can possibly be spared are sold to Germany. Instead of exerting direct pressure in Denmark, which might diminish the supply at the source, Germany has resorted to the methods of an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

otherwise greatly despised liberal economy — she has raised prices to such a height that foodstuffs are produced and flow freely southward over the border. Indeed, for the last quarter of 1940 the German fat monopoly raised its prices per ton for Danish butter from 2,400 kroner in 1938 and 2,750 kroner in August 1939 to 4,500 kroner.[4] For the first quarter of 1941, the price has been boosted to 5,000 kroner for the first 8,000 tons, 4,250 kroner for the next 4,000 tons. Thus Denmark has a real export boom. By December 31, 1940, her former debit on clearing account had turned into a 1.5 billion kroner balance in her favor.[5]

The Dutch likewise find themselves in a favorable situation, even though, like the Danes, they have lost their British market. Their state, a model of intensive and up-to-date farming, has been closely integrated with Germany. Huge shipments of Dutch vegetables, butter, cheese and meat roll eastwards day and night. The incentives are skyrocketing prices, paid in depreciating guilders, and the withdrawal of German duties. Dutch farmers desperately need an outlet. German purchases prevent wholesale bankruptcy. The only risk from the point of view of the Germans is that stubborn Dutch political resistance might force them to impose penalties. But they will avoid this if possible, because, as in the case of Denmark, Holland is too valuable an asset in the Reich's wartime food economy to be ruined.

Belgium, as the European country with the greatest density of population and next to Switzerland the highest degree of industrialization, is probably in the worst straits of any of the occupied territories. However, there is a great difference between Germany's treatment of the Belgians and the Poles. Immediately after the occupation of Belgium the German authorities began to coöperate with the Belgian administration in planning adjustments in the production, distribution and consumption of food. Belgium is short of fats, fluid milk, grain and potatoes; but she has an excellent sugar-beet crop and some milk and vegetables. While Norway, Denmark and Holland have bread rations of roughly 80, 90 and 89 ounces per capita per week, the Belgian ration is only 56 ounces.[6] To promote efficiency, industrial workers are allowed up to 112 ounces. Some food is said to be passing

[4] This price applied to the first 12,000 tons. Beyond that the price was 4,750 kroner. *Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 15, 1940.

[5] *New York Times*, February 2, 1941.

[6] *Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute*, January 1941, p. 238. This issue gives detailed bread rations for 12 countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into Belgium with navicerts through the British blockade. But the minimum supply of staple food needed can be arranged only by Germany, by transport either from Soviet Russia or the Balkans or out of her own reserves.

In occupied France food is strictly under German control, but the situation is much better than in Belgium, the wheat-bread ration being 87 ounces a week. The occupied region contains France's main wheat, sugar-beet and dairy areas. But these are also the principal scene of the present Battle of England. R.A.F. bombings, German military movements and civilian evacuations disrupt transport, trade and administration so that local shortages are common.

Industrial unemployment is widespread in Belgium, Holland and occupied France, while in Germany, with German war industries booming and German armies spread out all over the Continent, there is a desperate shortage of skilled labor. Consequently, Germany is eager to import as many mechanical workers as she can, especially from the Lowlands, France and the Scandinavian countries where skilled labor is particularly well-trained and hard-working. Food is the lure used to secure them. German employment agencies offer jobs in Germany to unemployed Belgian, Dutch and French workers. If these refuse they lose their rationing cards. Sometimes rationing cards are withheld from workmen — who then are informed that plenty of food can be had in such-and-such a German industrial center.

Unoccupied France has been manœuvred into an exceedingly difficult situation. Vast numbers of refugees are crowded into a small area which is ill prepared to secure or distribute the supplies necessary. Communications and transport are strained, the civilian administration is overburdened, hoarding and bootlegging produce unequalities and, in many spots, shortages. Rationing, so far, has been badly organized and remains largely ineffective. In view of this the reduced (though still not alarmingly low) ration of 74 ounces of wheat bread does not mean very much one way or another.

The territory under the Vichy Government produces winter vegetables, fruit and wine, but is short of grain and fats. Wheat came normally from northeast France, now occupied, and the former imports of tropical vegetable fats — normally from 500,000 to 600,000 metric tons net annually — are no longer available. While the chess game between Pétain and Hitler continues, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germans have no intention of relieving the food situation in unoccupied France. Indeed, food is one of the men in the game. Thus the French people read that Germany has promised to ship 100,000 tons of potatoes from Germany to Paris.[7]

All the occupied areas have to support vast German armed forces. On the other hand, Germany feeds, on German supplies, probably an equal number of prisoners of war and drafted foreign laborers. There still remains a large net profit for Germany in this account, however, since prisoners receive the smallest and German soldiers the highest per capita ration. Moreover, German soldiers buy and send home all the bootlegged and non-rationed food they can find.

VI

In general, we see, the European food situation no longer can be measured in ratios of physically available supply and more or less urgent demand. Although crops and stocks still act as delimiting factors, the civilian food ration is determined largely with an eye on other matters. The most orderly and satisfactory situation, of course, prevails within the boundaries of "Greater Germany." In Italy, too, bread is free of cards. In the neutral, the non-belligerent and the conquered countries every sort of condition prevails, from one roughly approximating that in Germany down to real stringency.

It would be going too far, however, to say that conditions everywhere are strictly what the German conqueror wants them to be. He took six years to build his totalitarian power economy at home. It works there with the precision of a carefully built and solicitously tended machine. But in the conquered territories he had hurriedly to superimpose similar methods upon radically different economic systems. Neither the psychological coördination and control, nor the technical execution, approaches the perfection achieved in Germany proper. This is why there is general disorder in the European transportation system, universal disruption of wholesale and retail trade, speculation, and a lack of information regarding stocks. All these factors hamper the proper distribution of the food which is available and assigned for use.

The longer Nazi legions and administrators rule the Continent

[7] By the end of November, she had actually shipped 8,000 tons. Potatoes, be it noted, are free from rationing in unoccupied territory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the more order they will restore. Since the threat of undernourishment, or even actual starvation, is the canker that destroys public morale, all governments, conqueror and conquered alike, concentrate their energies on banishing this fear. And they have made remarkable progress. The point to remember is that the commanders of the German army of occupation, with the keys to the big granaries in their pockets, will tighten or relax their grip not in accordance with the size of available supplies of food but according to the dictates of broad political strategy.

VII

Late this spring, probably, will come the critical period in Europe's food problem in this war. Thereafter the food situation will tend to become less tense even in such hard-pressed areas as Poland, Belgium, unoccupied France and Spain. With the coming harvest, if the weather favors, the energetic German drive to work out necessary adjustments may well begin to show astonishing results.

The yield of the Danubian basin and the Balkan countries in food and feed crops is not likely, in general, to increase substantially (except for a larger oilseed output, especially in Hungary). Yet the more advanced agricultural methods introduced by the Germans will give new proof of their efficiency and will exploit all the latent skill of the farmers. Practically all of the northern and the middle parts of central and western Europe will show increased agricultural production. The acreage devoted to potatoes, sugar beets and mangels will be drastically increased, and more calories will be produced on the same acreage of cultivated land.[8]

All these root and hoe crops require an increase in draft power, in manual labor and in fertilizer. These things can be provided. The armies of the occupied nations will be demobilized, horses will be turned back to the farmers, oxen will be used where horses are too few, nitrogen and potash fertilizers are plentiful, and industrial unemployment prevails. Nothing is more sensible, then, than to turn to more hoe crops.

Indications are that Greater Germany and all the occupied areas except Norway are preparing to do so. Even Belgium expects to be self-supporting in grain in the new crop year by boost-

[8] Potatoes yield two or three times as many starch calories per acre as does wheat or rye; sugar beets from four to six times as many.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing the wheat area from 160,000 to 260,000 hectares, and the potato acreage from 147,000 to 177,000 hectares. At the same time, the extremely productive small family gardens in the suburbs of all the European cities will turn out more small fruit and vegetables in due season. True, in Holland, Belgium, Norway and Denmark the poultry flocks have been cut by emergency slaughtering to less than one half, and the hog population has been reduced considerably. More calves and young cattle have been slaughtered than under ordinary conditions. But these inroads have not, contrary to press reports, reached alarming proportions; and as feed supplies improve, the number of chickens and pigs may well increase again fairly quickly. In the Danubian countries the stock has definitely been increased.

If in 1941 the war does not turn into a sweeping movement of invading armies on the Continent itself, and if a general crop failure does not occur, we are probably safe in assuming that the threat of famine will gradually vanish, though a dearth of fats will still persist, and eggs, fluid milk and cream will continue to be scarce. The need for activity by the Red Cross and by local relief associations in the various nations will persist, especially on behalf of children, the poor and prisoners. Finland, Spain and unoccupied France have already received some overseas supplies under British navicert; recently French convoys from North Africa reached Marseilles without being molested by the British. Finland has obtained 20,000 tons of edible oils, bacon and pork from the United States. Morever, the United States and Great Britain have agreed to a more flexible treatment of medical supplies and concentrated foods shipped under navicerts.

This appraisal of the European food situation may seem overoptimistic. But pessimists often forget that the continent's total import deficit in foodstuffs before the war did not amount to more than 5 percent of its bread-grain requirements or 6 percent (10.5 million tons) of bread and feed-grain requirements combined. The real shortage is in fats — 1.3 to 1.4 million tons. Germany today has an untouched war reserve of 6.5 million tons of grain, and this alone would permit her to adjust the situation in countries of greatest need without seriously depleting her stocks. The fat deficit will persist, but it will decrease as potatoes, sugar beets and mangels become available for feeding hogs, cows and sheep, and as more oilseeds, such as rape, are grown. A herd of 100 million pigs now consumes tremendous amounts of feed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which could be used as human food. Before starvation gripped the population this herd, along with cattle and sheep, would be slaughtered and eaten. Furthermore, exceptionally high prices of food and feed in all areas outside of Germany will certainly stimulate increased production and will enforce the utmost thrift in consumption. At present the greatest pressure seems destined to fall on England because of her shipping losses.

The Nazis consider themselves complete masters of the European food situation. On September 30, 1940, Walter Darré, German Secretary of Agriculture, stated that there would be "no special difficulties to overcome" in occupied countries, and that the available food supply was greatly underestimated abroad.[9] He did not think it necessary to lay any blame for food shortages on the British, though he naturally would have been tempted to do so. On January 7, 1941, the German Ambassador in Madrid, Dr. Eberhard von Stohrer, insisted that Spain did not need a hundred-million dollar credit from the United States, because Germany was in a position to carry out an offer to provide her with all the gasoline and other supplies she needed from Rumania and Russia.[10] On February 11, 1941, the radio brought the news that a joint German-Belgian commission had negotiated food shipments from Soviet Russia to Belgium. In February Russia offered Norway to barter a million tons of Russian grain for Norwegian aluminum. Immediately Germany interfered. The Nazis do not object to relief supplies coming in to Europe if they have no political implications. But they consider the regulation of Europe, including feeding it, their affair — their self-assumed right as well as obligation. It is a key factor in their New Order.

In conclusion, it may be worth while to reflect upon the rôle played by food in the World War. Food alone did not win that war. In October 1918, General Ludendorff forced the German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, to sue for peace within 24 hours. He did this because the German Army had lost the battle of Amiens and would have been thrown back to the Rhine by Christmas. Certainly the food stringency was one of the factors which had exhausted the fighting stamina of the nation as a whole. Yet even in November 1918 the front-line troops still were well fed. The Nazis have laid their plans well. They are

[9] *New York Times*, October 1, 1940, p. 9.
[10] *New York Times*, January 8, 1941, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determined that no shortage of food will arise to create even as much difficulty for their juggernaut as it did for the Kaiser's. Our sympathies must not be allowed to distort our judgment about the rôle of food in the tremendous struggle ahead. Appraisals of the food and raw material situation made before the commencement of the Battle of Norway and the Battle of France still hold.[11]

The Nazis will think twice before spreading pestilence and starvation in western Europe so long as they can avoid it easily. But if their plans go awry, if starvation does impend, they would and could manage so that famine would proceed in concentric rings from the extremest rim toward the German center of the fortress. In this process they would dispose of the lives of the 150 million hostages they now hold without batting an eye. This is their true advantage from the conquest of the Continent.

The blockade impedes the wheels of Hitler's war machine; but that machine is not going to be halted for lack of food or raw materials. The present Nazi domain contains too large resources for that, so long as they are exploited by the skilful politico-economists who drew up the blueprints of the Nazi economic tyranny. The Nazi machine will be defeated only by superior diplomacy, superior steadfastness and superior military strength.

[11] Karl Brandt, "Germany Behind the Blockade," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1940.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DEMOSTHENES REDIVIVUS

A Page from the Record of Isolationism

By Frederick H. Cramer

WE WRITE of the year 355 B.C. Pericles was dead, but his Acropolis stood. So did Athenian democracy. The age of the great tragic poets was past, but the age of the great philosophers had arrived. There lived in Athens Plato, an old man by now, his young and brilliant disciple Aristotle, and a very old man born at the height of the great Periclean age, Isocrates. The political power of Athens might be on the wane, but her magic cultural fires were still burning brightly. Her ancient rival Sparta was already rapidly sinking into well-deserved obscurity, while her neighbor Thebes, after a brief period of hegemony in Greek affairs, had lost her great political leaders, Pelopidas and Epaminondas. On the whole, the Greek world presented a spectacle familiar to all Athenians for many generations: a multitude of small states, mostly under republican governments, some local leagues, and a few major Powers, none of which had proved itself capable of securing a permanent ascendancy over the others. The political picture seemed, therefore, one of relative stability and even stagnation.

But in the realm of economics, progress towards an intensely capitalistic social order had greatly changed the standard of living and expanded the commercial interests of the leading bourgeoisie in all except the most backward Greek states. This trend was especially noticeable at Athens, always the most international-minded among the Greek cities. The widening horizons of thought and culture in Athens helped swell the chorus of those who asked for a political unit larger than the age-old city-state. Isocrates, for one, had been foremost in advocating a closer federation among the Greek states, a Pan Hellenic "union now." But his appeal had been without results.

Yet the trend of social and economic developments was inescapably toward some sort of unification. Twice it had seemed the destiny of Athens to effect a large-scale federation of democratic states through a confederacy for common defense. But twice Athens had failed to solve the problem created by her preeminent power within the confederacy: she had proved so harsh

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a master that time and again her "allies" had wrecked it by rebellious secession. The Delic League, the first of Athens' two attempts, had died in the Peloponnesian War. A second confederacy, again under Athenian leadership, had come into being as the power of Sparta weakened. But now, in 355 B.C., Athens was faced once more with her failure to make democracy work within her federation. Its most important members, among them Rhodes and Byzantium, had risen in rebellion against the overbearing sister-republic. After securing foreign allies, they had — in 357 B.C. — successfully defied Athenian efforts to bring them back into the confederacy by force of arms.

In consequence, the economy as well as the prestige of Athens had received a serious blow. Retrenchment became the order of the day. The ambitious imperialistic policy, no longer popular among the people, gave way before the growing strength of isolationist sentiment; and this sentiment was carefully fostered by the wealthier class, resentful of the heavy burden of taxes and civic duties imposed upon it by the war. Thus, for the first time in its history, a policy of political isolation became the guiding principle of Athenian statesmanship.

II

It would be very simple to continue by saying that after the abdication of Athens some other Power was destined to achieve the political unification of the Greek world and that consequently Philip of Macedon, by completing the task which the city-states had failed to accomplish, was but the willing tool of the *Weltgeist*. Generations of German historians from Droysen to Drerup and Kahrstedt have made this point. Observing that Germany was unified, not by the liberals, but by the armies of Prussia, these historians, all too prone to generalize, concluded that the Athenian democracy — because it was a democracy — had been foredoomed to failure at a similar task and that only brute force, as personified in the military and political genius of King Philip, could succeed. It is significant that the latest German writer on this subject, Jaeger, has thoroughly disagreed with the general school of thought among German historians on this point, and it is perhaps even more worthy of note that the French historians up to Clemenceau and Cloché never adopted the defeatist point of view with regard to Athenian policies between 355 and 338 B.C. At any rate, it is impossible to maintain that Athens went

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unseeing towards her doom, that once having adopted isolationist policies she never had an opportunity to make a stand before being engulfed by the Macedonian tidal wave of the future.

Never did the gods present the ancient world with a more agonizing, a more dramatic, combat between the two irrevocably conflicting principles of policy: isolationism or collective action. That Athens, the foremost democracy of antiquity, was the protagonist in this drama makes the lesson the more poignant, the more significant, for us today. One boon the gods did grant Athens, however, even though they failed to save her. They gave her a man to speak up for democracy, to speak up with the fervor of a biblical prophet and warn his fellow citizens to prepare while there was yet time. It was he who saw in Philip of Macedon a deadly menace long before his countrymen had understood that this time they were dealing with no mere ambitious semi-barbarian chieftain far away in the north. It was he, Demosthenes, who long before the Macedonian giant was bestriding the trembling Greek world warned that this was no time for bickering between the democratic city-states, no time for any one of them to remain aloof whenever in the Hellenic orbit a democracy sought to overthrow a dictatorial régime or was attacked by an aggressor Power. It was Demosthenes, the Athenian, who spoke up for the very Rhodians who but recently had fought their way out of the Athenian confederacy. Let us hear in his own words Demosthenes' appeal to the Athenian assembly to come to the aid of the democrats of Rhodes in their struggle against an oligarchic tyranny. And let us remember that not Spain in 1936 but ancient Rhodes formed the subject of his discourse:

> Seeing that Chios and Mytilene are ruled by oligarchs, and that Rhodes and, I might almost say, all the world are now being seduced into this form of slavery, I am surprised that none of you conceives that *our* constitution too is in danger, nor draws the conclusion that if all other states are organized on oligarchical principles, it is impossible that they should leave your democracy alone. For they know that none but you will bring freedom back again, and of course they want to destroy the source from which they are expecting ruin to themselves. . . . When men overthrow free constitutions . . . I urge you to regard them as the common enemies of all who love freedom. . . . You, living under a democracy, should show the same sympathy for democracies in distress as you would expect others to show for you, if ever — which God forbid! — you were in the same plight.[1]

[1] All quotations from the speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines in this article are taken from the Loeb Classics edition (Greek and English version).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This ringing challenge to Athenian isolationism by a young man of barely thirty years was no mere tirade. Demosthenes knew full well that he was going counter to the convictions of the majority of the assembly, not only because they favored an isolationist foreign policy in general but also because of their natural unwillingness, in this particular instance, to aid those very Rhodians who so recently had fought a bitter war against them. But Demosthenes saw beyond the present:

> I observe that some of you are wont to dismiss Philip as a person of no account, but to speak with awe of the King [of Persia] as formidable. . . . If we are not to stand up to the one because he is contemptible, and if we yield to the other because he is formidable, against whom, Athenians, shall we ever marshal our forces?

It is worthy of note that Demosthenes, who probably penned his *First Philippic* in the same year (351 B.C.), did not share the widespread notion that Philip was contemptible. Launching a frontal attack against the organized isolationist forces then dominating Athenian politics, Demosthenes declared, in this same speech *For the Liberty of the Rhodians:*

> You have got to defeat in your debates the faction that deliberately opposes the interests of your city. . . . Owing to this opposition, you can get nothing done without a struggle. . . . There are many politicians who recklessly take up this position.

Demosthenes distinguished sharply between the two groups furnishing the isolationist leadership: the "honest fools" and their anti-democratic allies. But as in our day, the isolationists succeeded without much trouble in defeating the farsighted program of lining up all the Greek democracies in a common defense front against their enemies wherever they might attack.

III

Undaunted, Demosthenes continued his attacks. If Athens was unwilling to seek solidarity among the democracies, let her at least, he pleaded, beware of a menace rising in the far north, a menace that in time would imperil both the political power and the democratic institutions of Athens. Seeing this clearly, Demosthenes demanded from the assembly a policy aimed to check Macedon's rising military power while it was still vulnerable:

> If in the past their [the isolationists'] advice had been sound, there would be no need for deliberation today. . . . Your affairs are in this evil plight just

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

because you, men of Athens, utterly fail to do your duty. . . . Do not believe that his [Philip's] present power is fixed and unchangeable like that of a god. No, men of Athens, he is a mark for the hatred and fear and envy even of those who now seem devoted to him. One must assume that even his adherents are subject to the same passions as other men. At present, however, all these feelings are repressed and have no outlet, thanks to your indolence and apathy, which I urge you to throw off at once.

At this juncture the logical policy for Athens would have been to arm in order to cope with any emergency that might arise — and this was the keynote struck throughout this *First Philippic*. But, asked the isolationists, why arm? Macedonia was far away. The only ones to feel the Macedonian sword had been barbarian Balkan tribes and a few Greek colonies on the Chalcidic shores. Other Macedonian kings had had their fling in that remote region without any threat to Greece proper. Against this comfortable interpretation of history Demosthenes exclaimed:

Observe, Athenians, the height to which the fellow's insolence has soared: he leaves you no choice of action or inaction; he blusters and talks big, according to all accounts; he cannot rest content with what he has conquered; he is always taking in more, everywhere casting his net round us, while we sit idle and do nothing.

When, Athenians, will you take the necessary action? What are you waiting for? Until you are compelled, I presume. . . . Or are you content to run around and ask one another, "Is there any news today? . . ." "Is Philip dead?" you ask. "No, indeed, but he is very ill." And what is that to you? Even if something happens to him, you will soon raise up a second Philip, if that is the way you attend to your affairs; for even this Philip has not grown great through his own unaided strength so much as through our carelessness.

It must have been difficult for any honest isolationist to close his ears to this logic. But there was still the other group, the appeasers, hell-bent on peace at any price. They would concede that Philip might be a pretty important fellow, but surely he would never be able to invade Athens. Was not Macedonia very far away? To this Demosthenes replied:

If Philip did nothing more, but were willing to rest satisfied with what he has already captured and subdued, I believe some of you would be quite content with what must bring the deepest disgrace upon us and brand us as a nation of cowards. But by always attempting something new, always grasping at more power, he may possibly rouse even you, if you have not utterly abandoned hope. . . . Surely it is obvious that he will not stop, unless someone stops him. And is that what we are to wait for?

Two main problems faced the anti-isolationists in their campaign to get Athens to adopt an adequate defense program: the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cost and the method. Rearmament meant higher taxes. It meant the curtailment of numerous services and amenities provided by the Athenian republic for its citizens. It meant, in short, lowering the living standard of the mass of the voters. At the same time, it also meant the introduction of compulsory military service in order to provide the necessary manpower. True, in former times it had been the duty of every Athenian citizen to bear arms for his country. The hoplites who had won the day at Marathon, the crews and marines who had triumphed at Salamis, had been Athenian citizens conscripted for the defense of their democracy. But those were the dim days of the glorious past. In the prosperous present, Athens preferred to hire mercenaries whenever fighting men were needed.

Nor is it difficult to understand the dogged way in which the average voter, no less than the isolationists and appeasers, opposed the defense program, with its threat to conscript both manpower and capital. Anyone who has followed the debates in the United States Congress can readily picture the epithets hurled against Demosthenes by the assembly — "interventionist," "warmonger," "revolutionary." How, they asked, could he prove that Philip harbored any designs against the security of Athens? As for them, they were convinced that no sensible person would suspect Philip of plotting to dominate the whole Greek world. Why then, they demanded, should Athens embark on a costly war overseas? Demosthenes replied:

> Truly, men of Athens, I do think that Philip is drunk with the magnitude of his achievements and dreams of further triumphs, when, elated by his success, he finds that there is none to bar his way; but I cannot for a moment believe that he is deliberately acting in such a way that all the fools of Athens know what he is going to do next. . . . But if, putting rumors aside, we recognize that this man is *our* enemy, who has for years been robbing and insulting us, that wherever we once hoped to find help we have found hindrance, that the future lies in our own hands, and if we refuse to fight now in Thrace, we shall perhaps be forced to fight here at home — if, I say, we recognize these facts, then we shall have done with idle words and shall come to a right decision. Our business is not to speculate on what the future may bring forth, but to be certain that it will bring disaster, unless you face the facts and consent to do your duty.

"*Consent to do your duty*" — is there a better way to describe the working of the democratic process in times of stress? But the people of Athens did *not* consent. They did not think it their duty to make the financial and personal sacrifices necessary to safe-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guard their democracy. They saw no emergency. Their standard of living was too dear to them. And consequently they dismissed the warning of the *First Philippic* as the hysteria of a well-meaning but misguided citizen. Athenian isolationism had put another feather in its cap.

IV

While the Athenians wrangled over their defense problem, Philip blithely continued his mopping-up operations among his neighbors. His military machine had reached such a state of efficiency that it was ready for combat with major Powers beyond the orbit of Macedon. The last neighbor capable of offering any resistance to his expansion was Olynthos, a city not far from the site of modern Salonika. Now it so happened that at that time the democratic government of Olynthos was beset by numerous enemies both within and without. Pursuing his customary policy, Philip exploited this situation to the full. When he deemed the strength of his Fifth Column within Olynthos to be sufficient, he struck:

I wonder — exclaimed Demosthenes in his *First Olynthiac* — if any one of you in this audience watches and notes the steps by which Philip, weak at first, has grown so powerful. First he seized Amphipolis, next Pydna, then Potidaea, after that Methone, lastly he invaded Thessaly. Then having settled Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia, and the rest of that country to suit his purposes, off he went to Thrace, and there, after evicting some of the chiefs and installing others, he fell sick. On his recovery, he did not relapse into inactivity, but instantly assailed Olynthos.

Immediately, Olynthos appealed to her sister democracy for aid. Once more, a battle royal ensued at Athens between the isolationists and their foes led by Demosthenes. But this time it was not unfriendly Rhodes appealing for democratic solidarity. This time it was Olynthos, the last major bulwark against Macedonian penetration into the heart of Greece. One would have thought that the men of Athens, observing the steady march of Philip, could no longer have blinded themselves to the effects a defeat of Olynthos must have on their own city. Yet, with the doggedness of the doomed, they continued to insist that anything was better than to commit the mortal sin of preventive war. No Athenian boys were to be ploughed under on overseas battlefields! And what did the spokesman of the "warmongers" reply?

The present crisis . . . calls on you, almost with an audible voice. . . . But, I confess, our attitude puzzles me. My own idea would be to vote for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an expedition at once, to make instant preparations for its dispatch, thus avoiding our previous blunder. . . . Our chief ground for alarm is that this man [Philip], so unscrupulous, so quick to seize his opportunity . . . misrepresenting us and our failure to intervene, may divert to his own purpose and wrest from us something of vital importance.

Quite clearly these were the arguments of an interventionist. For the defense of Athens herself, Demosthenes advocated a military expedition overseas. But again the isolationist chorus uttered the familiar refrain: "Beware of interventionist propaganda. The Olynthian war is but another imperialist struggle in which both sides strive for selfish aims. Hands off!" To be sure, no Athenian isolationist went so far as to introduce a resolution into the assembly requiring both belligerents to state their war aims — after all, in 2300 years the world has progressed in every field, even in that of pure folly! But the strength of the sentiment of "hands-off, it's only another imperialist war," can be gauged from the effort of the interventionists to overcome it. Declared their leader:

The eyes of the Olynthians are opened to the fact that they are now fighting not for glory, not for a strip of territory, but to avert the overthrow and enslavement of their fatherland. They know how he [Philip] treated those . . . who betrayed their country . . . and those who opened their gates to him. And a despotism, I take it, is as a rule mistrusted by free countries, especially when they are near neighbors. . . . Make up your minds; rouse your spirits; put your heart into the war, now or never. Pay your contributions cheerfully; serve in person; leave nothing to chance. You have no longer the shadow of an excuse for shirking your duty. . . . You must not let slip the opportunity that offers, nor make the blunder you have so often made before. . . . If we had . . . shown the required zeal in marching to the help of the first that appealed, we should have found Philip today much more humble and accommodating.

Unfortunately we always neglect the present chance and imagine that the future will right itself, and so . . . Philip has to thank us for his prosperity. We have raised him to a greater height than ever ruler of Macedon reached before. Today this opportunity comes to us from the Olynthians unsought, a fairer opportunity than we have ever had before. . . . If we leave these men too in the lurch . . . and then Olynthos is crushed by Philip, tell me what is to prevent him from marching henceforward just where he pleases.

But it took real vision to perceive the truth of these words. The law of human inertia, the psychological habit of assuming that it *cannot* happen because it *has not* happened, has always been the most powerful prop of isolationism. Why should the Athenians move a finger? The present was so sweet, and life was so comfortable. But, admonished Demosthenes:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We may find that we have paid a heavy price for our indolence, and because we consult our own pleasure in everything, may hereafter come to be forced to do many of the difficult things for which we had no liking, and may finally endanger our possessions here in Athens itself.

Philip, he conceded, had risen higher than any of his Macedonian predecessors. But had his position become so secure, was he already so powerful that resistance would be futile? Did he represent the inevitable wave of the future?

His present prospects are not so bright or satisfactory as they seem and as a superficial observer might pronounce them; nor would he ever have provoked this war had he thought that he would be bound to fight himself. He hoped that on his first entry he would carry all before him, and he finds himself completely mistaken. This unforeseen result confounds and discourages him. . . . We must assume that [the recently subjugated nations] would prefer freedom and independence to slavery. They are not accustomed to acknowledge a master, and Philip by all accounts is a particularly harsh one. . . . Look then, Athenians, upon his difficulties as your opportunity. Be prompt to take up the challenge. Send embassies when necessary. Take the field in person. Rouse all the other states. Reflect how eagerly Philip would march against you, if he had such a chance as we have, and if the war were on *our* frontiers. Are you not ashamed if, having the opportunity, you lack the courage to do to him what he would certainly do to you if he could?

Do not forget that you can today choose whether you must fight there or Philip must fight here. If Olynthos holds out, you will fight there, to the detriment of *his* territory, while you enjoy in security the land that is your home. But if he takes Olynthos, who is to prevent his marching hither? . . . "But, my friend," cries someone, "he will not wish to attack us." Nay, it would be a crowning absurdity if, having the power, he should lack the will to carry out the threat which today he utters at the risk of his reputation for sanity.

It is the duty of all of you to grasp the significance of these facts, and to send out an expedition that shall thrust back the war into Macedon. It is the duty of the well-to-do that spending but a fraction of the wealth they so happily possess they may enjoy the residue in security; of our fighters, that gaining experience of war on Philip's soil, they may prove the formidable guardians of an inviolate fatherland; of the statesmen, that they may give a ready account of their stewardship.

"All aid to Olynthos," such was the quintessence of these concluding passages of the *First Olynthiac*. Not merely aid short-of-war, but all-out aid. And not out of the goodness of the Athenian heart, not for platonic love of democracy abroad, but in order to protect Athenian democracy at home by defending it abroad. But would Demosthenes at last convince the assembly? It almost seemed so. Resolutions were passed for an Athenian alliance with Olynthos, the raising of an expeditionary force, and the estab-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lishment of a special war chest. But the isolationists, hard pressed though they were, did not give up. They went to work and cut down the "all-aid-to-Olynthos" program to a mere trickle of men and arms. Demosthenes, far from taking this cold sabotage supinely, insisted on reminding the Athenian assembly once more of what was at stake:

> That Philip has found men willing to fight him, situated at his frontiers and possessed of considerable power, above all so determined that they regard any accommodation with him as both delusive and fatal to their own country — this has all the appearance of a superhuman, a divine beneficence. So the time has come, men of Athens, to look to it that we do not prove more unfriendly to ourselves than circumstances have been, for we shall show ourselves the meanest of mankind, if we abandon . . . the very allies that fortune has raised for us and the chances she throws in our way.

To those average voters who followed the isolationists in believing that Philip was just another local upstart, Demosthenes declared in his *Second Olynthiac:*

> Glory is his sole object and ambition; in action and in danger he has elected to suffer whatever may befall him, putting before a life of safety the distinction of achieving what no other king of Macedon ever achieved. But his subjects have no share in the glory that results. They are perpetually buffeted and wearied and distressed by these expeditions north and south, never suffered to give their time to their business or private affairs, never able to dispose of such produce as they can raise. . . . Philip . . . wants to have the credit himself of every action, among his many faults being an insatiable ambition.

No, Philip was no ordinary local dictator. His aims already encompassed the whole of Greece; tomorrow the world itself would be the limit of his ambition. This was no time for politicians to haggle, for democratic complacency, for worrying about taxation and debt-limits, for heated debates on the division of powers. In the words of Demosthenes:

> We sit here doing nothing. But one who is himself idle cannot possibly call upon his friends . . . to work for him. No wonder that Philip, sharing himself in the toils of the campaign, present at every action, neglecting no chance and wasting no season, gets the better of us, while we procrastinate and pass resolutions and ask questions . . . . The outcome is strife and contention among yourselves, some taking this side and some that, while the interests of the state suffer . . . . If you authorize one class of men to issue orders . . . and force another class to equip the navy and pay the war-tax and serve in the field, while yet a third class has no other public duty than to vote the condemnation of the latter, you will never get anything essential done at the right time. There will always be some class with a grievance, who will fail you, and then it will be your privilege to punish them instead of the enemy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That third class, always voting in condemnation of others' policies — who were they but the inveterate isolationists opposing every effort to cope effectively with the Macedonian menace? It is significant that Demosthenes did not accuse them of voting against their better knowledge. Instead, he bent all his strength to establish a common national front against the evergrowing Macedonian threat. Once more, a shortlived burst of energy followed his heroic appeal for unity. Further levies were raised to go to the aid of Olynthos. But the whole defense program was struck a death blow when the financial measures proposed to implement it were declared unconstitutional. And yet this unconstitutional program, had it been executed, would probably have saved the democratic constitution of Athens.

Meanwhile, the defenders of that city were fighting on two fronts: against Philip who was hammering at their gates, and against his fifth column, the anti-democratic elements who were undermining morale from within. In the end, these Quislings induced a sizable body of Olynthian troops to go over to Philip. But before this came to pass, the anti-isolationist forces at Athens gathered for a last attempt to rescue Olynthos. Their spokesman, Demosthenes, must have felt sick at heart to hold forth on the same topic again, with the same arguments and against the same odds. The tone of his *Third Olynthiac* is more somber than that of the first two, the glow of his words of a darker hue; but the flame of his patriotism shines forth as brightly as ever:

> I observe that the speeches are all about punishing Philip, while our affairs have reached a stage at which it must be our first concern to avoid disaster ourselves. . . . Athens once had the chance both of establishing her power and of punishing Philip. . . . Now, however, I am persuaded that we must be content to secure the first, that of saving our allies. . . . Never was there a crisis that demanded more careful handling than the present. . . . The popularity-hunting of some of our orators has led us into this desperate predicament. . . .
>
> Well, what is done cannot be undone; but now . . . what remains, men of Athens, but to help them with *all* your power and energy? I see no alternative. For . . . if we shirk our responsibilities, I see not a little danger, men of Athens, for the future, if the Thebans maintain their present attitude towards us, and the Phocians have come to the end of their money, and there is nothing to hinder Philip, when he has crushed his present foe, from turning his arms against Attica. But surely if any one of you would postpone the necessary action till then he must prefer to see danger at his very doors, rather than hear of it far away, and to beg help for himself, when he might be lending help

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to others now; for I suppose we all realize that that is what it will come to, if we throw away our present chances. . . . Our statesmen in peace have lost us the allies we gained in war.

"But," says an objector, "if our foreign policy has failed, there is great improvement in domestic affairs." And to what can you point in proof? To the walls we are whitewashing, the streets we are paving, the water-works, and the balderdash? Look rather at the men whose statesmanship has produced these results!

Let the benighted isolationists point with pride to their achievements — their roads, their W.P.A. and their relief appropriations — but let the people of Athens realize that they are in for a rude awakening. Already a certain malaise had spread through the nation. There was lightning on the horizon, and the sound of battle, where democratic Olynthos stood fighting for her very life against the rising tide of Macedonian militarism. The Athenians, becoming restless, began to compare the glorious days of the past, of Miltiades and Themistocles, with the ominous present. They asked, why did things then go well that now went amiss? Replied Demosthenes:

Because then the people, having the courage to act and to fight, controlled the politicians. . . . Now, on the contrary, the politicians hold the purse-strings and manage everything, while you, the people, robbed of nerve and sinew, stripped of wealth and of allies, have sunk to the level of lackeys and hangers-on, content if the politicians gratify you with a dole. . . . They have mewed you up . . . and entice you with these baits, that they may keep you tame and subservient to the whip. . . . If, therefore, even at the eleventh hour, you can shake off these habits, and consent to fight and act as becomes Athenians and to devote the abundant resources that you have at home to the attainment of success abroad . . . I call on you to do that for yourselves . . . and not to desert that post of honor, men of Athens, which your ancestors through many glorious hazards won and bequeathed to you.

A poorly stifled yawn from the isolationists! Why does this fellow always bring up those old stories? War, after all, is rapidly going out of fashion. And if there is fighting to be done, one can hire mercenaries to do it. Beware, this spokesman of the warmongers is dangerous. Does he not advocate a general conscription of the male population for forced labor as well as for military service? Such regimentation is undemocratic. Let's vote it down.

And so they did. Not until two years later was a special war tax introduced. To save their *face* the Athenians did indeed dispatch a somewhat greater military force to the aid of Olynthos, but only to have it arrive on the scene of battle just in time to learn that Olynthos had fallen, that it had been wiped off the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

face of the earth, that its inhabitants had been sold into slavery, that another democracy had been obliterated. Now had come the time for the Athenian isolationists to reap the rewards of their folly — and they were not to their liking. Now they at last awakened to the fact that Athens was the next in line. Hurriedly, embassies were dispatched to her neighbors, the Peloponnesian states, asking their support in the crisis now so close at hand. The ambassadors met with an icy reception. In vain did they plead. The Athenian record was too devastating. Most of the states preferred Philip's assurances of peace to an alliance with a democracy that had let down the other democracies one after another. Completely isolated, Athens had no choice. Trying to make the best of it, she substituted for her policy of isolationism the even more fatal one of appeasement.

V

Olynthos had fallen. Its citizens filled the slave-marts of Greece. The Greeks were shocked; but their capitalists bought the slaves, splendid men, women and children. A few, among them Demosthenes, redeemed as many of these unfortunates as their private funds would permit. Even the young and coming isolationist Aeschines professed his shocked bewilderment upon encountering a gang of Olynthian slaves with their new master. But he evidently failed to make a proper connection between cause and effect. Athens, thanks to her isolationist policy, now had no choice but to give in, and Demosthenes participated in the first embassy sent to inquire of Philip the terms on which he would make peace — a strictly negotiated peace, of course.

Upon its return to Athens the embassy reported that Philip's terms formed no cause for alarm. Athens herself had nothing to fear. Indeed, Philip was even more gracious than might have been expected. Having perceived that Athenian policy until very recently had aimed at carefully staying out of wars and entangling alliances, Philip was only too glad to encourage this tendency and to assist its advocates, the Athenian isolationists, to achieve their goal even more completely than they might have wished. For the main clause of the proposed treaty demanded that Athens should cease to take any interest in the fate of those Greek states then engaged in war with Philip, that in other words she should just forget about her natural allies, especially the Phocians. Now it so happened that it was the Phocians who controlled the all-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important pass of Thermopylae, the only route for a major invasion, on land, against Athens. But, despite the all-pervading enthusiasm for appeasement, the Athenian assembly refused to swallow this clause. After ratifying the remainder of the treaty, they sent a second embassy to Philip in the hope of obtaining his assent to disregard this provision for enforcing Athenian isolation and making it complete.

Demosthenes did not share the illusions of his fellow-citizens — he knew Philip too well. Nevertheless, to preserve at least the appearance of national unity, he again went along with the others. The ambassadors fared ill. Even while they were on their way, Philip had achieved another major victory, this time in Thrace. The countryside through which they travelled showed signs of great military preparations — against the Phocians, they were told. When they saw Philip, he was amiable, but non-committal. The isolationist majority understood him to promise not to extend his military operations into the heart of Greece, *i.e.* against the Phocians, without consulting the Athenians. Yet how could any Athenian seriously have entertained such a thought? Even the manner in which Philip finally ratified the treaty, *with* that sinister clause in it, ought to have warned the ambassadors to beware: only after they had trailed him as far as Pherae in Thessaly did he deign to go through the formalities of ratification.

Back again to Athens travelled the weary men. In a desperate appeal Demosthenes denounced the sham-treaty, warned against this sort of appeasement and beseeched the Athenians not to leave the Phocians to the tender mercies of Philip. He did not speak for love of the Phocians; he spoke for love of Athens. Did not the Phocians control the all-important defile of Thermopylae, the gateway to Athens? And what if Philip went back on his vague oral promise not to attack Phocis without first consulting Athens? Could anyone seriously trust him in a life-and-death matter like this?

But against Demosthenes rose Aeschines, the glib appeaser. In eloquent terms he praised the value of peace, of that peace he had brought home, truly a peace with honor. Philip, he exclaimed, was a gentleman. He would never go back on his word. And thus, within three days after the return of the embassy, the Athenians formally advised the Phocians to surrender their stronghold, Delphi, the religious center of Greece. The Phocians understood. They knew that they were lost. But if Athens had calculated that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Phocians, feeling themselves completely forsaken, would quietly surrender Delphi to her while still maintaining a garrison at Thermopylae, she was quickly and disastrously disillusioned. Within a week the Phocians did indeed surrender, but to Philip; and they surrendered not merely Delphi but Thermopylae as well. Those who lived through the agony of Munich will sympathize with Demosthenes and his friends. But for the moment nothing could be done. The peace with Philip stood, bearing the name of Philocrates, a member of the embassy. It is fitting that he was discovered shortly afterwards to be in Philip's pay.

In the depth of defeat the anti-isolationists did not give up. For the first time, a strong undercurrent of popular feeling came to their aid. Now, when the Phocians were being punished by Philip with unheard of severity, when the Macedonian armies controlled the roads leading towards the Athenian border, when Athens stood humiliated before the world, the Athenians belatedly realized to what a pass their isolationism had brought them. Demands for a thorough house-cleaning grew. Yet Aeschines, like his counterparts among the modern isolationists, was quick to discover in the policy of his opponents insidious perils to democratic institutions and in himself a paragon of democratic virtue. In his speech *Against Timarchos* he declared:

> Autocracies and oligarchies are administered according to the temper of their lords, but democratic states according to established laws. . . . Therefore you, who have a government based upon equality and law, must guard against those [Demosthenes and his friends] whose words violate the laws or whose lives have defied them. . . . Did you not put to death Socrates, the sophist, fellow citizens, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias . . . who put down democracy, and after that, shall Demosthenes succeed . . . Demosthenes who takes such vengeance on private citizens and friends of the people for their freedom of speech? . . . He will . . . find fault with the peace which was brought about through Philocrates and myself, until he shall call out such bursts of applause from the jurors that I will not even face him in the court-room . . . but will consider myself lucky if I get off with a moderate fine instead of being punished with death.

These words clearly marked the beginning of the twilight of Athenian isolationism. The only problem that remained was this: Had Athens still time to undo what her isolationists had done?

A final showdown had manifestly become inevitable. The years from 346 to 340 B.C. were characterized by the indefatigable efforts of the Athenians to escape from their self-built prison of isolation. Once more, Demosthenes visited the Peloponnesian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states in an attempt to line them up with Athens for "the day" to come. He failed. Protests against his activities were delivered in Athens, not only from Philip, but from Greek states like Argos and Messene who feared a rapprochement between Athens and Sparta, their hereditary enemy. Demosthenes was put on the defensive. But he rose to the occasion. He used the opportunity thus offered to rivet into the minds of the Athenians the realization that the peace they were enjoying was but an armistice, a long armistice, at the end of which a reckoning was bound to come:

> If anyone views with confidence the present power of Philip and the extent of his dominions, if anyone imagines that all this imports no danger to our city and that you are not the object of his preparations, I must express my astonishment, and beg you all alike to listen to a brief statement of the considerations that have led me to form the opposite conclusion and to regard Philip as our enemy. . . .
>
> Guided in his calculations by ambition and the desire of universal dominion, regardless of the claims of peace and quietness and justice, Philip rightly saw that to our state and our national character he could offer nothing, he could do nothing that would tempt you from selfish motives to sacrifice to him any of the other Greek states, but that you, reverencing justice, shrinking from the discredit involved in such transactions, and exercising due and proper forethought, would resist any such attempt on his part as stoutly as if you were actually at war with him. . . . By his very acts you stand judged the one and only power in the world incapable of abandoning the common rights of the Greeks at any price, incapable of bartering your devotion to their cause for any favor or any profit. . . .
>
> Everything, if correctly observed, points to the fact that all his intrigues are directed against Athens. . . . He knows, then, these two facts — that he is intriguing against you and that you are aware of it. Assuming that you are intelligent, he thinks you are bound to hate him, and he is on the alert, expecting some blow to fall, if you can seize an opportunity and if he cannot get in his blow first. That is why he is wide-awake and ready to strike, and why he is courting certain people to the detriment of our country. He imagines that their cupidity will lead them to accept the present situation while their natural dullness will prevent them from foreseeing anything that may follow. . . .
>
> But there is one common bulwark which the instinct of sensible men possesses within itself, a good and safe one for all, but invaluable for democracies against tyrants. And what is that bulwark? It is mistrust. Guard that; hold fast to that. If you preserve it, no harm can touch you. What is your object? . . . Freedom. Then do you not see that Philip's very titles are utterly irreconcilable with that? For . . . every despot is the sworn foe of freedom and of law. Beware . . . lest, seeking to be rid of war, you find a master.

But the process of awakening the Athenians to the threat to their freedom was painfully slow. It was a far cry from the days of Marathon. Demosthenes sensed the gathering storm. He

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knew that peace between the forces of despotism and democracy is only an armistice. He differed sharply from the genial appeasers who still believed that the peace of Philocrates had warded off the danger of a finish fight between democratic Athens and despotic Philip. To offset this complacency Demosthenes warned:

> You . . . are compassed about with plots and snares, you will . . . find to your surprise that, through having nothing done in time, you have submitted to everything. . . . It would indeed have been fair . . . to call upon those who conveyed to you Philip's promises, on the strength of which you were induced to conclude the peace. . . . Yes, and there are others who ought to be called upon. Whom do I mean? The men who, when peace was made and when I . . . spoke out and protested . . . told you that I, being a teetotaler, was naturally a disagreeable, cross-grained fellow, and that Philip . . . would do just what you would pray for. . . .
>
> I do not wish to indulge in idle talk. But I think that one day Philip's policy will cause you more distress than it does now, for I see the plot thickening. I hope I may prove a false prophet, but I fear the catastrophe is even now only too near. . . . While the danger is in the future and gathering head, while we can still hear one another speak, I want to remind each one of you, who . . . it is that has forced you to take counsel, not for your rights and interests abroad, but for your possessions here at home and for the war in Attica, a war which will bring distress on every one of us, when it does come, but which really dates from that very day. For if you had not been hoodwinked then, there would be no anxiety in Athens, because Philip could never, of course, have gained command of the sea . . . nor could have marched past Thermopylae and Phocis. . . . May all the gods forbid that my warnings should ever be brought to the sternest test!

It was not to be. The conflict had become irrepressible, and gradually the majority of the Athenian voters were coming to recognize that the issue had to be faced. The three years which probably intervened between the *Second Philippic* and the *Third Philippic* (presumably delivered in 341 B.C.) mark a definite turning of the tide. Aeschines, apparently brought to trial at last, escaped conviction by so slim a margin that the verdict amounted to a moral condemnation. Philocrates shortly after the *Second Philippic* had been unmasked as a paid traitor and in 343 B.C. had fled into exile. The salutary effect of this house-cleaning was noticeable. The war fund, established in the Olynthic crisis but never supported with sufficient appropriations, was not set up in earnest. This time, when Byzantium (another city that had forcibly seceded from the Athenian confederacy a decade before) appealed for aid against Philip, the response of Athens was quite different from that which met the appeal from Rhodes. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assembly now listened with sympathetic attention to the plea of Demosthenes to keep Philip busy near the Dardanelles and thus prevent him from becoming active in central Greece:

Since the conclusion of the peace . . . all our interests have been completely betrayed and sacrificed . . . I do not think they could have been in a worse condition than they are to-day. Perhaps, indeed, this condition of our affairs may be attributed to many causes and not just to one or two, but a careful examination will convince you that it is above all due to those who study to win your favor rather than to give you the best advice. Some of them, . . . interested in maintaining a system which brings them credit and influence, have no thought for the future, while others, by blaming and traducing those in authority, make it their sole aim that our state shall concentrate on punishing her own citizens, while Philip shall be free to say and do whatever he pleases . . .

If indeed Athens can remain at peace and if the choice rests with us . . . I personally feel that we are bound to do so . . .; but if there is another person concerned, with sword in hand and a mighty force at his back, who imposes on you with the name of peace but himself indulges in acts of war, what is left but to defend ourselves? If you choose to follow his example and profess that you are at peace, I raise no objection. But if anyone mistakes for peace an arrangement which will enable Philip, when he has seized everything else, to march upon us, such a man has taken leave of his senses, and the peace that he talks of is one that you observe towards Philip, but not Philip towards you. That is the advantage which he is purchasing by all his expenditure of money — that *he* should be at war with *you*, but that *you* should not be at war with *him* . . .

Today we call this the "softening-up process." We know it well. But it is no new invention. For years Philip had engaged in it. He had won most of his Greek successes by first undermining the will-to-resist of each of his prospective victims. Nor did he, in the best Blitzkrieg manner, always deign to make an open declaration of war when the softening-up process had been completed. On this point Demosthenes admonished his countrymen:

If we are going to wait for him to acknowledge a state of war with us, we are indeed the simplest of mortals, for even if he marches straight against Attica and the Piraeus, he will not admit it, if we may judge from his treatment of the other states. For take the case of the Olynthians; when he was five miles from their city, he told them there must be one of two things, either they must cease to reside in Olynthos, or he in Macedon, though on all previous occasions, when accused of hostile intentions, he indignantly sent ambassadors to justify his conduct. Again, when he was marching against the Phocians, he still pretended that they were his allies, and Phocian ambassadors accompanied him on his march . . . . And then again quite lately, after entering Thessaly as a friend and ally, he seized Pherae and still retains it. . . . And do you imagine that . . . in your case he will give warning of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hostilities, especially when you are so eager to be deceived? . . . Is there any intelligent man who would let words rather than deeds decide the question who is at peace and who is at war with him? . . . When he lays hands on Megara, sets up tyrannies in Euboea, makes his way, as now, into Thrace, hatches plots in the Peloponnese, and carries out all these operations with his armed force, he is breaking the peace and making war upon you.

I say that you will be wise if you defend yourselves now, but if you let the opportunity pass, you will not be able to act even when you desire to. . . . let your deliberations embrace *all* the Greek states and the great danger that besets them.

The steps of Philip's rise to power were built from the ruins of scores of cities and states. The tragic failure of the Greek states to realize that he was no mere local despot bent on local aggrandizement explains more than anything else why they persevered in their suicidal isolationism until it was too late. His systematic progress had been made possible by this very epidemic of isolationism. This issue between voluntary coöperation and collective slavery has never been more clearly presented, never more brilliantly illuminated, than by Demosthenes, the Athenian.

Neither the Greek nor the barbarian world is big enough for the fellow's ambition. And we Greeks see and hear all this, and yet we do not send embassies to one another and express our indignation. We are in such a miserable position, we have so entrenched ourselves in our different cities, that to this very day we can do nothing that our interest or our duty demands; we cannot combine, we cannot take any common pledge of help or friendship; but we idly watch the growing power of this man, each bent (or so it seems to me) on profiting by the interval afforded by another's ruin, taking not a thought, making not an effort for the salvation of Greece. For that Philip, like the recurrence or attack of a fever or some other disease, is threatening even those who think themselves out of reach, of that not one of you is ignorant . . .

Yet the Greeks see all this and suffer it. They seem to watch him just as they would watch a hailstorm, each praying that it may not come their way, but none making an effort to stay its course. . . . We hesitate one and all, we play the coward, we keep an eye on our neighbors, distrusting one another rather than our common foe. Yet if he treats us all with such brutality, what do you think he will do when he has got each of us separately into his clutches?

The misguided narrowness of the Greek city-states must be set aside for a larger conception, a wider union, a federation however loosely knit of all those with common political, cultural, and social ideals. And lest the armchair generals bemuse the Athenians into thinking that according to the accepted rules of warfare no serious danger could befall them, Demosthenes proclaimed:

For my own part, while practically all the arts have made a great advance and we are living to-day in a very different world from the old one, I

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

consider that nothing has been more revolutionized and improved than the art of war . . . In those days . . . they were so old-fashioned, or rather such good citizens, that they never used money to buy an advantage from anyone, but their fighting was of the fair and open kind. But now you must surely see that most disasters are due to traitors, and none are the result of a regular pitched battle . . .

Since, however, you all know this, you must take it into account and not let the war pass into your own country; you must not come to grief through keeping your eyes fixed on the simple strategy of . . . old . . . but arrange your *political* affairs *and* your *military* preparations so that your line of defense may be as far away from Athens as possible, give him no chance of stirring from his base, and never come to close grips with him . . .

But it is not enough . . . to oppose him with active military measures. . . . You must reflect that it is impossible to defeat the enemies of our city until you have chastised those who within our very walls make themselves their servants. . . . You have granted to these men more security for the pursuance of their policy than to your own defenders. Yet mark what troubles are in store for those who lend an ear to such counsellors . . .

Perhaps you wonder why the people of Olynthos and Eretria and Oreus were more favorably inclined to Philip's advocates than to their own. The explanation is the same as at Athens, that the patriots, however much they desire it, cannot sometimes say anything agreeable, for they are obliged to consider the safety of the state; but the others by their very efforts to be agreeable are playing into Philip's hands. The patriots demanded a war subsidy, the others denied its necessity; the patriots bade them fight on and mistrust Philip, the others bade them keep the peace, until they fell into the snare. . . . It is the same tale everywhere, one party speaking to please their audience, the other giving advice that would have ensured their safety. But at the last there were many things that the people were induced to concede, not for their own gratification nor through ignorance, but gradually yielding because they thought that their discomfiture was inevitable and complete. And . . . that is what I certainly fear will be your experience

Demosthenes warned that there was no ready-made panacea for the plight in which Athens now found herself. Above all, he said, it would be sheer madness to rely upon Philip's good nature.

It is folly and cowardice to cherish such hopes, to follow ill counsel and refuse to perform any fraction of your duties, to lend an ear to the advocates of your enemies and imagine that your city is so great that no conceivable danger can befall it. Ay, and a disgrace too it is to have to say when all is over, "Why! Who would have thought it? For of course we ought to have done this or that, and not so and so." Many things could be named by the Olynthians to-day, which would have saved them from destruction if only they had then foreseen it. . .

So we too, Athenians, as long as we are safe, blessed with a very great city, ample advantages, and the fairest repute — what are we to do? Perhaps some of my hearers have long been eager to ask that question. I solemnly promise that I will answer it and will also move a resolution, for which you can vote

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

if so disposed. To begin with ourselves, we must make provision for our defense, I mean with war-galleys, funds, and men; for even if all other states succumb to slavery, we surely must fight the battle of liberty. Then having completed all these preparations and made our purpose clear, we must lose no time in calling upon the other Greeks . . . so that if you win them over, you may have someone to share your dangers and your expenses . . .

I do not, however, suggest that you should invite the rest, unless you are ready to do for yourselves what is necessary. . . . But I do contend that we must send supplies to the forces in the Chersonese and satisfy all their demands, and while we make preparations ourselves, we must summon, collect, instruct, and exhort the rest of the Greeks. That is the duty of a city with a reputation such as yours enjoys. But if you imagine that Greece will be saved by Chalcidians or Megarians, while you run away from the task, you are wrong. For they may think themselves lucky if they can save themselves separately. But this is a task for you; it was for you that your ancestors won this proud privilege and bequeathed it to you at great and manifold risk. But if every man sits idle, consulting his own pleasure and careful to avoid his own duty, not only will he find no one to do it for him, but I fear that those duties that we wish to shirk may all be forced upon us at once.

There is nothing to add to this eloquent appeal. It produced results, at last. In the words of Plutarch:

But when things came at last to war, . . . the first action he [Demosthenes] put them upon was the reducing of Euboea, which by the treachery of the tyrants, was brought under subjection to Philip. And on his proposition, the decree was voted, and they crossed over thither and chased the Macedonians out of the island. The next was the relief of the Byzantines and the Perinthians, whom the Macedonians at that time were attacking. He persuaded the people to lay aside their enmity against these cities, to forget the offences committed in the Confederate war, and to send them such succors as eventually saved and secured them. Not long after, he undertook an embassy through the states of Greece, which he solicited and so far incensed against Philip that, a few only excepted, he brought them all into a general league. . . . But the hardest task was yet behind, left for Demosthenes, to draw the Thebans into this confederacy with the rest. . . . Now the Thebans, in their consultations, were well enough aware what suited best with their own interest, but everyone had before his eyes the terrors of war.

Thus, to the very last, isolationist pacifism stood in the way of joint action. Demosthenes, however, achieved his greatest triumph by winning even the Thebans over to the side of Athens. But it was too late. The new-born league had no time to implement its treaties. Near the small town of Chaeronea in central Greece the united armies of Thebes and Athens went down to defeat in 338 B.C. Too long had the forces of isolationism, appeasement and reaction been at work. And thus fell Athens.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBERALISM IN JAPAN

By Sir George Sansom

WE who live in democratic states find it hard to understand why it is that people in authoritarian states have in the last decade given up their liberties with so very little struggle. We generally like to believe that they have been tricked into surrender and that, given some help and encouragement from outside, when the time is ripe they will strive to regain the freedom they have lost, will work and fight if need be for a kind of government comparable to our own. In extreme cases we suppose that the economic difficulties and political repression prevalent in these totalitarian states must have produced a potential revolutionary force, and that therefore only a little more hardship, a little more tyranny, are required to bring about an uprising. This belief may turn out to be correct; but so far there is very scanty evidence for it. In authoritarian countries there is no chance for the individual foreign observer to gain accurate knowledge of what the people are thinking. He cannot carry out a poll of opinion. He can only guess at public sentiment from a few haphazard samples; and since he can only guess at what people feel, he is not likely to be a useful prophet as to how they will act.

All these obstacles to political and social diagnosis are multiplied when we come to deal with a country like Japan, with its acute differences in tradition, language, thought and behavior. This no doubt is why the evidence which comes from foreign observers as to the present political temper and aspirations of the Japanese people is extremely various and contradictory. The foreign policy of the Japanese Government is clear enough, and it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the issues between it and the governments of democratic states are now strategical rather than political. What is not so clear is the internal situation in Japan. To understand that, it is necessary for us to rid our minds of a number of misconceptions which arise because we think in terms of our own vocabulary when we discuss Far Eastern affairs. We are inclined to postulate the existence of a numerous class of "liberals," and we are misled by our own use of the word "liberal" into supposing that there is in Japan a school of political thought which approves of democratic institutions and thus somehow corresponds, if only in miniature, to those

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great majorities in the United States or Great Britain which believe in representative government, in freedom of speech and thought, and in a great measure of individual enterprise. A further assumption, no less unjustified, allows us to picture this liberal element in Japanese life as a force hostile to what is called the "military party," as prepared at the appropriate moment to reverse the present totalitarian trend and by some kind of revolutionary process to set up a new, enlightened and prosperous régime with which the democracies can talk business.

There is little in Japan's past history to justify such assumptions. It is true enough that since the Restoration of 1868 there have been short phases of liberalism in internal politics in Japan, but it was liberalism of a type long obsolete in Occidental countries, and events have shown that it had in it no power of growth because it was a borrowed thing, out of harmony with Japan's traditional ways of thinking.

It is by examining those traditional ways that we are most likely to arrive at some knowledge of what the people of Japan are likely to be thinking today. No official reticence can conceal history from the observer. The facts are quite clear. From 1615 or thereabouts Japan was ruled by a feudal oligarchy, which anticipated in many respects the methods of government used by modern totalitarian states. The distinguishing features were there — the rule of a self-constituted élite, the disabilities imposed upon certain classes, the restriction of personal liberty, the sumptuary laws, the monopolies, the censorship, the secret police, and the doctrine that the individual exists for the State. When in 1868 this régime was overthrown it was replaced not by a popular government but by a powerful bureaucracy which — with the adaptations made necessary by Japan's entry into the modern world of international commerce and industry — perpetuated the essential features of totalitarianism. Lest this should be thought a fanciful reading of Japan's political history, it may be well to quote a Japanese authority. Mr. Shiratori, formerly Japanese Ambassador to Rome, and a vigorous proponent of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo pact, wrote in 1938:

> The tide has turned against that liberalism and democracy that once swept over the nation. The once widely accepted theory of government which sees in parliament the real center of power has now been completely rejected and the country is fast reverting to totalitarianism, which has been the fundamental principle of Japan's national life for the past thirty centuries. . . . It

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

makes our hearts warm to see ideas that have influenced our race for centuries in the past embodied in the systems of modern states of Europe.

After making full discount for the extravagance of language which seems to be needed for the expression of totalitarian thought, one can perceive in these statements some useful evidence. In the first place, it is to be noted that Mr. Shiratori was not speaking for the so-called military party. It is a mistake to suppose that there is a split between military and civilian opinion in Japan. Certainly the army has played the greatest part in the development of a planned economy for war purposes, and though opinion is by no means uniform throughout the fighting services the army has been the most important single body in the promotion of a certain kind of national socialist doctrine. But totalitarian ways of thinking have for years past been gaining strength in other branches of government. They have strong adherents in the Departments of the Interior and Education, while the planned and controlled economy which must form the basis of any totalitarian state was originated in the Department of Commerce shortly after the Manchurian adventure of 1931. It is therefore fair to say that for the best part of a decade the most active, if not the most numerous, elements in the bureaucracy have been consciously building up a totalitarian system. The process was hastened, as it was facilitated, by the exigencies of war; but it cannot be said that it encountered any effective opposition either from within the official class or from the parliamentarians who might have been expected to resist it. The bankers and industrialists did, it is true, make some mild objections from time to time, but they retreated little by little and are today under effective control. They have not, perhaps, been so fully subjected to official orders as the German industrialists, but for practical purposes they are now integrated in the machinery of state.

One may safely say of the political and economic itinerary followed by Japan since 1931 that among the ruling classes of Japan there were undoubtedly differences of opinion as to method and timing, as to the route and the speed, but no fundamental disagreement as to destination — Japanese hegemony over Eastern Asia. As for the general public, it was helpless. For even if it had had the will to resist, lacking an effective parliamentary system it had no means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Government. But there is nothing to show that the Japanese

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people did at any particular period in fact desire to resist. The building up of the now almost perfected system of autocratic government was a gradual process, and the points at which resistance might suitably have been offered were not obvious to a public which, far from being in the habit of fighting for its rights, was traditionally disciplined and obedient. Even in a highly developed democracy considerable alertness and insight on the part of the public are required to detect a crucial situation in internal affairs, and those qualities are usually possessed by leaders rather than by the rank and file. In Japan there is no habit of mistrust of authority, no strong disposition to criticize, no protestant tradition, but rather an old ingrained spirit of conformity. Consequently there has not developed in the past an effective body of popular opinion or an experience of popular leadership. So that, even supposing the present rulers of Japan to have imposed their new system on the country against the popular will, it is difficult to imagine how that popular will could have expressed itself in action. Neither the political nor the social traditions of Japan have been such as to encourage ideological revolt.

This is not to say that the Japanese people are docile and obedient to the point of timidity, or even of indifference to political issues. Their history shows many instances where brave men have suffered misery and death in defense of their political or religious beliefs. But we should be deceiving ourselves if we thought that the present-day Japanese are fundamentally opposed to autocratic forms of government and are awaiting the day when they can reverse the current totalitarian trend and set up democratic institutions. The mass of the people have very little knowledge of what democracy means; and conversation with highly educated and enlightened Japanese of a liberal turn of mind usually reveals that, whatever dissatisfaction they may feel with the present régime, they would not propose as a remedy a further attempt to build up a parliamentary government, even of the nineteenth-century model, on a social foundation which is not suited to receive it. Such attempts have been made in the past, but have failed. Liberalism has never secured a firm foothold in Japan, and it has never, even in its short seasons of success, been a force working against an expansionist foreign policy. The truth seems to be that what we in our countries call a democratic outlook is organically related to Christianity; and perhaps it is not seriously falsifying the picture to say crudely that the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

essential difference between Japan and Western democracies is that Japan is not a Christian country. She has a highly developed social organism, supported by an admirable social ethic; but it emphasizes the duty of the citizen to the community, not the duty of the individual to himself, and still less the community's duties to the individual.

Given these conditions it is easy to understand how the Japanese people have now come to accept a form of government of which they do not necessarily approve. But it is not easy to judge the measure of their disapproval. Since the beginning of the war against China, they have been subjected to a gradually increasing degree of restriction and discomfort which today begins to amount to hardship — but not to unbearable hardship. Some essential commodities including foodstuffs are rationed, and there are shortages of others. They have been harried by a propaganda campaign for "National Spiritual Mobilization" which seems not to have evoked any enthusiastic response. And they have to tolerate a great deal of petty regulation and interference exercised not only by officials but also by a vast army of private busybodies. There is a rigid censorship; there is even a high official whose title is Thought Controller. The powers of the police and the gendarmerie combined operate with something like the methods of the Gestapo, though not perhaps with its sinister and comprehensive efficiency; and in general there is a good deal of the espionage and secret denunciation which characterize life under autocracy.

On *a priori* grounds, therefore, one would be inclined to say that there must be a great deal of popular dissatisfaction in Japan, and no doubt there is. But there has so far been no sign whatever of active discontent, to say nothing of concerted popular opposition. Probably the best and briefest way to describe the frame of mind of the Japanese people today is to say that they accept the present situation reluctantly but patiently, that they have no great enthusiasm for the New Order at home, but that they are not disposed to resist it and, even if they were so disposed, they have not the necessary political training and experience or the requisite political leaders.

It must always be remembered in thinking of Japan that it is a geographically isolated country, inhabited by a very homogeneous people, and that these are factors which make for national unity, for solidarity against the outside world. Racial conscious-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ness does not have to be created. It is there in the nature of things. And, although it is much to the credit of the Japanese that as individuals they are normally free from xenophobia and welcome foreigners in their country with spontaneous kindness, it cannot be denied that the very marked differences of race and color, language and tradition between them and Western peoples make it easy for a feeling of "encirclement" to arise, and for antagonism against Westerners to be fostered. Such feelings are indeed more natural and rational than the international hatreds that have been stimulated in Europe by far less defensible racial doctrines. One is thus bound to conclude that there is so far in Japan no sign of a trend of popular opinion or an intellectual movement which might in propitious circumstances produce a strong reaction against the present form of government because of the foreign policy now being pursued. Judging from past history one would be disposed to argue that Japan has shown herself immune to social revolution. The political reform of 1868 was in essence not a revolution but a restoration; it came from above and not from below and as a social revolution it was incomplete, if not abortive. Since that date there have been a few small popular risings, but these were very limited in scope and should properly be described as sporadic local riots rather than as national movements. They certainly cannot be taken as evidence that there is a potential factor of social revolution in the temper of the Japanese public. The rising of May 1932 was to some extent agrarian in origin, but essentially it was a reactionary putsch. The attempted coup d'état of February 1936 was definitely a military mutiny with political aims; far from having any popular origin, it was stimulated by the results of a parliamentary election, which were thought by certain military groups to be a verdict against the costly expansionist policy promoted by the army.

It would appear then that the present strains upon the political, economic and social structure of Japan are not sufficient in kind or in intensity to provoke any hostile popular reaction; and if a reaction is to come it is improbable that it will be other than a popular reaction. Other forces that might, at one time or another, have resisted Japan's march along the totalitarian road seem definitely to have conformed, or at least to have abandoned any hope of stemming the advance. The first position which the liberals might have defended was provided by a constitutional issue as to the powers of the Diet. It centered on the so-called

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"organic theory," which maintained that Parliament exercised its functions as an independent organ of the State and not as an instrument of the Emperor. The chief proponent of this theory was a courageous liberal professor, Dr. Minobe, who was attacked by reactionary elements in the government, deprived of his seat in the Diet and his chair at the University, while his books were banned. When this battle was lost by the liberals of the academic and parliamentary worlds, the purely juridical obstacles to the development of an authoritarian state were swept away. A similar surrender was forced upon the leading industrialists and bankers, who submitted to successive steps in a planned economy which in the end left them denuded of most of the power which they had formerly held. Since this class favored laisser-faire principles — which obviously could not survive under the degree of regulation of manufacturing, trade and foreign exchange required for the prosecution of the war — it was destined sooner or later to abandon its position.

As for the bureaucracy, its older members were as a rule reluctant to go along with the army leaders, who were all for rapid and drastic changes, each of them a step towards a centralized, corporate state designed principally for waging war. They struggled and temporized, but little by little they gave way to the new forces, some of them explaining rather apologetically that it was a mistake to endanger national unity by clashing head-on with the extremists. The best thing, they felt, was to step aside and let the momentum of the radical movement exhaust itself. This "wave of the future" reading of political history in the making naturally ended in the complete victory of the forces which the liberals had not sufficient conviction and drive to check or even to moderate. The methods of *jujitsu*, when applied to politics, apparently do not work; a true resultant of opposed forces can be obtained only when opponents strike blow for blow, and thus hammer out a solution. All the same, it must be remembered that even had the cautious and liberal elements in the bureaucracy, in industry and finance and among the intelligentsia put up a fight they would have had to meet strong opposition within their own spheres, for the prospects of a new order attracted great numbers of ambitious young men, who were not only temperamentally disposed to vigorous action but were also tempted by the prospect of ousting their seniors, gaining promotion and exercising power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such liberal forces as might have stood out against the new leaders of Japan are therefore now in retreat. Some have merely gone to ground, some have been won over, and others are cooperating, unwillingly perhaps and with private reservations, but coöperating none the less. Consequently, there is effective unity on the home front in Japan today. The question then arises: What will be the reaction of the Japanese people if further strains are imposed upon them by further overseas adventures? This is not an easy question to answer for it at once involves us in speculation as to what Japan's plans are. However, we may assume one of two things: either she will continue her southward expansion so gradually as not to involve herself in the European war; or she will become a direct participant in that conflict, thereby turning the Pacific into a belligerent zone.

Let us assume for a moment that she chooses the first alternative and preserves her non-belligerency. In that event the problem is mainly economic, and the reaction of the Japanese people will depend largely upon the nation's economic balance sheet as it affects their life and work. The material cost to Japan of her current program, which presumably does not involve any excessive new burden of expenditure, is likely to be offset by certain material as well as psychological gains. The shortage of rice resulting from two bad crops can be made good by imports from Indo-China and Thailand, and other advantages of this nature will accrue from her growing influence in those regions. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that her immense investments in Manchuria are at last beginning to show a return, for it is reported that promising iron-ore deposits are now being worked and that the exploitation of certain other supplies from Manchuria as well as China is being better organized. It is true that embargoes and the loss of foreign trade because of the war in Europe have seriously damaged Japan's economic fabric; but it looks as if good temporary repairs had been made. We may therefore expect, in the absence of any strong evidence to the contrary, that so long as Japan maintains her non-belligerency she will have no great difficulty in supplying her people with an adequate minimum of commodities on the simple and inexpensive standard to which they are conditioned. After all, this is an elementary precaution which any efficient government must take; and despite some blunders, such as a needless irritation of public sentiment in the shape of rather silly sumptuary rules, it has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gradually schooled Japanese people during the last few years to accept wartime discomforts and annoyances which, until recent months at least, had not yet reached the degree of hardship already being suffered without complaint by other nations in far more desperate plights. Judging by past events, what might possibly goad the Japanese masses into some kind of revolt would be a grave food shortage definitely attributable to mistaken government policies. But of this there seems little likelihood.

As for psychological fatigue and sheer war-weariness, one guess is as good as another. Yet there is no obvious reason why one should expect the Japanese people to break under a strain which by the most up-to-date standards of frightfulness is mild indeed. If the plans of the Japanese Government go wrong, if it should turn out that the gaps in the national economy cannot be repaired by drawing upon supplies in Southeastern Asia — where negotiations are now going on — then a new set of domestic conditions would arise and the people might justly become angry with their rulers and turn upon them. But all this is mere speculation, and nobody can foretell what form the popular reaction might take. It might easily produce not a popular uprising but a still more drastic and repressive government.

The case is different if we assume that Japan becomes involved in a large-scale war in the Pacific without first extricating herself from China. But here also questions of strategy rather than of politics are at issue, for the degree of strain to which Japan's economic and social structure would be subjected must depend upon the nature of the conflict. It is for strategists to predict what form that conflict would take, and what military and economic results it would produce. On these points a layman's views are of little value. Should the struggle develop as a distant and protracted blockade of Japan, it might in the long run damage her internal economy enough to produce violent opposition to the present régime. But nobody who is aware of the loyalty and unity of the Japanese people will expect them, under those circumstances, to crack under any but the most intolerable strain. Unless and until such a point were reached, the effect of hostile action against Japan would be to close the ranks of the Japanese. As evidence on this point it is useful to recall that, as the war against China developed, the Japanese authorities used strong propaganda to direct popular animosity, not against the Chinese, but against third Powers, notably Great Britain. They knew that there was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no national enthusiasm for the war against China but only a disciplined resignation to it; but they also knew that they could stimulate war feeling by crying that Japan was in reality being attacked by the British. The anti-British campaigns, which have grown in intensity as the war has dragged on, cannot be fully explained on any other grounds.

Should hostilities develop into large-scale naval actions, their results would no doubt speedily determine the fate of the present Japanese Government. For it is clear that while it would gain strength in direct proportion to its success in successfully resisting enemy attacks, so also would it fall if Japan were defeated. It would be rapidly ejected, being perhaps replaced by an administration more popular and representative; but it might just as likely be succeeded by an emergency government of anything but popular complexion. One cannot judge of the strength of political forces until they have been tested in political conflict, any more than one can judge of the strength of armies until they have given battle.

From the arguments set forth above it would appear that we cannot forecast in the near future any important change in the policy of the Japanese Government because of the pressure of public opinion. There may be modifications here and there in policy at home and abroad, and some of these may be dictated by regard for popular sentiment; but they will be only the minor concessions of a prudent autocracy concerned to maintain a united home front, and not changes made at popular instigation. Similarly, we may conclude that, so long as hostilities are in progress, the Japanese people will remain united even under very great strain. It would be unwise to count upon a social revolution in Japan to bring about her military defeat. A military defeat might well contribute to a social revolution — but that is a vastly different matter. We have very little precedent for judging what form such a social revolution would take. It might include violence and civil disturbance; but it might equally well be achieved by one of those feats of compromise for which the Japanese have a remarkable aptitude. This is all that can be safely predicated of Japan's future political development, save that the defeat of totalitarian states in Europe will be more cogent than any other argument in persuading Japan to revise her present principles of government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW YORK LOOKS ABROAD

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

YEARS ago, I remember, an employee at the New York Customs House was filling out some paper for me. He asked where I had been born. "New York," I replied. "Yes," he said, "but which town?" Apparently it didn't cross his mind that I might have been born in New York City. His instinctive reaction was reasonable enough. For a century the tides of European immigration into the United States had channelled through the Narrows and dispersed on the piers of Chelsea, Weehawken and Brooklyn. Each tide had left such a deposit in the port of arrival that native New Yorkers had become the exception. When Peter Stuyvesant surrendered New Amsterdam to the English in 1664 it was a place of less than 1,500 souls. At the close of the Revolution the population was still only a little over 22,000. In each succeeding decade or so the figure doubled, until by a hundred years ago it reached 312,000. Today it is over seven millions. If we add the population of nine adjacent counties whose daily life centers almost wholly in the city, the total passes the twelve million mark — one-tenth of the nation.

I

Even in its beginnings New York was a mosaic. Eighteen languages were spoken in the streets of New Amsterdam, including Dutch, French, Swedish, English, German, Polish, Bohemian, Portuguese and Italian. Religious discrimination was rare. There was no witch hunting. Indeed, many persons who found New England insupportable moved to Long Island and the shores of Pelham Bay in order to enjoy the religious freedom of the New Netherlands. The town's cosmopolitan and easy-going character was not materially altered by nearly a century of English rule. As in the other British colonies, political institutions took shape along Anglo-Saxon lines, but the population remained mixed and kept the traits usual in a place where many races congregate — liveliness, bustle, resourcefulness and, on the whole, tolerance.

The ethnic picture did not alter much immediately after the

Editor's Note. Earlier articles in this series have been: "The Pacific Coast Looks Abroad," by Chester H. Rowell, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1940; "The Middle West Looks Abroad," by W. W. Waymack, April 1940; and "The South Looks Abroad," by Virginius Dabney, October 1940.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

British troops and their Tory friends quit New York in 1783. The war left surprisingly little bad feeling on either side, and most of the early arrivals in the following years were English and Scotch. The waves of mass immigration from other lands did not commence until the forties and fifties. The first to arrive in quantities were the Irish, escaping their poverty-stricken isle, especially following the potato famine of 1845. The Germans began to come in real numbers about the same time, most of them peasants and artisans, but some of them intellectuals fleeing what would now be called the "white" counter-revolution after 1848.[1] Then came the wave of Italians, beginning in the '80s and reaching a high point in the opening years of the twentieth century.

By this time the Irish were becoming contractors and politicians, and the Italians took over from them the job of digging the ditches, carrying the hods and laying the rails to accommodate America's expanding industry. In New York, as in other towns, many of the Italians opened up little shops. So did the Jews. Many Jews had come earlier to the United States from Germany, not for racial reasons, but moved by the same general impulses which influenced other Germans. The later Jewish immigration was mainly from Russia, following that country's adoption of restrictive laws in 1882 and as pogroms became more and more frequent. The peasants who emigrated from Russia, Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe usually went on to the mines or factories in Pennsylvania or Ohio, or to the agricultural plains of the west. But the Jews tended to stay in New York. Many of those who did not open shops entered the rapidly expanding garment trade, which today, as a result, is one of the city's greatest industries, clothing three-quarters of the women of America and making four-fifths of their furs and feathers and jewelry.[2]

The Irish and the Italians and the Jews came in such swarms that New York became the greatest Irish city in the world,

[1] There was another wave of German immigration after the Franco-Prussian War, this time largely of industrial workers. The early Socialist movement in the United States was mainly the creation of the German element. Until the '50s the Germans in New York were mostly Democrats, but they then became Republicans because they opposed slavery and favored homestead legislation. The Irish on the whole remained Democrats. Many of them fought in the Union Army. Other Irish elements were anti-abolitionist out of fear that Negro freedmen would take over their unskilled labor jobs. They were chiefly responsible for the Draft Riots of 1863. (*Cf.* Carl Wittke, "We Who Built America." New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939, p. 170 and 221.)

[2] On the life of the various national groups in New York see an interesting article in *Fortune* for July 1939.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ahead of Dublin, the greatest Italian city in the world, ahead of Rome, and the world's Jewish "capital," with half of all the Jews in America and over an eighth of the total in the world. Today three out of every four people you meet in the street in New York are immigrants or the children of immigrants. This compares with a 1930 census figure for the United States as a whole of one out of three.

The surprising thing is that in spite of such apparently overwhelming dilutions the population matrix of New York should have retained a predominantly English character. The hardy Dutch strain also persists. Remarkably enough, the names of the original settlers from Holland still figure in contemporary New York life along with the names of the respectable English families that were conspicuous in the city's business and banking in the early nineteenth century. The old stock does not hold its own, of course, to the same extent as in Boston, where until recently all seven members of the Harvard Corporation belonged to families which had served the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for six or seven generations. Nevertheless, many trustees and directors of New York organizations have names that figured, or might easily have figured, on the annual reports of similar organizations in the years before or just after the Revolution.

Despite this, the steady evolution of the city has until recently been towards a complication of racial characteristics rather than towards their simplification. Even apparently dyed-in-the-wool New Yorkers add to the diversity, for they almost invariably turn out to have been born in Louisiana or Minnesota or New Mexico, which means that they have transplanted here at least something of their distinctive racial strains and cultural backgrounds. In addition to the nationalities already mentioned, we have experienced large or considerable immigrations of Hungarians, Czechs, Greeks, Scandinavians, Syrians, Croatians, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. We have a Chinatown, a great Negro quarter, and districts where the shop signs are predominantly in Spanish or Armenian or any one of a dozen other languages. Many of these people read of events back in the "old country," as well as of doings in the local colony, in papers printed in their own language. At the present time, approximately 200 foreign language newspapers and magazines are published in New York. They are of all political persuasions. Some of them are religious organs, for the church means a great deal to a newcomer in a strange land.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A few have ideological leanings — Fascist, Nazi, Communist. But the largest and most successful newspapers, though in several cases radical, profess to be thoroughly American.

Now that mass immigration to the United States has been stopped, the melting-pot process, working inexorably with each day's births and deaths, will gradually overcome the results which such an enormous and prolonged and diversified influx of humanity has had on the character of the city. The driblets of refugees from Hitler's terror at present reaching our shores will not interfere with the process. Many of them are individually eminent in art, literature and science, and hence would be conspicuous wherever they happened to be. But they merely add to the cosmopolitan appearance of contemporary New York life. Their numbers are negligible in a city of over seven millions. Nature and the public school system will accomplish their work thoroughly in another generation or so.

In the meanwhile, however, New York remains without doubt the largest and most self-consciously diverse conglomeration of races and tongues ever gathered together in one spot on the earth's surface. This precludes any simple statement about what is in its mind when it "looks abroad." It does not forget its own earlier self — its Dutch and British childhood, its sedate early nineteenth century adolescence. It is not unconscious of the blood it has drawn from every state in the Union. Its heart is continuously tugged at, too, by memories of "old countries" all over the globe — Midlands factory town and Hamburg waterfront, steppe and pampas, ghetto and mountain chalet, fjord and loch and blue Mediterranean bay. New York is Cosmopolis. To it nothing anywhere — no event, no idea — is wholly alien. This may be a weakness or a strength. Critics will at any rate agree that it is New York's outstanding characteristic.

II

It would be wrong, however, to imagine that the people of New York examine events abroad with especial interest only out of a vague nostalgia or as propagandists for a particular race or political system. Their material occupations, intellectual interests and pleasures have international ramifications which remind them constantly of their dependence on foreign markets and of their debt to foreign cultures.

The cotton picker in Alabama, the automobile worker in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Michigan, the wheat farmer in Kansas, all depend on exports for part of their daily work. Hence economic conditions in foreign lands affect their economic conditions. Earlier articles in this series have indicated that realization of the fact seems to be making progress all over the country, even in regions usually considered obdurately isolationist. But the process, like any educational process, is bound to be slow. The man in the cotton or wheat field can hardly see even as far as the cotton factor in Memphis or the wheat trader in Chicago. The miner or glass worker can only with the greatest difficulty look beyond Pittsburgh, Detroit and Cleveland to the final destinations of the various highly specialized finished products for which his labor has been responsible. They do not even see the cargo-ships that put in to American harbors to carry those products abroad. Thus their experience is very different from that of people who live in a busy seaport and receive daily visual demonstrations of the meaning to them all, directly or at second hand, of foreign commerce and the banking, factoring, railroading, trucking and unloading which make that commerce possible. Of all American seaports New York is the greatest, and the people of no other American city, as a result, are more keenly aware that their daily business pulse beats as part of the world blood stream.

New York is the greatest port not merely in the United States but in the world. In the old days a multitude of sailing ships used to whiten the harbor with their sails, and their masts and rigging formed a forest along its shores. "City of ships!" cried Walt Whitman, "City of the world! City of the sea!" The sailing ships were gradually replaced by liners and freighters and tankers, and these have just been supplemented by the transatlantic "Clippers" of Pan American Airways, today almost the last mail connection between the Old World and the New. In a normal year 10,000 vessels come to New York's 695 piers.[3] They carry 35 percent of the nation's exports and 50 percent of the nation's imports. The President of the Merchants' Association has estimated that over 700,000 of the city's population, that is to say 10 percent, depend in one way or another on foreign trade for their livelihood.[4] In addition, the produce exchanges of New York deal in commodities from all parts of the world, and the Stock Exchange as of January 1, 1941, listed 323 bonds and stocks

[3] *Cf.* report by R. B. Rankin, of the New York Municipal Reference Library, 1929.
[4] *Bankers Magazine*, January 1939.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of foreign governments and foreign industrial companies. Each year New York banks clear checks from all over the world to a total of more than 160 billion dollars.

Over the years, the vessels visiting the port of New York carried not only cargoes which made profits for New York shippers, handlers and financiers, they also carried passengers with news and ideas. Assiduous reporters questioned these travellers about everything under the sun. Was the cholera spreading in France? Had Dickens really called us half-civilized when he got home from his American trip? Was Napoleon III (who once had lived in Eighth Street) set on making war? Would Woodrow Wilson compromise on Fiume? Does Mussolini sleep badly at night? The travellers brought news, too, about the outlook for the franc, for Brazil's coffee crop, for the Danubian wheat harvest, for the oil output in the Caucasus. The New York newspapers report all this fully, as well as the more prosaic details about shipping and mails. The two great morning dailies also print a greater volume of cable and wireless news from other countries than is supplied to the population of any other city in the world.

To New York, too, come the world's leading artists and singers, and in New York the cooks of every nation have set up their restaurants. Until the outbreak of the present war, the great shops showed goods not just from France, Germany and England, but from Dalmatia, Bali, Mexico, Syria, South Africa and innumerable other places. And in their little neighborhood shops the various foreign "colonies" found their own home delicacies, just as they could in many cases see in neighborhood theaters their own imported movies. Thus by a thousand channels the daily life of New York is exposed, for good or ill, to the impact of foreign cultures, whether in art, food, music, science, dressmaking, literature or journalism.

In one poignant respect this is more true today than at any time since the cessation of mass immigration twenty years ago. The Europe of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini offers little room except a cell or a coffin for persons who will not conform to the Nazi or Communist mold. Many of the European leaders who struggled in the past twenty years to win or keep the right to think, write, speak, worship and work freely are now in concentration camps or dead. Some are cowed, others silently bide their time. But week by week a few manage to escape to England, Africa, Palestine, or some other refuge where, if their age and strength permit,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they can reënlist in the old struggle. Polish and Czech legions are camped today in Scotland and Palestine, and Polish fliers down Nazi planes over the Channel; "Free French" troops press forward with the Australians into Libya and span thousands of miles of jungle and desert from Gabon to Chad in order to take the fleeing Italians on another flank; Belgians who still believe in British victory organize in the Belgian Congo to help fight for it; hardy Norwegian and Dutch seamen man their own and English ships to keep England victualed and munitioned. But there are many for whom such feats are physically impossible, and some of these make their way across the Atlantic. The few who are permitted to come to the United States under our present laws land mostly in New York.

It is no new experience to New York to receive them. New York has a habit of tolerance, a confidence in its ability to fuse many strains and talents into a single whole, which goes back, as I have already suggested, to the city's very beginnings. Dozens of examples could be cited to show why New York from the start had intimate reason to know the value and meaning of religious and political tolerance. The wife of Governor Stuyvesant, Judith Bayard by name, was a member of a French Huguenot family which had sought refuge in Holland, and her grandfather had gone through the siege of Breda. Many of the Huguenot settlers in New York and its vicinity had tasted oppression even more directly. Those who settled New Rochelle gave it the name of their native Protestant stronghold, famous for all time for its heroic resistance to Richelieu. But these are merely characteristic of the many New York families and groups, of all races and in all periods, who had been oppressed at home and who sought liberty in the New World. The disorders and persecutions of the Thirty Years' War, the suppression of the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745 in Scotland, the general misery caused by the Napoleonic upheaval, Irish resentment against the abuses of absentee landlordism and alien government, the aftermath of '48 in Germany and in the Hapsburg Empire, the German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the reactionary decrees of the Tsarist Government from '81 onwards, the nationalistic ferment throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkans — all these and many other similar developments made millions of Europeans want to leave their ancestral homes and led them to turn hopeful eyes across the Atlantic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New York, the port where so many of these people landed and where so many of them stayed, finds no difficulty in imagining what has been endured by the later refugees who now are fleeing similar troubles in Europe. The statesmen, socialists, priests and pastors of the German Republic, the Austrian legitimists and labor leaders, the Jewish rabbis, bankers and journalists, the "Free French" who will not surrender either to Hitler or to his French servants, the Czech and Polish patriots, the representatives of Norwegian and Dutch royalty, the anti-Fascist Italians, the former officials of the Spanish Republic, the anti-Bolshevik Latvians and Finns, do not tell us a new story. What we hear from Ignace Jan Paderewski, Count Sforza, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, Julio del Vayo, Alexis Léger, Paul van Zeeland and Otto of Hapsburg our parents and grandparents heard from Louis Napoleon, Carl Schurz, Louis Kossuth, Giuseppe Garibaldi and Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. The chapter our generation writes in New York's history is like the other chapters. And it is a history, we like to think, no less typically American than any tale of the western frontier.

III

The whole story still has not been told. New York does not look abroad only through immigrant eyes or in terms of foreign business, shipping and culture. From its skyscrapers its office workers and business executives look out across the fortified Narrows onto a sea which they do not think of as a vast and empty expanse on a map — a barrier — but as a busy highway. They know that this highway runs both ways, and they have begun to comprehend that sea power regulates its traffic.

New York also looks up into the skies. It knows that in case of war the whole Eastern seaboard would be more exposed than inland cities to enemy attack not only from the sea but from the air. It knows that its importance as the country's chief port and business and financial center would single it out in enemy eyes as a particularly valuable objective, while its population density and the concentration of its industries would make it a good target. This is no less true now than it was in the last war. An abundance of skilled labor has attracted many of the greatest defense industries to the New York area, stretching along the coast from Bridgeport to Bayonne, where the largest graving dock in the country is now to be constructed. The Brooklyn Navy Yard,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

always a principal naval base, is being expanded rapidly to permit the construction of 45,000 ton battleships. Further, since the city depends largely for power on a few giant stations within its own limits, its ability to move and work would be gravely handicapped if they were destroyed. Its great bridges and its aqueducts are also vulnerable. Experts say that the New York skyscrapers are not particularly susceptible to damage by bombs. But so-called aërial torpedoes of the type employed in some of the German raids on London might be very effective against our tall buildings, as their impact is lateral.

At present the risk of direct air attack on New York from across the Atlantic is not very great. But the words "at present" and "from across the Atlantic" must be emphasized. We do not know what improvements in airplane design are possible, and there are other means of reaching our shores than by flying all the way.

The closest point to America in what might be called Europe proper is Ireland: from Foynes to New York is about 3,000 miles.[5] Our own best Martin bomber can fly about 5,300 miles. But this is without bomb load. Its limit with a 3-ton load is about 1,200 miles. In the present war, the longest known bombing raids so far have been those from England on Venice, a distance of about 800 miles, or a round trip of 1,600 miles, one way fully loaded, the return unloaded. Mr. T. P. Wright, of the Curtiss-Wright Company, predicted last year that the range of civil airplanes would be increased about 30 percent in the next ten years — 15 percent by speed increases resulting in savings in fuel, 10 percent by reductions in specific fuel consumption, and 5 percent by reductions in structural weight.[6] Presumably these advances might be made more quickly under pressure of war conditions, and might be improved upon for special types of bombers to say 50 percent.

But even if the range of an enemy plane comparable to the Martin bomber were at once increased by the full 50 percent, it still would be able to travel something less than 1,800 miles with a 3-ton bomb load, and could not undertake a round-trip raid totalling more than, say, 2,200 or 2,400 miles. That is not sufficient even to enable a "suicide squad" to make a one-way trip,

[5] The shortest distance across the southern Atlantic, from Bathurst to Natal, is 1,835 miles. Obviously German or Italian bases in northern Brazil or in French, Dutch or British Guiana would jeopardize the security of the Panama Canal, and hence of the whole United States. But that is a problem with which this article is not concerned.

[6] *Aviation*. March 1940.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with a full complement of bombs, across the full width of the North Atlantic. The range would be increased, however, if the plane carried fewer or lighter missiles. Incendiary bombs are comparatively light. So are machine guns and their ammunition; and straffing by machine gunners can cause great havoc in crowded areas, as the civilian populations of several countries can testify. Incidentally, the German planes which raided Iceland in February did not drop bombs but did use machine guns. There also remains the possibility that the invention of some revolutionary type of engine may decrease the fuel load and hence extend the operating radius of fully loaded bombing planes to an unforeseen degree. We cannot count on this *not* happening.

What about possible enemy bases closer than Ireland? The Azores are 2,380 miles from New York, considerably nearer than Ireland, and air conditions on this route are more favorable than they are further north. Even so, a round trip from the Azores to New York and back is not practicable for a heavily loaded bomber of any present standard type that we know about. The chief danger to the United States from a German occupation of the Azores would be that planes operating from there would prey on American shipping and spot our naval movements. Iceland and Labrador lie much closer to our shores. According to Stefansson and other Arctic experts, climatic conditions there hinder their use as regular air bases rather less than is commonly supposed. They certainly might serve as "stepping stones" for enemy aircraft. An enemy established in Newfoundland would of course be a direct menace. The Canadians have now improved their defenses of that territory. We also are beginning to construct a base there under the Anglo-American agreement of September 2, 1940.

Unfortunately, bases do not tell the whole story. So long as the United States does not have a navy able to command both the Atlantic and the Pacific against any possible combination of hostile navies its coasts remain vulnerable to attack by planes launched from aircraft carriers in midocean. New Yorkers may be permitted to examine this problem with less detachment than their cousins in Montana, Minnesota and Missouri.

The present German and Italian fleets together would be no match for the whole American Navy. But this statement fails to take two vital factors into account. One is the present and possible future rôle of the British Navy and the remaining units of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the French Navy. The other is the present and possible future rôle of the Japanese Navy. If a friendly British fleet no longer guarded the Atlantic, and if the greater part of the American Navy were detained by urgent business in the Pacific, then a hostile German-Italian fleet, reinforced perhaps by captured British and French units, would command the Atlantic. Enemy raiders could sink shipping up and down our coast and enemy submarines would lurk off Sandy Hook, the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, and other Atlantic gateways. Above all, individual enemy units could easily operate far enough out in the Atlantic to launch planes for surprise air attacks on New York and other great coastal centers.

In these circumstances the portions of the American naval force which were free for service in the Atlantic would of course hamper the movement of enemy warships in nearby waters; and our growing air fleet would of course attempt to locate and destroy the enemy aircraft carriers and would engage any of their planes that dared approach our shores. Even so, shipping in and out of New York harbor would be subject to sporadic attack by surface raiders and to fairly regular submarine attack, and the city itself would have to expect to undergo bombing raids from the air.

IV

Although the northern and middle Atlantic seaboard would be the first to suffer from enemy action in case of war, the people living here seem to be at least abreast of the country as a whole in their willingness to assume the risks of war in defense of what they consider the national interest. Nor are they discouraged at the prospect of contributing their share for national defense. It is a very large share. Federal collection districts do not coincide exactly with New York City limits. But roughly one can say that though only about one-twentieth of the population of the United States live in New York City proper they contribute about one-fifth of the total sum raised through the individual Federal income tax.

The Gallup Poll provides us with interesting indications of New York opinion on these matters. So does the record of the New York delegation in Congress on repeal of the arms embargo and on the lend-lease bill.

The findings of the poll published on December 29, 1940,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

showed that although the vast majority of Americans want the United States to stay out of the war if possible, 60 percent of those consulted felt that it was more important to help England than to stay out. The area which includes New York (New England and the Middle Atlantic states) was not so strongly of this opinion as either the Southern states (75 percent favorable to helping England even at the risk of war) or the Western states (65 percent favorable). Nevertheless it favored the bolder course by 62 percent. The areas which reduced the national percentage were the East Central and the West Central states, which voted in favor of aid to Britain at the risk of war by only 54 percent.

American opinion on the lend-lease bill, as revealed in the Gallup Poll published February 12, 1941, was divided along somewhat similar lines. The national average was favorable to the bill by 54 percent (with 15 percent giving qualified answers, 22 percent replying "no," and 9 percent having no opinion). The vote of the area which includes New York almost exactly coincided with the national vote.[7]

In May 1940, at the beginning of "all-out" war in Europe, only 36 percent of the people had favored help to England at the risk of war, while 64 percent had favored staying out at any cost. In the eight months from May to December 1940 the two points of view changed places almost exactly. Doubtless the influence of the newspapers and magazines published in New York, and of New York columnists and publicists, helped bring about this evolution in national opinion. *The New York Times* and *The New York Herald Tribune* are in a sense national organs, with nation-wide influence. *The Times*, in particular, is read by editorial writers everywhere. Although both of these papers opposed the New Deal and the third term, they have supported the broad lines of President Roosevelt's foreign policy, especially aid to Britain. So also, in general, have weeklies as different as *Time* and *Life*, *The New Republic* and *The Nation*. Radio commentators speaking from New York, especially Raymond Gram Swing, Dorothy Thompson and Elmer Davis, have pointed out the relationship of daily events in Europe to our long-range national interests. So have various organizations which carry on country-

[7] On the matter of defense expenditures New York opinion has coincided fairly closely with the average national opinion. On May 27, 1940, the Gallup Poll asked whether voters favored President Roosevelt's recent request to Congress to increase defense appropriations by another billion dollars. The country favored the increase by 86 percent. The area including New York was for it by 87 percent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wide educational work in international relations and which have their headquarters in New York — the Foreign Policy Association, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the American Association for Adult Education, the League of Nations Association, etc. The newsreel releases, most of which are edited in New York, usually lean over backwards to avoid being accused of partisanship. The "March of Time," however, is not afraid to be definitely anti-Nazi, and several of its releases have been effective arguments for a vigorous defense of American democracy.

Along with the discussion of foreign issues in the press and over the air has gone a lively exchange of proclamations, "open letters" and newspaper advertisements signed by conflicting groups of American publicists, business men and professors. Many of these have been stimulated by rival organizations established during the past year to argue or deny that the United States has a cultural, moral, political, economic and financial stake in Hitler's defeat. New York has become the center of this verbal warfare. Thus the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies established its national headquarters in New York, even though its chairman hailed from Kansas — the editor of the *Emporia Gazette*, William Allen White. A rival organization, the America First Committee, supported by Henry Ford and headed by General Robert E. Wood, soon afterwards set up headquarters in Chicago. But it has looked to New York for professional advertising counsellors and it has enlisted the support of certain New York business men who enjoy the prospect of profitable transactions with a Hitlerized Europe — without, needless to say, having bothered to inform themselves about what happened to their counterparts in German business and industry once these had helped install Hitler in power. Like the William Allen White group, the Chicago committee carried its case to the New York public by means of full-page advertisements in the papers. One of these, appealing to Americans to "stop our Government's sending its planes, guns and ships to belligerents across the sea," appeared in *The New York Times* on October 3.

But it was the No Foreign War Committee that was meant to act as the shock troops of the isolationist army. Following the example of the William Allen White group its backers imported a "country editor," Verne Marshall, of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and opened up headquarters in a New York hotel. The new organization also undertook an educational campaign by means of adver-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tisements in the New York newspapers. Fortunately for those having a different conception of American interests, Mr. Marshall managed to make every mistake of judgment that they could wish, ending up by revealing that one of the chief backers of the No Foreign War Committee was an international oil speculator who had been engaged in various deals with the Nazi Government. Its other backers hurriedly began disowning it. Colonel Lindbergh announced on January 17, 1941, that though he had "attended a number of conferences" when the Committee was being formed by Mr. Marshall, he did not agree with its "methods and policies," and he cancelled the speech which was to have opened the campaign in St. Louis. The chief result of the semi-eclipse of the No Foreign War Committee was to force isolationist strategists who had planned to stay in the background to assume a rather more public rôle. The staff work continues to be directed partly from Chicago and partly from Washington, but the real center of activity is New York, where Ex-President Hoover, one of the chief isolationist strategists, has established personal headquarters at the Waldorf-Astoria.

Coming to New York on February 20, 1941, to drum up opposition to the lend-lease bill, Senators Wheeler and Nye, respectively from Montana and North Dakota, told a Mecca Temple rally of the America First Committee and the Keep America Out of War Congress that the bill's purpose was to put the United States into the war. Senator Wheeler said that "the great mass of Americans, whether they live in New York City or in Butte, Montana," are against fighting for "empty meaningless slogans." Both Senators attacked "international bankers." Norman Thomas, Socialist, also spoke. Anti-Semitic cries from the audience had to be rebuked by the Chairman, John T. Flynn, Scripps-Howard columnist. The names of President Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie and Secretary of War Stimson were loudly booed, as was that of Winston Churchill. Mention of England also elicited boos and hisses. If there was any unfriendly demonstration at mention of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin it was too small to be heard over the radio, which however reproduced plainly the catcalls against England.[8]

New Yorkers look on all this activity as merely tit for tat. They

[8] *Cf. New York Times, New York Herald Tribune* and *New York Post* February 21, 1941. Senator Wheeler (*New York Times*, February 23) denounced as "untrue" the suggestion that the meeting had been "un-American." But he entered no specific denial regarding any of the individual grounds for criticism noted above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cannot resent the West's attempts to indoctrinate them with isolationist dogma when so many channels of publicity radiate from New York. They do find it mildly amusing, however, that not the "effete East" but the "virile West" gives an impression of pessimism about the country's ability to survive whatever grim ordeals may lie ahead, and that descendants of the pioneers rather than their more sedentary cousins most often imply that they consider any peace better than any war. Recalling repeated warnings that the rest of the country is violently allergic to advice and pressure from New York, they are tempted to ask why gentlemen from Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota and California should expect the big bad metropolis not to be just as suspicious of Western propaganda as the West is when what it calls "a Wall Street representative" visits what he calls "the sticks."

Now I myself never happen to have heard New Yorkers express annoyance over efforts by the rest of the country to educate them, though it is true that I have heard complaints that so many of the professors have such a poor record as prophets. The people who assure us today with the utmost confidence that the British fleet is not a factor in the American scheme of defense are often the same who assured us just as confidently that there was not going to be a war. As recently as the summer of 1939 the Administration tried to change the Neutrality Law so as to permit Britain and France to buy arms in this country. The successful opposition of the isolationists was based on the argument that the move was unnecessary, because warnings of impending war were poppycock; that if war should by any chance actually materialize we would be indifferent to the result; and that anyway we would run more risks in letting the British and French buy arms from us than we would run in coping single-handed with the Nazis following an Allied defeat. The late Senator Borah of Idaho made the classic claim at this time that he had better sources of information about the real situation in Europe (where he had never so much as set foot) than President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull and the whole foreign service of the United States Government. Senator Nye of North Dakota on July 29 made an attack in the Senate on those who saw war coming in Europe. "The information of our scaremongers," he said, "has obviously been bad — very, very bad." On August 17 he expressed the opinion that the refusal of Congress to repeal the arms embargo had made a European war less likely than ever.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

War in Europe took the isolationists by surprise, then, when it came only a few weeks later, but they remained undaunted. Some said it was a "phony" war; it didn't follow the familiar World War pattern and apparently too few people were killed in the early stages to make it seem "real." Others, including Henry Ford, laid responsibility for the war on "greedy financial groups" in Europe. Hitler and Mussolini, in Mr. Ford's eyes, were mere "puppets." [9] Others put the responsibility on President Roosevelt because he had not placed the influence of the United States Government behind further efforts at appeasement. Often the persons who said this were the same who had criticized Neville Chamberlain for his "betrayal" of the Czechs at Munich. Senator Nye, who had fought the arms embargo against Spain, fought the repeal of the arms embargo against Great Britain and France. Some Senators, including the late Mr. Lundeen of Minnesota, called the war imperialistic, and in the same breath suggested that while the British and French were occupied with the Nazis the United States ought to seize their possessions in the Caribbean. Colonel Lindbergh, a rigid isolationist towards Europe (and Asia?), proclaimed the whole Western Hemisphere "our domain" and suggested that Canadians had no right to draw part of it into a European war "simply because they prefer the Crown of England to American independence." Senator Wheeler, of Montana, deprecated attempts to "involve" us in foreign affairs. But he suggested that the President ought to "insist" that a "just peace" be worked out in Europe, and he contributed his own sketch of what the arrangement ought to be.

Once the war had actually begun the American public rejected these confusing counsels. A new resolution to repeal the arms embargo so as to permit sales on a cash and carry basis was introduced in Congress and this time approved. It passed the Senate on October 27, 1939, by 63 to 30 votes, and the House on November 3 by 244 to 171 votes. In general the chief opposition to this first decision that our interests would be served by an Allied victory came from the Middle West and West. Of the 63 "yeas" in the Senate, 24 were from the Atlantic seaboard states, 15 from

[9] Mr. Ford's annoyed surprise that, in spite of his very great wealth, most Americans didn't accept his judgment has led him gradually to go even further. In a recent statement from his Georgia plantation he expressed the opinion that the people of Europe deserve indiscriminately to suffer because they are so "stupid." He implied that he hoped they would go on fighting until both sides collapse (what a change from the days of the Peace Ship!), and added the "sincere hope" that neither England nor the Nazis would win. If Mr. Ford read the *Daily Worker* he might be interested to find how closely his arguments parallel the Communist "party line."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of those the Southern states not included in that category, and 24 from the Central, Mountain and Pacific states. Of the 30 "nays," 9 were from the Atlantic seaboard states, 1 was from the remaining Southern states, and 20 were from the Central, Mountain and Pacific states. In other words, 48 out of the 63 affirmative votes in the Senate came from the Atlantic seaboard and the South, while 20 of the 30 negative votes came from the Middle West and West. Both New York Senators, Messrs. Wagner and Mead, voted "yea."[10]

In the House the geographical division was less marked. However, of the 24 Members of Congress representing districts wholly or partially in New York City, 15 voted "yea" and 4 "nay" (with 2 paired for, 2 paired against, and one not recorded), approximately 3 to 1 in favor of permitting the sale of arms. The most prominent Congressman from New York City to vote "nay" was Mr. Bruce Barton. In this, however, he was in accord with the Republican Leader in the House, Mr. Martin of Massachusetts, and the ranking Republican member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fish, representing a constituency in the Hudson Valley.[11]

On the occasion of a more recent test, when the so-called lend-lease bill came up for action in the House on February 8, 1941, the New York City delegation evinced an even stronger desire to aid Britain than it had shown in November 1939, recording 17 "yeas" and 5 "nays" (one member did not vote and there was one vacancy due to the death of Kenneth Simpson). In the upper house, the same Senators in general who had opposed raising the arms embargo were against this measure. Again both the Senators from New York favored it. Testifying in favor of the bill, Mayor La Guardia remarked on February 11: "I want to be realistic and take no chances. My city won't be bombed if the British fleet holds out." These two sentences indicate only one

[10] The final line-up revealed that two survivors of the death guard which had helped prevent the establishment of a strong League of Nations in 1920 — Senators Johnson of California and Borah of Idaho — were still ensconced in their same old dugouts, while two who had meanwhile died — Senators Lodge of Massachusetts and La Follette of Wisconsin — had left sons to carry on the old isolationist fight. Senator Clark, of Missouri, a son of President Wilson's rival, the late Champ Clark, also voted against the amendment of the Neutrality Law. Senator Norris, however, who voted against our entry into the war in 1917 and against the League in 1920, voted "yea" on this occasion, saying that he thought repeal of the arms embargo would increase the likelihood we could stay out of war.

[11] Some of Mr. Fish's constituents seem to have thought he should have known better. In 1938 he won his seat by a majority of 30,900 votes. In 1940 he was reëlected by a majority of only 8,976 votes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the reasons why most New York legislators favor aid to Britain. But it is a strong reason. As the Mayor said on the same occasion: "It's very little comfort to the cities on the Atlantic Coast and the Pacific Coast that this country is a citadel which can never be conquered, when you explain to them that the citadel is west of the Alleghanies and east of the Rockies."

V

It should not be imagined from all this that New York does not contain fairly important elements which favor appeasement on one ground or another. Some are simply pacifist, either because they are of abounding and undiscriminating good will, or because they think there is nothing worse than war and death, or because they say (ignoring history from Carthage to Yorktown and Appomattox) that "war never settles anything." Some are defeatist. Some whose "property nerve" is particularly sensitive would like the war "fixed up" on any terms. Some hate President Roosevelt so much that they cannot favor any course he favors. Some hate England so much that they hate President Roosevelt. Some agree with Colonel Lindbergh in preferring peace now to a British victory later. Some join Mr. Ford in wishing that both sides would be defeated and "punished," one for seeking to conquer and despoil its rivals, the other for daring to resist being conquered and despoiled. Obviously most of the people who hold such views are not pro-Nazis or pro-Fascists. The furthest one might go is to say that many of them are Nazi and Fascist "fellow travellers" who in the moral realm are not interested in differentiations between the dictatorships and the democracies and who in the physical realm consider that American political, military and economic interests would not be affected by the victory of the former and the defeat of the latter.

In addition, of course, New York contains groups which are definitely Nazi and Fascist. There also are the Communists. No clear distinction needs to be made between these three at the present time. As earlier in France, England, Norway and the Low Countries, so today in the United States they agree in exploiting the natural fear and hate of war which exist in all civilized nations. Each supplements the activities of the others in spreading dissension, confusion and suspicion by raising irrelevant issues. Each attempts to delay and hamstring effective defense moves. Each doubtless contributes its quota of spies and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

saboteurs and prepares fifth column activities for the possible day of formal conflict.

The Nazis and Fascists usually do not say openly that they are anti-democratic, merely that they wish to revise and rejuvenate the good old American traditions so as to permit collaboration between the United States and the "New Order" in Europe. Even the members of the German-American Bund wrap themselves in the American flag and quote from the Founding Fathers. The Bund's headquarters are in New York and its organ *The Free American* (with the subtitle *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*) is published here. Many of its summer camps infest New Jersey and Long Island, to the intense annoyance of the natives. But it is a national organization with well-known methods and aims and need not receive full treatment in this article.

The Communists follow a different tactic in that they by now have pretty well abandoned their former pretense of being devoted to democracy. They gloss over what they are for and emphasize what they are against. They are against "tyranny, imperialism and war" — provided, of course, it is not Communist tyranny, Communist imperialism and Communist war. The national headquarters of the Communist Party of the United States are in New York, in charge of Earl Browder, formerly Secretary of the Party and twice its candidate for President, recently sentenced to jail for passport fraud. The *Daily Worker* (circulation about 48,000) ought perhaps to have been mentioned earlier among the local newspapers having national circulation and influence. Like the weekly *New Masses* it follows a strict party line — except in the intervals when it is left momentarily breathless by one of Stalin's unexpected aberrations. The bewilderment of New York Communists and fellow travellers following the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 23, 1939, was so acute that at first they could only ignore it. After a day or so they hailed it as a move to insure peace. A week later, having lined up his Bolshevik partner, and having arranged the division of booty, Hitler drove into Poland.

Something like 250,000 residents of New York were born in Germany and some 350,000 were born in Italy. These are not all pro-Nazi or pro-Fascist by any means. Each racial group is composed of two vocal wings and a largely inert mass in the center, which tends to shift its sympathies in accordance with the prevailing news from Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The largest German-language newspaper, the *Staats-Zeitung und Herold* (circulation 48,000), which belongs to the Ridder family, is conscious of the sharp antagonisms dividing the German-American community and avoids discussing the issue of German aggression or dictatorship. At least once (November 11, 1938) it condemned race hatred, and on another occasion (September 27, 1939) it indirectly criticized the Bund by deprecating relations between American citizens of German descent and official representatives of a foreign power. Usually it does not criticize the Nazi régime; but it does not praise it either. The general mass of German-Americans are more inclined to favor Hitler than the mass of Italians are to favor Mussolini. This is partly because even those who do not approve Hitler's tyrannical methods cannot help being dazzled by his successes. They try to think of him in German rather than Nazi terms. Moreover, the Nazi Government has been exceedingly busy here. The German Library of Information, with headquarters in New York, distributes printed matter widely. Nazi agents trace out with infinite care the relationships of every individual in the German-American community; and those with families in the old country are given to understand that any incautious statement or action will result in immediate retaliatory actions against those relatives by the Gestapo. Attempts to counteract these activities are being made by various liberal organizations, among them the German-American Congress for Democracy, the American Friends of German Freedom, the German Labor Delegation, etc.

The number of Germans who wish to take definite steps to transform the American Government along Nazi lines seems to be smaller than might be expected. Thus when the Republicans of the 18th Congressional District, which includes the German colony in the Yorkville neighborhood, had an opportunity last autumn to vote in the primaries for Joseph E. McWilliams, running on a frankly Nazi program praising Hitler's methods and attacking "Jewish Internationalism, Jewish Conniving, Jewish Machinations, Jewish Communism and Jewish War-mongering," they gave him only 242 votes against 568 for the anti-Nazi "regular" Republican nominee.[12]

The Italians who admire Mussolini are less vocal than Hitler's

[12] Mr. McWilliams, a native of Oklahoma, calls his group the "Christian Mobilizers." They have had connections with both the German-American Bund and Father Coughlin's "Christian Front." He has been fined for disturbing the peace, and spent a time in Bellevue Hospital, but was discharged as not being insane or feeble-minded (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 26, 1940).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

admirers are, and the Italian colony as a whole has begun to look on the glories of Fascism with a slightly jaundiced eye. *Il Progresso Italo-Americano*, owned by Mr. Generoso Pope, and having a circulation of about 80,000, reveals an ambiguity in editorial and news policy which doubtless reflects the mixed feelings of its readers. Some of Mussolini's earlier admirers had already become lukewarm following the adoption of anti-Semitic legislation in Italy. Stories of food shortages at home were worrying, too. And the price of imported delicacies — olive oil, cheese, salami — shot up to unpopular heights. Then came the reversal of Fascist fortunes in Ethiopia and North Africa, the Greek victories in Albania, and the British bombing of Italian ports. New York Italians now tell inquiring reporters that Mussolini is more a Fascist than an Italian, and his picture has begun to come down off the walls of Italian barber shops and fruit stores along Mulberry Street. The Mazzini Society attempts to accelerate this awakening; so does the liberal New York monthly, *Il Mondo*.

Various reasons can be given for the fact that the Italian Government never succeeded in organizing the Italian community in New York with real German efficiency, despite the cooperation of various cultural and sports societies, the arrangement of friendly news and comment in the Italian language over local radio stations, the release of free news "shorts" to movie houses, and other propagandistic efforts. The most appealing reason is that Italians have a stronger traditional liking for liberty — the liberty of Mazzini and Garibaldi — than do the Germans. Also, though many simple workmen of Italian descent were pleased to hear of the earlier Italian successes, they had not felt a conscious need for them the way Germans living abroad thirsted for the rehabilitation of the German race through German arms. Italians have never been much bothered by theories of racial superiority or inferiority. They do not suffer from the German inferiority complex and do not feel the passionate German urge to "belong" to a nation of conquering heroes.

Two other of New York's component racial elements deserve mention.

The Jews naturally hate régimes which discriminate against their race, especially the Nazi régime which has robbed, beaten, jailed and murdered their brothers in Germany. They are anti-Nazi almost to a man and the vast majority are in favor of helping England. Governor Lehman has stated their position frankly on a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of occasions. Now and then one encounters a professional Zionist who is less than 100 percent for Britain. And occasionally an American of Jewish blood is diffident about urging a bold attitude towards the war for fear that his inevitably strong racial prejudices will seem to have swayed his sober judgment as a citizen, or for fear of attracting Jew-baiters into fresh excesses. On the whole, however, New York Jews have been influenced by the same fundamental motives that move other sober and patriotic Americans. And the extent of their charity towards sufferers from the Hitler terror, Jew and Christian alike, often puts Christians to shame.

The reactions of the Irish-American community are also of interest and of great political importance. One section might be described as lukewarm with regard to helping England. Another section, not more numerous, perhaps, but more influential, has urged that every means be used to defeat Hitler, and that this involves putting aside old grudges and assisting Britain to the limit. New York's leading Roman Catholic layman, Alfred E. Smith, is of this opinion. So are "fighting Irishmen" like General O'Ryan and Colonel Donovan. There is a third contingent, small but vocal, which hates King William III (who died in 1702) to such an extent that it loves the enemy of any English king even when that enemy is Hitler. This minority includes the Irish-American followers of Father Coughlin, himself foreign born.

The other day a minor judge in Queens named Herbert A. O'Brien, long identified with Father Coughlin's "Christian Front," caused something of a stir by stating, in the course of testimony against the lend-lease bill in Washington, that racial antipathies were being so aggravated in New York by the European war that violence was to be expected. The real purpose of his testimony appeared in his statement that the lend-lease bill "will get us into two wars — a civil war will start almost at once." In other words, Judge O'Brien had set out to frighten the innocent, but not by revealing a situation which he deprecated so much as by threatening that it might be intensified. Mayor La Guardia dismissed the O'Brien scare by saying that if he had known the Senate was interested in stories of the kind he could have provided "several better ones from the psychopathic wards."

More might be written about the attitude of New York's racial groups towards the war. The reactions of our variegated social, business and political elements could also be examined in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more detail. Obviously New York in these days is under a very special strain. But so far there is no evidence that either foreign agents, or foreign-born elements that might most naturally be tempted to listen to them, or native-born Nazi, Fascist or Communist fellow-travellers, or respectable people who have come to doubt the merits of the American way of life or the desirability and feasibility of defending it, have succeeded in making any real dent in New York's fundamental Americanism. On the contrary, I believe, New York stands at least as robustly on American traditional foundations as any other part of the Union, and faces at least as willingly whatever sacrifices may be necessary to defend and preserve the Union's freedom and well-being.

VI

Do the times produce the men or do the men make the times? Both. Repeatedly in recent years the principles and policies of three native New Yorkers — President Roosevelt, Governor Lehman and Mayor La Guardia — have received the approval of the New York electorate. The three have sometimes differed on social and administrative policies. On American foreign policy they have differed not at all. Did they exercise conscious leadership in developing the sentiment of their city which so strongly favors the preservation of American democracy against all its enemies, foreign and domestic? Of course. Did they often draw unconsciously upon New York's store of vitality and courage and respond instinctively to the urgings of its deepest historic traditions? Again of course.

In New York, a city with roots spreading in every direction, tapping every sort of soil, there has been no serious question or conflict, either in the minds of the majority of the people or of their leaders, as to what are their paramount interests and duties in the present international crisis. Significantly, when the representative of one of New York's early Dutch families "looks abroad" he urges the same unyielding attitude toward the threats of the twentieth century barbarians as does a member of a cultivated New York family of Jewish bankers and philanthropists and the son of an Italian immigrant who himself served overseas in the last war. New York is Cosmopolis. But there is more cohesion than a casual observer might suspect in its union of bloods and talents.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WAR BY RADIO

By John B. Whitton

RADIO, as the most effective method of disseminating propaganda, has taken its place alongside diplomacy, economic pressure and military power as one of the accepted instruments of foreign policy. In this Russia was the pioneer, sending round the world glowing accounts of the Soviet régime. Hitler took it over. Just as he tested out his new airplanes in Spain, so he experimented in the Saar and Austria with radio techniques later to serve him in France and Britain.[1] In the Sudetenland he made the Germans conscious of Czech "tyranny" by impassioned radio messages from Munich. Italian short-wave programs from Bari meanwhile stirred up the Arabs against the British. And there have been many messages from Rome and Berlin designed to turn the people of Latin America against the United States.

Prior to the present conflict, radio propaganda was peculiarly a weapon of *totalitarian* power politics. But since the war actually began all the belligerents, totalitarian and democratic states alike, have made departments of radio propaganda integral parts of their war machines.[2] On the home front, both armed forces and the public are exhorted to unity and spurred on to sacrifice. To neutral countries are transmitted skits, topical talks and news, while enemy firesides and cantonments are bombarded with arguments, facts and allegations calculated to weaken morale.

I. RADIO PROPAGANDA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR

Radio propaganda has been employed, not merely as a gradual process of molding the minds of peoples, often far from the scene of conflict; it also has become an instrument in actual battle. Thus the Nazis have used the radio as a dynamic weapon, a practical aid to attack and invasion. On the eve of battle the enemy's morale is weakened when radio broadcasts from Germany demonstrate that German spies are everywhere, seeing all, knowing all, reporting all.

Thus a French hydroplane unit located near Paris, and which

[1] Thomas Grandin, "The Political Use of the Radio," *Geneva Studies*, August 1939.

[2] Harold N. Graves, Jr., "European Radio and the War," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1941.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was suffering from German bombing, learned from the "Traitor of Stuttgart" the first news of the decision to transfer its camp. It was even informed of the exact location of the new headquarters and of the exact time of departure. A food riot in Caen was similarly announced to the French people a few moments after it had occurred. Inhabitants of a British town in the Midlands were horrified when told by the Zeezen radio the location of an arms factory in their midst, the exact number of workers, the precise location of the air shelters. Two French generals, as they sat down to dinner in the Maginot Line, were furnished by Stuttgart with an exact description of the menu.

Similarly, the radio may sow confusion and panic during an attack. As the Germans advanced toward Paris they used French wave lengths to warn the inhabitants of towns and villages, in stentorian and terrifying tones, to flee for their lives before the German tanks and bombers were upon them. Thus hundreds of thousands of panic-stricken refugees were cast upon the roads with all their impedimenta, making it extremely difficult for French reinforcements to be moved up.

Again the strategy of terror succeeded after Leopold surrendered. While the Germans were rapidly advancing into Northern France they exhorted the French, over various wave lengths, so powerful and so numerous as almost to monopolize the ether, to abandon what was represented as a hopeless battle and to call on their government to surrender. Thus on May 28, 1940, the Princeton Listening Center recorded this message as sent in French from the Nazis to the French people:

> Beneath the force of Germany's crushing action, the King of the Belgians took the decision to put an end to a resistance which had become senseless . . . French soldiers, French citizens, the capitulation of Belgium makes the military situation of France as follows: The northern part of the Maginot Line has been flanked. It no longer exists! The west part of the line has lost its value. . . . Spare your country and try to save your lives. Force your government to make peace or drive it out. Stop the rich, the profiteers, and the merchants, the Jews and the English from escaping. Otherwise they will not fail to leave you in the lurch.

The cause of the British was pictured as desperate, their surrender only a matter of days. "Act quickly," urged the German radio. "Leave the fleeing English to look after themselves. Those cowards, who have no word of honor, do not deserve any better." The acceptance by the French of the Armistice of Compiègne

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seems to have been due in large part to a general conviction that Britain's collapse was imminent. The radio certainly played a part in engendering this state of mind.

Meanwhile the French transmitters did little to bolster the weakening morale of French soldiers and civilians. Premier Reynaud frequently spoke on the radio, but instead of following the British practice of admitting the truth, bad as it was, simply and calmly, he often came out with it in dramatic, alarming tones. There was little sustained effort to inspire unity and courage. Music almost disappeared from the air, except for the "Marseillaise;" but that phonograph record was played so often it became worn and scratched, giving a mournful impression. The general French apathy with respect to the war — its origins, execution and objectives — of course had a variety of causes, many of them much more fundamental than an uninspired radio policy; but it must bear its share of the blame.

The major defect of the French programs was their dullness, in striking contrast with Goebbels' command that the first rule for Nazi broadcasting is that it must be interesting. Many of the French prewar skits and the light music were eliminated as undignified for wartime, while news items were cut to the bone by a narrow censorship and often were held up until long after they had become known over the foreign radio. Furthermore, explanations as to why the war was necessary were meagre, there were few direct attacks on Nazi Germany, and, in contrast with the German radio, even martial music was rarely heard on the air.

The reasons for this situation are several. Reflecting the defensive spirit of the French Government and army command, the policy adopted by the radio was uninspired and negative. The propaganda department was inadequate. M. Giraudoux, chosen as director, was an outstanding author and playwright, but he knew little about administration or propaganda technique and he put his activities on too high an intellectual plane. His staff was poorly coördinated and was hampered by frequent changes in personnel and policy, while the radio division was under-staffed and lacked adequate modern equipment. Unlike the BBC, the French never set up an efficient service to monitor foreign radio propaganda.

As a consequence of the paucity and tardiness of the news heard over the French radio, and the depressing nature of the entertainment, the French people regularly tuned in to foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stations. Stuttgart was heard in many parts of France, although jammed at Paris through the use of an obsolete transmitter. For some reason, however, the Nazi broadcasts from Hamburg were not ordinarily jammed. In general, there was considerable listening to Nazi stations. This was especially the case among the soldiers, who had little or nothing to do in the Maginot Line during the long winter months.

There is much evidence to the effect that German radio propaganda had considerable effect on public opinion in France, but more among the civilian population than among the soldiers. The soldiers appear to have tuned in to the German stations mainly for amusement and diversion, and listened with contempt to the efforts to break down their morale or turn them against the British. In the opinion of the most competent observers, however, this contempt tended to decrease under the constant bombardment of propaganda, and as we look back it seems remarkable that the French Government did nothing to forbid or to discourage listening to German stations. Several of the Nazis' propaganda themes might be mentioned here as examples. In the attempt to divide the Allies, the Nazi radio inserted these words at the end of many programs: "Les Anglais donnent leurs machines, les Français leurs poitrines" — the English give their machines, the French their breasts. Again and again it was said, "The English will fight to the last Frenchman." No one, it was alleged, ever saw an Englishman at the front, for they all were back of the lines spending their time with the wives of the French soldiers.

Apparently the radio propaganda addressed to the civilian population was more effective, although it is always extremely difficult to measure the exact effect of propaganda. There were insistent appeals to the masses calculated to shake their confidence and loyalty and engender doubts as to France's aims in the war or as to her ability to win it. Attacks on the "capitalists" and "plutocrats" were especially emphasized. There was a great amount of anti-parliamentary and anti-Semitic propaganda. Finally, as part of the strategy of terror, the French were reminded of the superior might of the Germans, represented as unconquerable, and they were told to beware of the terrible attacks and bombardments which were sure to come. Thus, besieged with dangerous thoughts from abroad, and unsupported at home by an imaginative and inspiring radio policy, the French — both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

soldiers and civilians — had lost a radio war to the Germans even before the military *Blitzkrieg* had begun.

When the invasion came, the German radio was adapted, as already noted, to the needs of conquest. But after it was complete the radio became a two-edged sword. For though the Germans, using all the French stations, can bombard the conquered people with anti-British propaganda, they cannot effectively prevent the French from listening to Churchill or de Gaulle from London, or to Roosevelt, whose speeches are re-broadcast by the BBC. The British had already sought to keep up the spirits of Norwegians, Dutch and Belgians after their conquest, by sending them regular programs in their own languages. And since the Compiègne Armistice they have transmitted daily messages to the beleaguered French people, and not without effect, as shown by the following story. In Paris, at the end of last September, an American visited the *Bon Marché* in search of a pair of shoes and was astonished to discover a long line of customers in front of the shoe department. He inquired as to the cause, and was told that the previous night de Gaulle had advised all Frenchmen to buy as many pairs of shoes as possible to keep them from falling into the hands of the Nazis who, he alleged, were going to requisition all remaining stocks.

II. PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY TERRITORY

The miracle of radio has made it much easier than before to spread propaganda in enemy territory. The methods formerly used, such as dropping leaflets from airplanes or free balloons, were very limited in range and influence. Radio, however, penetrates the enemy frontier without difficulty — in fact, it circles the earth seven times in a single second.

The Nazis early prohibited Germans from listening to foreign stations. The British did not; indeed, the British newspapers very obligingly noted the hours when the famous Lord Haw Haw could be heard. Lately in England, however, such listening has been discouraged as "unpatriotic." Incidentally, each side announces over the radio the names of newly captured prisoners of war in order to encourage people in the enemy territory to listen to its broadcasts.

In the campaign against enemy morale, enemy civilians are told of the corruption of their leaders in peace and their inefficiency in war. Thus the BBC told the Germans: "And now, about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Goebbels. . . . You know that modest way of his? This probably accounts for the fact that he has told you too little about his castle . . . on the Bergensee, the walls of which are decorated with marble, and also a country house . . . on the Langensee, and also a 50-room mansion in Berlin." Similar opulence was charged against Goering, Himmler, Ley and Ribbentrop, who, it was alleged, were making a rather broad interpretation of the Lebensraum slogan.[3]

The effort to sow doubt, confusion and dissension in enemy territory — what might be called dissolvent propaganda — is attempted by all the belligerents. Every effort is made to prove that the enemy's cause is lost. Social, economic and financial conditions are represented as grave, if not hopeless. The Germans asked the French and British, "Why go to war over Danzig?" Eying the laboring classes they said, "Why sacrifice your lives to save a decadent plutocracy?" This last appeal is used by the British, too, in their broadcasts to Germany. Thus the BBC, on July 8, 1940, maintained that Germany's new order "means eternal class struggle, and this is the new order which Hitler believes will last for more than a thousand years . . . an age-old capitalistic manœuvre designed to break the solidarity of the workers."

The German attacks on the Jews, an ever-recurring theme, are apparently designed in part to turn class against class in Britain (and in France and the United States), and at the same time to elicit in certain foreign quarters admiration for Hitler as the outstanding champion of anti-Semitism. Berlin has said to the British: "They [the Jews] live to subjugate the world's energy and wealth, and without any regard to national rights and aspirations, without any concern for human feelings or elementary decency." And to the Americans: "Germany does not need to express either anti-Semitism or its racial doctrine, for both are accepted . . . as a rule of life in America."

In the bitter struggle to win over neutrals, notably the United States as the main prize, radio has played an important rôle. Here the foreign propagandist is really put on his mettle, for he cannot count on the censor to keep embarrassing facts from the public, nor on the police to suppress listening to the enemy. If Zeezen sends Americans a false or exaggerated account of a sea

[3] It is interesting to note that the BBC makes no such personal attacks on Hitler, criticizing him as a leader, not as a man.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

battle, refutation from the BBC or from American radio chains is inevitable. In this matter American news analysts have done much to counteract untrue belligerent propaganda. Also, if the foreign propagandist is to hold his radio audience, he must understand the life, the customs and the literature of the people he is attempting to reach, and must take account of their local point of view. Finally, he must realize that, as a result of faulty techniques employed by both belligerents in the last war — notably the exaggerated use of atrocity stories — the public has become propaganda-conscious. This condition has led to the use of a more veiled approach.

One method of soliciting neutral sympathy is to demonstrate the superiority of your cause over that of the enemy, to show that your aims are sincere and idealistic, those of the enemy hypocritical and aggressive. Thus, over the BBC the Reverend Pat McCormick has told us: "Britain and all that Britain stands for can never die; she is bound to win the day in the end, because she stands for the right, the good, the true and the noble." A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, reminds us how the security of the American continent might have been weakened if Britain had let the French fleet fall into German hands. In contrast, Dr. Otto Koischwitz, alias "Dr. Anders," sends this message to Americans: "The German people are willing to endure the hardships of war. They do not need any intangible, vague, changeable, so-called ideal war aim. They defend the most elemental, the most primitive, the indisputable right of existence."

On another occasion the Nazis said: "Germany now fights for its existence as an independent nation. Germany fights for a living space. . . . This refers to the space required by a nation for peaceful economic development and within which it can tolerate no intriguing and no counter-alliances. Germany's living space is Central Europe, allotted to it by nature. To keep opponents out of this space is not aggression."

With respect to the conduct of the war, each side has harped on the alleged evil practices of the other. The British stress the atrocities in Poland, various inhuman acts of sea warfare, the plundering of occupied territories, the bombing of open towns. Thus on December 5, 1940, the Princeton Listening Center heard Major Hastings tell Americans: "Now, as I am speaking, the bombs are dropping. Five miles high, they are, five miles. Assassination as at Coventry, deliberate, thoroughgoing, painstaking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assassination. Tomorrow there will be another tale of smashed and suffocated and mangled men, women and children, and another gratified grunt from the Nazis."

The Germans, on their part, emphasize the illegality of British control measures, the illegal boarding of the *Altmark*, the bombing of civilians. Here is a sample: "Our assumption was, of course, that even England would not murder civilians, including women and children, for the mere pleasure of so doing. . . . Every crime against German civilians is being carefully noted and when the time comes to present the account, the cost to Britain will be terrible indeed." Apropos of the British action against the French fleet at Oran, E. D. Ward from Berlin compared it "to that Herod, who in his mad rage at his inability to lay hands on the Christ Child, ordered the slaying of the innocents."

During the first months of the war, when the Nazis were making efforts to prevent too great a deterioration in relations between Germany and the United States, they often reminded us of German heroes who had fought in our wars, such as General Herkimer, or those who had taken a prominent part in American life, such as Dr. Muhlenburg, Pennsylvania preacher. As the United States revealed its desire for a British victory, the Nazi propaganda bureau adopted other themes, appealing more to materialistic self-interest, plus a note of intimidation, to be described in a moment.

While the belligerent uses the radio to stress his affinity with the neutral in ideals and interests he tries at the same time to drive a wedge between the neutral and the enemy. Germany has sent out over the air to the United States a series of historical sketches describing the disputes and wars between this country and England, from the Boston tea party down to the war debts. One of the favorite Nazi themes is the allegation that Britain, today as in 1917, has plotted to draw the United States into the European war. "Change the names, the dates, the serial number," says E. D. Ward, "and you have the same story that was written 22 years ago." From the other side of the Channel, British speakers point out to Americans the vast chasm separating Nazi totalitarianism from our concepts of democracy, and stress the incompatibility between the German invasion of Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium and American views on international morality.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III. THE RADIO FIGHT FOR AMERICAN SUPPORT

In the radio war, as in the economic, diplomatic and military fields, the policy of the dictatorships has been dynamic and aggressive, that of the democracies passive and defensive, at least until the Battle of Flanders. Long before the present war, the dictatorships had the upper hand. The Russians sent Communist propaganda to the democratic countries, but the latter, despite fears awakened by this campaign, did little by radio to counteract it. The Nazis, in an effort to influence the plebiscite in the Saar, bombarded the voters there with violent pro-German propaganda, which the French hardly attempted to meet. Similarly, the British waited nearly two years before responding in kind to the Italian radio campaigns among the Arabs, who were urged to revolt against their English "oppressors."

When the present war broke out, the initiative was immediately assumed by the Nazis and maintained for many months. Utilizing excellent equipment and a highly-integrated organization which was the result of years of experience, the Nazi radio was soon sending North American audiences 11 hours of programs each day, and promising us, in the words of a Berlin speaker, "regardless of the war, a choice assortment of broadcasting viands, sparkling musical champagne and other tasty delicacies, such as operettas, variety entertainments, dance music and comic bits." Sandwiched between operas and orchestral music, lively news talks and skits were offered to the American public. The Germans were the first to use American men and women for this purpose. All of them were familiar with American life, and some, like the Iowan Fred W. Kaltenbach, talked to the "folks back in Iowa" in a Midwestern drawl. From the first these speakers conducted an energetic campaign over alleged British crimes and misdemeanors and warned us to beware of being drawn into the war. Violent criticisms were hurled against certain groups and institutions in the United States, notably capitalists, Jews, newspapers and "politicians." At the same time, every effort was made to solicit our sympathy, and to show that our material interests would not suffer from a German victory.

Since the summer of 1940, but with increasing intensity these past few months, the Nazi radio has adopted a much more critical tone in its radio campaign in the United States. No longer do the German spokesmen try to curry our sympathy; rather,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

they spread dissension and confusion, to foment lack of confidence and turn class against class. There has been an intensification of the anti-Semitic campaign. For the first time, the Nazi propagandists seem to feel on the defensive; their main fight now is to nullify the efforts to increase American aid to Britain. As part of this fight, they even resort to direct intimidation, warning us that if we continue to aid Britain we will live to regret it; that since American traders refuse to do business with the Nazis now they will not be able to do so after the war; and that hence the country will suffer losses, a lower standard of living, etc. Accompanying the menaces are assurances that Hitler has no designs on Latin America, and above all no plans for aggression against the United States. Judging by the vast increase in the number of attacks on the United States, its leaders and its institutions, and by the fact that there is now but little difference between the Nazi radio policy toward Britain and that toward the United States, we must conclude that already the Germans are considering us more as an enemy than as a neutral.

British radio propaganda, although more generously financed and better organized than the French, was nevertheless relatively dull and uninspired before the coming of the *Blitzkrieg*. According to a recent study published by the Princeton Listening Center:

> Listeners in the United States were accorded the same treatment as Dominion and colonial audiences. Broadcasting to Americans, who were accustomed to hear minor events reported as if they heralded the imminent collapse of the solar system, London stations relied solely on the Overseas Service, inaugurated for Empire listeners in 1932. It was paced in the same rhythm as the leisurely Home Service; much time was devoted to descriptions of the war effort of the Dominions and Colonies and the activity of Empire troops in the mother country. American listeners might well have agreed with Lord Strabolgi, British Labor peer, who complained last February about the "dullness, repetition and paucity" of news radiated by the BBC.

Since the end of May 1940, however, British radio broadcasts to the United States have been more frequent and more lively. Programs especially prepared for, and beamed to, this country were enriched by additional speakers of first rank, and came to include J. B. Priestley, Wickham Steed, Leslie Howard, Somerset Maugham and others. This use of outstanding men known already to the American public for books or scientific achievements gave the British a notable advantage over the Germans, whose radio speakers are as a rule men and women unknown in America and sometimes inclined to use language and to speak in a tone

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hardly in harmony with American taste. The BBC has also added interesting skits and stunts, long a feature of German programs. Americans accustomed to the dignified and reserved BBC speakers must have been considerably surprised by the announcement, illustrative of the new policy: "Don't forget Princess Elizabeth at 7:45 P.M., Eastern Standard Time, next Sunday!"

This improvement in radio organization after the Battle of Flanders was paralleled by a notable change in propaganda technique. Prior to that time, the British seemed content to stress the inevitability of British victory, implying that aid could be given freely to the Allies without fear of German reprisals. The British even boasted that they intended to refrain from propaganda entirely. But with their backs to the wall, the British adopted a new policy. Their radio themes suddenly became dynamic. They stressed that Britain's and America's destiny were inseparable, that the United States was next on Hitler's list. As Britain was America's first line of defense, it was right that the greatest reliance should be placed on the moral and material support of the United States. In contrast with the German radio, which sought to divide the American public, the British radio aimed to unite American opinion, unite it in support of Britain. Its speakers have tried to inspire confidence, to create a community of interest and feeling between the two peoples.

The French, at the outbreak of the war, gave little attention to public opinion in America, apparently leaving the effort to gain American support almost entirely to the British. Their programs for American consumption were confined mainly to a factual summary of the news, and programs of music, plays and other literature on a high intellectual level, often actually pedantic, lacking the interest and the appeal of the German or even of the British renditions. Many faults of technique, too, were evident, for example the use of French speakers who translated the news extemporaneously and literally, in rather poor English, sometimes in an effeminate tone not at all suited to a country at war. Little effort was made to fit the programs to American tastes. Following the invasion of Denmark, however, the French made belated efforts to reform their entire radio policy. Although improvement in their domestic programs was small, great progress was perceptible in their overseas offerings, especially after the attack on Holland. In fact, for a brief period, lasting until the collapse, the French put on a series of programs which were the most attrac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive of all European broadcasts heard in the United States. News flashes were interspersed between regular programs, military bands occasionally replaced stringed quartets, and refugees and American Legion representatives were put on the air. *Paris-Mondial* was the first station in the democratic countries to use American speakers as a regular part of its programs.

Looking back on the eighteen months of radio warfare, we are impelled to conclude that the Nazi radio, despite the advantages of greater experience, superior organization, and a more imaginative and more energetic policy, has made much less of an impression on the American public than the British.

In the first place, the "climate" of radio propaganda has been more favorable to the British. As shown by the Gallup Polls, public opinion in the United States has been overwhelmingly in favor of Britain. Our people generally accepted the view that alike from the economic, the military, and the cultural point of view our interests are usually parallel, often identical. Naturally one will give a more sympathetic ear to his business partner and friend, than to his business competitor and enemy. In Winston Churchill, too, the British have had a spokesman without a peer elsewhere for confident, measured eloquence interspersed with flashes of irony and wit. Moreover, the elementary facts of the war are such as to predispose the American listener against anyone pleading the German cause. In the last war, the Germans could never live down the rape of Belgium, the submarine warfare, the use of poisonous gas. Similarly no amount of opera or diverting chats by Lord Haw Haw from Berlin can explain away the Jewish pogroms or the ruthless destruction of Rotterdam.

In the second place, there is the practical matter of the radio audience. Here, too, the British enjoy great advantages. From scattered evidence it would appear that not more than 10 or 15 percent of American listeners regularly tune in on short-wave broadcasts from Europe. Probably most of the listeners to German and Italian short-wave signals are immigrants or members of the first generation of American-born. As a matter of fact, most students of the subject believe that the main object of Nazi and Fascist radio propaganda is to maintain or cultivate the loyalty of these groups, and, at the same time, to send directions to sympathizers and "Fifth Columnists" as to the kind of propaganda these are to spread throughout the country. Such listeners, however, represent only a small fraction of the American public. On

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the other hand, many of the British short-wave programs are re-broadcast in this country. By the fall of 1940, a total of 88 American stations were relaying BBC news, and one of the major American chains, the Mutual Broadcasting System, was giving re-broadcasts of BBC news, and even a certain number of topical talks. In addition, Canadian stations easily audible in many parts of the United States were giving more complete renditions of London transmissions, and naturally their own views on the war, practically identical with those of England herself. This immensely valuable avenue of approach — the Canadian radio — cannot be matched by the Germans.

Another advantage enjoyed by the British over the German radio is a reputation for reliability. German and Italian broadcasts are marked by numerous cases of misrepresentation, misstatement or downright falsehood, but it is rare that one finds the BBC wandering from the truth. The BBC may not always give the whole truth, and it may suppress or postpone the announcement of particularly bad news. And, naturally, it will present the most favorable interpretations of events and causes. But, by and large, its broadcasts have maintained a high degree of accuracy. The German and British radios are as different as the lawyer who manufactures evidence, and the one who, while making out the best possible case for his client, refrains from directly unethical practices. There is much evidence to the effect that the American public considers the reports from London as much more reliable than news from Berlin. And it is likely that if the BBC maintains its present policy, Americans will tend to ascribe even greater credibility to the BBC news, and that our resistance to British reports, so prevalent among a people fearful of propaganda, will tend to diminish.

This propaganda phobia is a grave obstacle to clear thinking. The tendency to ignore everything coming out from a belligerent country as "mere propaganda" is folly. The crucial question is whether the fact is true and the appeal is sound. I have seen students at the movies squirm in their seats, protesting, "This is propaganda," when views of bombed Coventry were shown. We must not allow ourselves to be taken in by specious arguments. But we must not let ourselves mistrust the truth out of laziness or in order to spare ourselves the pain of acting on our considered decisions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OUR HERITAGE FROM THE LAW OF ROME

By C. H. McIlwain

WE in England and America have inherited a long-standing tradition, and we keep repeating it without criticism, that Roman Law on its political side is the synonym of absolutism. It is time that we began to examine that tradition. When we find Nazi Germany repudiating Roman Law because it stands in the way of a program for the slavery of the world under the heel of its "Aryan" masters, we must ask why the most despotic, repulsive and oppressive system ever proposed for mankind includes among its first principles this repudiation of Roman Law.

It is not because the Nazi leaders have not seen the problem. They have seen it far more clearly than we have, and they have come to the settled conclusion that their yoke can never be imposed on the world until the universalism, the rationalism, the individualism of Roman Law are replaced by the tribal myth of Aryanism. They are forced to repudiate the catholicity of all previous European culture for a narrow tribalism which alone can justify their domination of the world. The Nazis reject Roman Law, an important element in that culture, because it is essentially universal; and because, like all universal systems, it is individualistic. To be more specific, they reject it because it recognizes what we used to call "the rights of man," and because Nazism can advance in no other way than by trampling on all those rights. If Roman Law is the despotic system we have usually assumed it to be, why should the Nazis not use it instead of rejecting it? Why should they be forced to omit it entirely as they do from their "new order" for the world? One cannot vindicate the intelligence of the Nazi leaders without questioning their sincerity. Men who could see so clearly the political implications of Roman Law for their theories of Aryan superiority could hardly be oblivious of the absurdity of the latter theory or of its completely unhistorical character. If we assume their intelligence we cannot give them credit for honesty. Here, however, we are concerned only with the correctness of their estimate of the character of Roman Law. We must therefore examine critically our own traditions concerning the political influence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the jurisprudence of Rome, for if the Nazi interpretation is right, ours is certainly wrong.

I

In 1605 John Cowell, a doctor of the Civil law, and later Regius Professor of that subject at Cambridge, set forth the law of England in an interesting little book in Latin modeled on the "Institutes" of Justinian, arranged in the same order, and combining English and Roman legal principles. In his dedication Dr. Cowell says that many years of study have convinced him that "our common law, as we call it, is nothing else than a mixture of the Roman and the feudal." And he adds that the bitter controversies between the respective advocates of the Civil and the common law in England would have been ended long before, and the two laws themselves combined in a single system, but for the fact that these advocates have had a greater zeal for their own private profit than for "the public glory of their country." This is a rather remarkable and a rather startling statement about the common law, and it includes a biting indictment of the common lawyers. Little wonder that Sir Edward Coke should have referred to Dr. Cowell as "Dr. Cow-heel," or that Cowell's law dictionary, the "Interpreter," published in 1607, was attacked in Parliament in 1610. For tactical reasons this parliamentary attack was ostensibly aimed at Cowell's definitions of "King," "prerogative," and "subsidy." But the real animus of Coke and the rest of the common lawyers in the House of Commons was against Cowell's insistence on the Roman element in the English common law — such things, as he says in one of the definitions in his "Interpreter," as "have as yet no apparent acceptance amongst our Lawyers, but only a hidden use;" against his belief that both laws "be raysed of one Foundation, and differ more in language and termes then in substance, and therefore were they reduced to one method (as they easily might) to bee attained (in a manner) with all one paines;" and against his insinuation that it was the "private profit" of the common lawyers alone that led them to oppose such a reduction. We are immediately concerned here with the meaning and the correctness of Cowell's assertion that the English common law is a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal, and with the reasons for the contrary view held by the common lawyers of the time and by a majority of these ever since. If we can answer the questions thus raised,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we shall have accounted in some measure at least for our Heritage of Roman Law.

There is hardly a modern book — hardly an English book at least — on the Renaissance, that does not attribute the growing absolutism of that time more or less directly to the Roman Law. In the main the authors of such books seem to have taken at its face value the statement of Sir John Fortescue in the fifteenth century that the central and most fundamental principle of Roman Law is expressed in the absolutist maxim "what has pleased the prince has the force of a *lex*," and that wherever actual absolutism is found it is an application of this maxim. Fortescue deals with this subject in more than one place in his various works, but his "De Laudibus Legum Angliae" (or "Praises of the Laws of England") alone is responsible for the later development of the English ideas on this subject, as it alone among his writings was in print before the eighteenth century. In Chapter XXIV of "De Laudibus" Fortescue calls the doctrines just referred to "the chief principles among the civil laws" (*inter leges civiles praecipua Sententia*).

Almost all historians of England and of English law since Fortescue have followed him in asserting that Roman Law spells absolutism, and that England is freer than other countries because her law is less a Roman one than theirs. We may agree that England at the end of the fifteenth century was less despotic than France, as Fortescue says; we may believe that this difference became still wider in later times; but this is not necessarily to accept Fortescue's explanation of the causes of these differences. In 1605 when Cowell wrote, the rights of the subject in England were no doubt far safer from royal interference than similar rights were in France; and it is no less certain that these rights were defined by the common law and found their chief defenders in the common lawyers — that law, as one member of the House of Commons aptly put it in 1610, was "the wall betwixt the King and his subjects." But does it necessarily follow from this that Cowell was wrong in saying, as he did, that this English common law was a mixture of Roman and feudal principles?

Answers to the questions whether Fortescue was right in saying that absolutism was the "central principle" of the Roman Law, and whether Cowell was right in his assertion that our English common law is a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may possibly lead us to the answer to our own question: What is our heritage from the law of Rome?

Anyone who studies the development of our law between the Norman conquest and the Renaissance, and compares this with what went on in the same period on the Continent, in France particularly, finds an amazing similarity between English and continental institutions, including the strong influence of Roman Law, before the fourteenth century; and thereafter a remarkable change in England which led at length to bitter hostility between the common lawyers and the civilians. No such change as this took place in France, where the development of Roman Law was unbroken. But it did take place in England. Thus by the last quarter of the fifteenth century Fortescue thinks he finds despotism to be the central principle of the Roman Law, and the chief proof of it he believes to be the government of France which is a regal or despotic (*despoticum*) rule; while England's is by contrast a rule regal *and* "constitutional" (*politicum*). For him, France was a despotism because she had stuck to the central principle of the Romans that what has pleased the prince has the force of law; while England had developed a constitutional government in defiance of this Roman principle.

There is no question of the difference between England and France that had come about by Fortescue's time, but there is a very great question as to the part played by Roman Law in making that difference. Furthermore, there is no question that Fortescue retains, and carries further, principles of constitutional government which can be found two or three centuries earlier in England; but this does not necessarily mean that he retains the same attitude toward Roman Law, or the same definition of Roman political principles, held by his predecessors at that time. He was right in pointing out the growing contrast between England and France; wrong, I believe, in attributing this difference to Roman legal principles. He was right in his contention that the English rule was freer and less despotic than that of France in his day; right, too, in his implication that England no longer applied Roman Law to the same extent as in France. But in his assertion that Roman Law means absolutism and his implication that English liberty is the result of the discarding of Roman Law — there, I believe that history proves him and those who have followed him to be clearly wrong.

Probably the strongest proof that earlier English lawyers had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a conception of the political aspect of Roman Law different from that of Fortescue is to be found in the great book of Bracton on "The Laws and Customs of England," finished soon after the middle of the thirteenth century. To Bracton the maxim that the will of the prince has the force of law is not, as it was later for Fortescue, a statement of absolutism and at the same time the "central principle" of Roman jurisprudence. On the contrary, he finds that central principle, I think, in a notable passage from Papinian in which a law is said to be, not the will of the prince, but the "common engagement of the republic" — a passage which Bracton quotes with approval and clearly believes to apply to his own country as much as to Rome. He is acquainted, of course, with the famous maxim that what has pleased the prince has the force of law, but he thinks that if it applies to England at all it is because the passage of Justinian's "Institutes" in which it occurs is in reality a reference only to the popular origin of the Emperor's authority, which in no way implies its arbitrary character. In fact, Bracton regards the *Lex Regia* to which the "Institutes" refer here as the Roman equivalent of the English coronation oath in which the kings at their accession swore (or were soon to swear) to govern according to the laws chosen by the people. For him Roman Law clearly means a constitutional rule, not a despotic one. He cites more than one passage of the Roman Law books indicating that fact and apparently finds none which denies it, and for him England is therefore like Rome in the enjoyment of such a constitutional form of government.

Bracton does not distinguish the essentials of English constitutionalism from those of Roman constitutionalism. To him they are more alike than unlike. In neither of them does he find absolutism "the central principle;" in both that central principle is rather that the the people alone, and not the prince, is the source of all legal authority. No one who reads Bracton with attention can doubt his constitutionalism; no one can deny his reliance on Roman legal principles; and no one has ever been able to show that in this Bracton does not faithfully represent the legal thinking of his day. What we now know from the recently published cases decided in the earlier thirteenth century confirms the view that Martin of Pattishall, William of Raleigh, and the other earlier English judges whose decisions Bracton cites so often in his book, held the same fundamental constitutional position

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as he, and placed the same reliance on Roman jurisprudence in support of it. Bracton was by no means the first — he was nearer to the last — of those English lawyers and judges who identified the essentials of English and Roman constitutionalism. And that tradition may be traced back safely as far as Glanvill, in the reign of Henry II, when the mediæval revival of Roman Law was still in its early stages. Bracton is thus a standing proof of the fallacy of our current notion that English law from the beginning has been less influenced by Roman jurisprudence and Roman political ideas than continental; and that it is for that reason a more constitutional and a less despotic system.

If corroboration of Bracton's evidence were needed, we might find it in the history of canon law in England from the Conquest to the thirteenth century. The recent careful examination by Dr. Zachary Brooke of the English manuscripts of the canonical books in this period fully warrants his conclusions, in opposition to Stubbs and the earlier Anglican nationalist writers, that "the law of the Church, the whole law and not a selected part of it, was the law of the English Church;" and further, that "there is no shred of evidence to show that the English Church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was governed by laws selected by itself." When we remember that the English judges in this important period in the formation of our common law were all ecclesiastics, and when we consider the common Roman features of the canon and the civil law, the importance of these facts in the building of the general principles of the common law itself, public as well as private, will at once become evident.

For a generation or more English historians almost without exception had accepted without due examination or criticism the view set forth by Bishop Stubbs in the celebrated Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission of 1883, that the canon law in its entirety was never in force in mediæval England, but only such part of it as the Church of England saw fit to receive. Stubbs was led to this belief by the undoubted fact that in England, as in other particular provinces of the universal Church as well, there did exist certain traditional rules and even certain "constitutions" which were peculiar to the country, had no application outside it, and were therefore no part of the "common law" of the Church Universal. From this fact he drew the unnecessary inference that no part of the canon law was in force in England if the *Ecclesia Anglicana* did not receive it. He re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

garded canon law as a foreign law, and if it was employed in any jurisdiction in England it was only because this was an "indulged jurisdiction," as Sir Matthew Hale called it in the seventeenth century in his "History of the Common Law." But between the thirteenth century and the seventeenth the whole notion of a "common law" had undergone considerable change. In the seventeenth century Lord Hale was entirely justified in regarding such courts as that of the Admiralty as "indulged jurisdiction." Other courts whose procedure also followed the Civil rather than the common law had been abolished by statute, such as the Court of Star Chamber and the High Commission for Ecclesiastical Causes; and such courts as remained in reality existed only by sufferance of the sovereign authority in the state. In the seventeenth century they were "indulged" by Parliament, and for this reason to Stubbs the Civil law which they followed had always been "indulged" by the English Church. Now this is a *non sequitur*, and a serious one. In the Middle Ages and afterward, in secular matters as well as ecclesiastical, a law, in order to be "common" need not be necessarily exclusive: it was a subsidiary rule which merely underlay particular rules which differed from it, not one which overrode them unless they were utterly inconsistent with it. Common law and particular law stood side by side, the former assumed by the Courts without specific proof, the latter accepted as valid if proved and not against reason common law or statute. The existence of ecclesiastical rules peculiar to England in the Middle Ages is therefore no valid basis for the conclusion that England repudiated the law common to the whole Church. Common law is merely the system to which recourse is had when no particular law applies, it in no sense excludes all particular law. For example, in Germany after the reception of Roman Law, German custom was not abolished, it merely ceased to be the reservoir on which the judges drew in cases where no such custom was applicable.

Probably it was a clearer understanding of what a common law thus always implied — or rather, what it did not imply — which led Maitland to reject the generally accepted view that canon law was merely "indulged" in mediæval England. If this rejection is supported by the facts of the time, as I believe it is, this has an important bearing on the larger question of the influence of Roman law on the development of our legal institutions, public and private, in the most critical of all the periods in their devel-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opment. The insular character of English canon law cannot be dated before the sixteenth century; the insular attitude toward Roman Law not before the fourteenth.

Our attention has hitherto been directed toward England alone, and Bracton has been taken as the most likely index of the extent and character of the Roman Law influence upon our political institutions and ideas about the middle of the thirteenth century. If now we should compare his book in this respect with the writings across the Channel most nearly comparable in time and in subject matter, the impression of the importance of Roman Law in England would, I believe, be heightened rather than lessened. The continental book that naturally occurs to one as probably the fairest basis of such a comparison is the "Summa De Legibus," written by an unknown author about the same time as Bracton's book, and dealing with Norman institutions in much the same way as he was dealing with those of England. But any comparison of the two books, even an incomplete one, would soon show that the influence of Roman Law is stronger and more pervasive in the English book than in the Norman one.

What has been said thus far applies to England from the eleventh or twelfth century down to probably the end of the thirteenth, or possibly a little later; but it would be unsafe on the existing evidence to extend it much further. This, however, is far enough to prove its fundamental importance; for the period between the eleventh and the thirteenth century is beyond question the most decisive by far in the whole evolution of our legal institutions and ideas. We talk about "the Renaissance" and its influence on our political institutions and our law, and they were no doubt of the greatest importance; but we sometimes forget that some three or four centuries earlier there was a true "Renaissance" whose influence on our law and politics was far more fundamental and more lasting. It was then, and not later, that our common law, our notions of the relations of law and government, in fact our whole conception of the state, took much of the form that they retain to this day.

II

To make my point I have had to include some tiresome history, for this is a historical question. But if that history is correctly stated, the inferences to be drawn from it are clear. I shall try to state them in a series of short propositions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our heritage from Roman Law is very great, and it has not been appreciated. Dr. Cowell was right in saying that our common law was a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal. The common lawyers who opposed him were right in defending the common law as "the wall betwixt the King and his subjects." But they were wrong, as Fortescue before them was wrong, in holding that the central political principle of the Roman Law was the despotism of the maxim that what pleases the Prince has the force of a *lex;* and wrong also in believing that the English common law could include none of it. I am here not attempting to defend all of Cowell's inferences or some of his definitions. I am asserting only that in his statement that the common law of England is a mixture of the Roman and the feudal he was far nearer than his opponents were to the views of the great builders of our common law in the most critical period of its evolution, such as Glanvill and Bracton, and, in fact, all the judges before the fourteenth century.

Those early judges saw, as their English successors could not see, that the central principle of Roman Law is not to be found in absolutism. Unlike Fortescue and the later lawyers, they did not interpret the maxim of Justinian's "Institutes" as a statement of despotic power, but rather as a reference to the fact that all the authority of a prince must come ultimately from the people. If Bracton saw any "central" principle in Roman Law, it was not absolutism but the doctrine of Papinian, that all law is the "common engagement of the republic," a doctrine which Bracton quotes and applies without reserve to his own country. He had a greater knowledge and a clearer vision of the political meaning of Roman Law than Fortescue or Fortescue's successors. To him it was not so much Roman as universal, and its central principle was that law is the creation of the people alone whenever and wherever it is found. Sir Edward Coke, narrowminded conservative though he was, was one of the great heroes in the history of our constitutionalism, for in his day the common law was the only "wall" against the despotism of the Stuarts. And the party he was opposing, to which Cowell belonged, we must also admit, was striving with might and main to "leape over or breake downe this wall," as one of its opponents charged in the House of Commons. Cowell owed his advancement to Archbishop Bancroft, the leader of this party; his books were written at Bancroft's suggestion, and the "Interpreter" itself was dedicated to him.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet in this there is no invalidation necessarily of Cowell's contention that the common law itself was a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal. It is this alone that I am arguing, for it is in the "mixture" that we find our greatest inheritance from Roman Law. Coke was defending against Cowell the liberties of England enshrined in the common law; but Cowell, it seems to me, was in some respects the better historian of the early development of that law.

There is nothing very new in this argument. It may be found stated in far better terms than mine in some of the pamphlets written against the non-jurors and their doctrines of non-resistance immediately after the English Revolution, especially in some "Reflections Upon the Opinions of Some Modern Divines," in which the author proves with great learning that the *Lex Regia* of Rome, like the common law of England, "did not overthrow the Propriety of the Subject." This would, and it did, refute the specific doctrine of Cowell's "Interpreter" that an English king could take a subsidy without consent. But it corroborated Cowell's general contention that the English law is a "mixture" of the Roman and the feudal; for the English principle of no taxation without representation is an outgrowth of the mixing of feudal custom and the principles of the Roman Law in the period of Granvill and Bracton. And in estimating the extent and the nature of this "mixture" in our modern liberty we must not overlook the fact that this "Propriety of the Subject," which the Roman and the common law both put beyond the ruler's reach, as the pamphleteer said, included far more than our modern mere "property rights." In the feudal period when this "wall" was built against the encroachment of government, "propriety" included most of those rights of the subject which we call personal as well as proprietary; it protected the integrity of the status of the serf as well as the feudal immunity of his lord. Thus this "wall," built of local materials, the customary law of the country, but fashioned on a plan that owed much to Roman jurisprudence, marked off a field in England, as it had in Rome, into which the power of the prince could not lawfully intrude. And this field in the Middle Ages included not alone the territorial fiefs of the King's subjects, but their immunities, or liberties, or franchises, as they were called, as well as their dignities, their offices, and their personal status.

It is not too much to say that most of the safeguards of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

individual which we prize today have their origin in these feudal immunities or liberties. They began in local English customs which undoubtedly preceded the revival of Roman Law in England; but the principles on which these diverse customs were fused and made "common," and above all the legal remedies gradually evolved to prevent or punish their breach, came in large part from the Roman Law. And they were devised by men who revered that law as their successors did not, and who even regarded it as a system almost synonymous with human reason. In the universal principles of this Roman Law, as these founders of our common law saw them, the central principle was certainly not despotism. John of Salisbury, a contemporary of Granvill, quotes much from Justinian's law books; but I recall no quotation of the well-known maxims of absolutism. Instead we find the famous *Digna Vox* of the Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian — "Indeed it is on the authority of the law that our own authority depends."

The recent developments in this present World War have done more than merely wake us up to the deadly threat that a totalitarian victory would hold to our whole way of life. They have brought home to every man, except to those hopelessly blind or selfishly indifferent, the necessity for action, and immediate action, if our own fate is not to be the fate of Denmark and Norway, of Holland and Belgium and France. And they have done even more than that. These developments, together with the official pronouncements of the totalitarian adventurers themselves, have convinced all thinking men at last — and it has taken much to do it — that the present struggle is far more than any mere battle for the domination of Europe or even of the world. It now stands out, confessedly and openly, as an attempt to set up a "new order" in the world, an order in which the traditions of the race, in culture, law, morality, and religion, are all to be thrown down and supplanted by a complete *étatisme*, maintained by brute force and designed to crush all initiative, to override every individual right, and to substitute for the law in which this right is enshrined the naked will of the ruler alone. This ruler is represented in this "new order" as the living voice of a culture that is tribal and not universal. He is the "leader" of a race of masters with a divine though heathen right to a rule which they now mean to exercise over a subjugated world of slaves. The official statements of the present Nazi leaders leave

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no doubt that nothing less than this is the program they propose to enforce upon every part of the world when once it has been overrun by their military power or subdued by their economic power.

The "new order," then, would be a cultural as well as a political revolution. It would destroy at a blow traditions honored and cherished, even if not always lived up to, for more than two thousand years. Roman Law is far from being the whole of this great inheritance. But it is an important part, and a part, I am convinced, which our particular Anglo-Saxon tradition in its later interpretation has sometimes led us to overlook or underrate.

The appalling recrudescence in the last few years of an absolutism that we fondly thought the world had renounced forever makes somewhat clearer than before our duty and also our debt to the Law of Rome. This crisis in the world's history is the most serious in a thousand years. Because Nazi tribalism rejects the universality of Roman Law we know the better that at all costs we must maintain it; because the despotism of present-day Germany overrides all the private rights that the Roman and the English law protect, we are the more conscious of the value of these rights and the more determined that they shall not perish from the earth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MEXICAN ARMY

By Virginia Prewett

MEXICO'S army is not a parade-ground army. Nor is it large or highly mechanized when judged in comparison with the armed forces of Great Powers. Yet, it serves the Mexican nation in the multiple capacity as guarantor of the stability of the constituted government, keeper of the public peace, and active collaborator in the country's public works program — and it does this at a cost per man that is approximately one-eighth of what in times of peace the United States has been accustomed to spend on its armed forces. Mexico's army is a working army, and on its various internal fronts it wages a peace-time campaign all the year round.

During the past twenty years the Mexican Army has been undergoing a process of transformation, both in mission and in organization. From a force of revolutionary irregulars that set up and pulled down governments at the will of its commanding generals it has grown into a national institution fulfilling the orthodox function of protecting the nation against its enemies. From 1920 till the present these enemies have been internal ones: rebels and bandits. Now, however, the Army has a new mission — to defend the country against external aggression. Since the Havana Conference of last July, this has come to include Hemisphere Defense.

In order to discuss Mexico's rôle in Hemisphere Defense, we must first examine her strategic position and what opportunities it offers for invasion by non-American Powers.

On the east, Mexico is protected from direct attack by the firm control which the United States exercises over the approaches to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. To the south the rough terrain and impenetrable jungle along the Guatemalan border — through which there is only one major line of communication, the railroad line running down to Suchiate — protect Mexico in that quarter. In any event, Guatemala, with less than three million inhabitants, is not regarded in Mexico as a potential threat. A more immediate danger lies in the large number of German coffee planters, many of them naturalized Mexican citizens married to Mexican wives, who could carry on subversive activities from their settlements along the Guatemalan border in the state of Chiapas. In this region, where roads are scarce and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communications difficult, the Francisco Sarabia Company operates 6,470 kilometers of airlines, partially staffed by Germans who too have become naturalized Mexicans.

Mexico is most exposed, then, on the west, where over two thousand miles of unprotected and virtually unpatrolled seacoast stretch from the United States to Guatemala. The ports of Guaymas, Mazatlán, Manzanillo, Acapulco and Salina Cruz, spaced fairly evenly along this coast, are without up-to-date defenses and, on paper at least, are wide open to invasion. The Mexican Navy, consisting of two 1,600-ton transports, four 1,300-ton gunboats and ten 183-ton coast-guard boats, is scarcely adequate as a scouting force, much less as a defense for Mexico's two coasts. If, therefore, the American Navy should for any reason be unable to lend a hand in the protection of Mexico's western ports, these might quite conceivably fall into hostile hands and become bases for an invasion of the United States itself.

An even more immediate possibility is that at small and secret enemy stations along Mexico's wild and rugged west coast, sea raiders, particularly submarines, could refuel in order to strike surprise blows at our Pacific coast bases or, more important still, at the Panama Canal. The Japanese have had a fishing industry on this coast for many years and are said to know these waters better than anybody else in the world. They have colonies composed of naturalized Mexican citizens married to Mexicans, all up and down the coast. They also own oil companies, organized under Mexican law, as well as oil concessions. From the desert regions of northwestern Mexico, sabotage activities against the United States could easily be organized. Such vital cogs in our defense machine as Randolph Field, Kelly Field, Boulder Dam, the naval bases at San Francisco, San Pedro and San Diego, the aviation industry of Southern California, are all within striking distance of Mexico.

Another point of great strategic importance is the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, where the Gulf of Mexico is less than two hundred miles from the Pacific. From New Orleans to Puerto México on the Gulf is only 795 miles. Both Puerto México and Salina Cruz, the corresponding harbor on the Pacific side, can be made into first-class ports, though the latter receives a sand drift from the Pacific and would have to be dredged extensively. If the railroad connecting the two ports were converted into a multiple-track way and a highway built parallel to it, there would exist a new and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

up-to-date shortcut from the Atlantic to the Pacific some fifteen hundred miles north of Panama. Completion of the Mexican link of the Pan American Highway, now passable in good weather almost to Salina Cruz, would make it possible to reach this port overland from American soil in 24 hours — and Salina Cruz, it must be remembered, is halfway between San Diego and the Panama Canal. This port, though not so large as Magdalena Bay or even Acapulco, both of which have been discussed as possible naval bases on the Pacific, can with dredging and other improvements be made into an adequate refueling station which by pipeline could be plentifully supplied with oil from the fields on the other side of the isthmus. In any long-term plan for the coördinated defense of this hemisphere, these developments, made within the framework of a military agreement with Mexico, seem to be inevitable. In particular, Mexico is strategically very important because of her supply of many metals and minerals vital to American war industries. Should the United States find itself at war, every mine, every oil field, every railroad and every highway in Mexico would have its place in Hemisphere Defense.

Obviously, then, the part assigned to Mexico's Army in any general plan for the protection of this hemisphere is important. Upon it would rest the duty of insuring the stability of the existing government by preventing armed revolution, of policing the interior of the country against sabotage, and of protecting its coasts against invasion. Armed revolt has not been successful since Obregón overthrew Carranza in 1920, after which time the United States adopted a policy of denying the sale of arms to Mexican rebels. But this is in itself no guarantee that part of the Army might not revolt should there arise within the country a serious political division in which one side received effective support from foreign Powers. Indeed, European or Asiatic Powers might help to start such a revolt in the knowledge that it would cripple our Hemisphere Defense plans. This would alarm American opinion and oblige the United States to divert a considerable portion of its armed forces to border duty; it might also be the signal for outbreaks in other Latin American countries where well-organized European minority groups hold strategic positions. If a disturbance in Mexico could be used to force actual intervention from the United States, this would be a major tactical victory for the enemy, for it could be used as proof positive of our "imperialistic" designs on Latin America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is therefore vital that the Mexican Army, if it is to fulfil its mission as a defender of the constituted government, must stress the duty of the individual officers and men to maintain loyalty to the Army as a permanent, non-political institution. This evolution away from the old idea that the Army was a means for advancing the political fortunes of its leaders has, since Calles' time, been assiduously fostered by the Government. Today Mexico's Army is, in every sense of the word, a new institution.

The break with the old Díaz army, begun in 1910 when this ornamental body first disintegrated before the impact of the Madero movement and then went over to it, was completed when the reactionary elements that had reassembled around Huerta were defeated and dispersed by Carranza. Carranza's Constitutionalist Army of eighty thousand men was in fact a combination of several armies, each one held together by personal loyalty to its commander, and all of them united by the common desire of their chiefs to overthrow Huerta. Enrollment was voluntary and informal; rank and promotion depended directly on pleasing the chief; equipment was heterogeneous and there was no regulation uniform. Though there were some Díaz-trained officers scattered throughout the various corps, tactics were on the whole pragmatical and unorthodox. These armies lived off the country. Their number rose and fell with the temperature of the political moment. They were, in fact, little more than loosely-organized forces of irregulars.

This evolution towards a line army has been the result of giving the officers instruction in military science and in orthodox methods of organization and discipline. Along with this has gone the inculcation of the idea that the Army is the servant rather than the creator of the government. This process would have been interminably slow had it not been paralleled by other processes: first, the elimination — by a series of purges — of the officers who adhered to the old conception of the Army as primarily a revolutionary instrument: and secondly, the establishment of the precedent that an officer's career profited by his remaining loyal to the constituted government in times of rebellion.

The first of these purges came soon after the victory over Huerta, when Villa separated from the main body of the Constitutionalist Army. The process of evolution by education began soon afterwards. While Carranza was reorganizing the Government, Obregón began to reorganize the Army. An important step,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taken in 1917, was the founding of the *Academia de Estado Mayor* (General Staff School), staffed by men who had received technical training under Díaz. In 1920, this school was converted into the *Colegio Militar*, the time of instruction was increased from eighteen months to three years, and separate courses were established for infantry, cavalry and artillery. The second purge took place in 1923 when the rebellion of de la Huerta was put down. Many of the officers who supported him were shot, many others went into exile, and the way was thus cleared for the young officers coming from the military school. A better selected and educated body of officers made it possible in turn for stricter norms of discipline to be imposed on the men in the ranks.

Under Calles, Secretary of War Joaquín Amaro began to whip the rank and file into shape. Recruiting standards were raised and an effort made to improve the equipment, the living conditions and the morale of the men. In 1924, the nation was divided into thirty-three small military zones and a policy of shifting commands was begun. This served to prevent any one general from establishing personal influence over too large a sector of the Army. In 1925, Mexico began to send military missions to study in France, Spain, Italy and the United States. Upon their return these officers acted as instructors and advisers to the Command. In 1926, the first step toward the creation of a general staff was taken when the *Comisión de Estudios Militares* was created. In 1927, another purge took place when Generals Serrano, Gómez, Aguirre, Amado and a large number of their adherents were eliminated after the failure of their attempt at revolt.

But the old revolutionary pattern persisted, and in 1929 General Escobar in Coahuila, in agreement with Generals Manso in Sonora and Caveo in Chihuahua, attempted to overthrow the Calles' dictatorship then being exercised through President Portes Gil. The defeat of these rebels by loyal forces under Generals Almazán, Cárdenas, Cedillo and Miguel Acosta provided another precedent for the new tradition that officers must support the existing government against attempts to change it by military force. When under Calles the Army was used to put down the Catholic rebellions in Jalisco and Michoacán, commanding generals were given further opportunities for appreciating the advantages of remaining loyal.

In the early 30's, the process of evolution by education was speeded up. At the same time an attempt to standardize the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Army's equipment was begun with the remodeling of the old arms factory at Mexico City and by improvements in the country's powder and small arms plants. In 1932, the *Escuela Superior de Guerra*, Mexico's War College, was organized. The *Comisión de Estudios Militares* was strengthened and given the best technical brains the Army had developed. Soon after, the *Escuela de Aplicación* was organized for infantry, artillery, cavalry and engineers. The latter gives advanced courses, similar to those of our branch schools in the United States, for captains about to be promoted and for young majors. In 1935, infantry officers below the rank of colonel were given an examination and those who did not pass were put on the list for the schools. Courses of study for non-commissioned officers were also instituted. In 1936, the promotion of field and junior officers was put on the basis of an examination formulated by the *Comisión de Estudios Militares*. In 1937, it was made unlawful for a commissioned officer to have a civilian occupation. Also in 1937, after it had been found that police duty in remote districts required more junior officers than the schools were producing, the *Centro de Instrucción de Jefes y Oficiales* was set up in order to prepare non-commissioned officers of proven merit for service as officers. Thus, as in the old revolutionary army, it is now possible for an enlisted man to reach the higher ranks; but the modern route of advancement is by proving one's capacity to absorb education and technical training rather than by displaying personal loyalty to a particular chief.

That this evolution is gradually changing the psychology of the Army is shown by the fact that in each successive military rebellion since de la Huerta's in 1923, fewer and fewer Army elements have taken part. The last revolt, led by General Saturnino Cedillo in 1938–39, scarcely deserves the name of military rebellion, so few were the men who followed him. It is, however, true that the rapid and arbitrary promotions made in the revolutionary years have left a large number of men in the higher ranks who are still as much politicians as soldiers. To cope with this evil the Cárdenas Government had a law passed reducing the time of active service for these officers from 35 to 25 years; as a result a large number went on the retired list. For political reasons, they were recalled in 1939; but the law still stands and can be put into effect whenever the political crisis has passed.

In 1938, the office of Secretary of War was changed to that of Minister of National Defense, and its duties became more purely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

administrative. At the same time the *Comisión de Estudios Militares* became the *Dirección Técnica Militar*, to supply technical advice and planning. Plans for an orthodox general staff have been completed and will be carried out in the near future. The 1939–40 presidential campaign found the Army divided in its loyalties. The government party, the PRM, had a well-organized military sector which supported Ávila Camacho, while thirty-four officers of the active list were given extended leave to campaign for Almazán. But now that the election is over, President Ávila Camacho has stated repeatedly — and his re-statement of it in his inaugural address received applause — that the political activity of Army officers will be discouraged. The "military sector" of the new Congress has already merged with the "popular sector."

Mexico's combat troops at present number around 42,000 men; another 10,000 are included in administrative and service bodies. Fifty battalions of infantry numbering 22,600 men, and forty cavalry regiments numbering 19,000, two artillery regiments numbering 1,300, two battalions of engineers, seven aviation squadrons, and an experimental anti-aircraft battery and tank corps make up the effectives.

The basic unit of the infantry company is the "pelotón" or squad of nine privates, a corporal and a sergeant. Eight men in each squad are armed with a Mauser-type *musquetón*, a rifle manufactured at the National Arms Factory in Mexico City that dates from the time of Díaz. However, this gun has been improved and its universal use is a step toward the standardization of equipment. The ninth private of the squad is armed with a light Mendoza machine-gun, the product of a Mexican inventor and also made at the National Arms Factory. This is considered a good gun, is simple in construction and does not heat up. Three squads make up a platoon of thirty-three men; and three platoons make a company, officered by a first and a second captain, three lieutenants and three sub-lieutenants. The high proportion of junior officers is a carry-over from the days of the levy army before and during the Díaz dictatorship. The proportion has been preserved because patrol duty in small detachments requires many junior officers. Into the infantry battalion go three line companies and a light company of machine-gunners, numbering around fifty men. The latter are equipped with six of the heavier Mendozas, a 7-mm. machine-gun, and two 60-mm. Brandt mortars.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The cavalry regiment follows this same general organization. Troops of 100 men each are officered by first and second captains, three lieutenants and three sub-lieutenants. Three troops make a squadron, staffed by a colonel or brigadier, a major, a captain adjutant and two sub-lieutenants who act as sub-adjutants. The personnel of the supply and administrative services bring the cavalry regiment to 400 men. The Mexican cavalry horse is of Spanish-Arabian descent, acclimated to Mexico during the centuries that have elapsed since it was first brought over. It is a small animal, but tough and admirably suited to the country's rough terrain and varied climate. Mexico's two artillery regiments are permanently stationed at the nation's capital. Their equipment was formerly the old French 75, but this is now being replaced by a modified adaptation of the same gun.

Not since the Escobar rebellion in 1929 has Mexico's Army been organized into the conventional divisions; instead it has been distributed among the country's thirty-three military zones as local situations and the nature of the terrain have required. Within the military zones, regiments or battalions are divided among the principal towns. Two thirds of each of these units are then sent on 30-day tours of duty among smaller towns to protect highways and railways and in general to maintain order. The section remaining at the base is occupied with parade-ground training and construction work. This plan, while practical from the point of view of police duty, is not conducive to combat efficiency or to that parade-ground perfection on which officers of many Latin-American countries, notably Cuba, place so much emphasis. It is for this reason that Mexican military authorities are anxious to lessen the Army's police duties.

During the past few years the accent in the Army has been on work. Official reports from the Ministry of National Defense tell a running story of thousands of civic projects, large and small, completed by Mexico's soldiers. Roads have been built and kept in repair, drainage and irrigation projects have been completed, reforestation undertaken, the improvement and beautification of towns carried out. Schools have been erected and staffed with teachers from the Army. The Army has built hospitals and airports. Mexico now has 307 of the latter, 68 of them under military control. Construction of six major army posts has been started, and those at Mexico City and Monterrey are nearing completion. Others will be at Torreón, Irapuato, Pachuca and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cuernavaca. The most important single work now under construction is the Military Hospital at the capital, a building which when completed will be the largest and most modern hospital in the nation.

Mexican Army officers coöperate with local authorities in applying the agrarian laws, in establishing the limits of the *ejidos* (communal peasant communities) and in dividing land to be distributed among the peasants. Army officers are also in charge of the reserves, a body (first instituted in 1937) which now numbers on paper approximately 60,000 men. Reserve stocks of second-class weapons and some two million rounds of small arms ammunition are held for their use. All over the nation these reserves have built highways, secondary roads, telephone lines, bridges, playgrounds, schools, and have assisted in building airports. This use of Mexico's soldiers as laborers has undoubtedly been as immediately practical as their use as policemen; but it is also open to question whether this work has added to their combat efficiency, which after all is the primary quality needed by a body whose chief purpose is national defense.

Another work of vital national importance that the Army is doing is to make a military map of the country. Mexico is a big nation, nearly four times as large as France, and it has regions as yet practically unexplored. The first step towards evaluating the resources of these regions is to obtain detailed information about their physical characteristics, and this information the Army is slowly and patiently assembling. The Mexican Air Force, although small in number and possessing only twenty-five planes fit for active service, carries out aërial exploration for this map and also compiles meteorological data.

The Mexican nation is proud of its air tradition. As long ago as 1915 two nephews of General Carranza who had learned to fly in the United States bombed Guaymas from the air, one of the first uses of the airplane for this purpose. A school of aviation was founded in Mexico in 1917, was enlarged in 1932 and is now located at Vera Cruz in order to give pilots flight training at low altitudes. In accordance with the Army's policy of organizing a national supply of war materials, a contract for the construction of airplane fuselages was made with the Canadian Car and Foundry Company early in 1939 and a factory was installed at Valbuena, near the capital. Production on a small scale was to have begun this year, but it has been impossible to carry out the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plan because the entire output of airplane motors in the United States is now going to the American and British air forces.

The development of the Mexican Army's artillery, like that of its air force, has been limited by the nation's internal necessities and financial resources. The two existing artillery regiments are enough to meet any demands for domestic pacification. Their purpose, like that of the anti-aircraft and anti-tank units, has been more experimental than anything else: they have given the Army Command a clear-cut idea of what types of material are best suited to Mexico's special needs.

The Mexican Army may therefore be said to be sufficiently well organized and equipped to meet the demands now being made upon it. Just what would be its potential value in Hemisphere Defense is a matter of some conjecture since in the past there has been little expectation that it would be called upon to repel an invasion in force. It is, however, part of the plan of Mexico's National Defense Ministry and of the Ávila Camacho Administration to develop the Army so that it will provide an effective rampart against any threat the nation may have to meet.

A first step will be the introduction of compulsory military service. The law providing for this has already been passed, and the first classes will be called up in 1942. Compulsory military training will serve Hemisphere Defense in two important particulars, high Mexican Army circles believe. It will create a trained reserve that can quickly be called into service against invaders, revolutionaries and saboteurs. Second, and equally important, military training is expected to instill into Mexico's young manhood a clear conception of its duty to the nation, thus creating a psychological bulwark against subversive influences. Furthermore, the enlargement of the Mexican Army would give the younger officers more opportunity for activity and advancement, and this should reduce dissatisfaction among them and consequently the danger of rebellion.

The existing facilities for training — barracks, parade grounds, camps and the like — are not nearly large enough to accommodate all the young men eligible for service. The provisional general staff is, therefore, planning to begin by replacing the existing volunteer troops with those called up under the compulsory plan. It is estimated that about twelve thousand can be called in 1942 and that by the end of 1944, the entire volunteer army will be replaced by the new contingents. At the same time, the changes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be made in the Army's organization and the enlargement of its construction program will permit the gradual increase of the total combat force in training. For instance, the projected reorganization of the company so that it will have only one captain, two lieutenants and two sub-lieutenants would at once release a considerable number of officers for training draftees.

As new units are formed and as funds are made available, the Army will be organized into the conventional divisions and an effort will be made to emphasize its national defense rather than its police functions. Mixed divisions will probably consist of four infantry battalions, one cavalry regiment, one field or mountain artillery regiment, with engineer, signal corps, quartermaster and ordnance companies. In Mexico's mountainous country, where roads suitable for a highly mechanized force are few, the rapid motorization of the Army is not judged to be desirable. To give troop movements speed and mobility, a high proportion of cavalry will be preserved and cavalry divisions will be organized. In all, the plans call for six or eight light cavalry and mixed divisions of approximately eight thousand men to be organized by the time the present volunteer rank and file has vanished through the expiration of its enlistment. Meanwhile, two armies will coexist in Mexico, the dwindling volunteer body and the increasing compulsory-service body. Until facilities are such that compulsory service can be made universal, young men will be called up from the sections of the country that are danger spots, where it is thought most desirable to have a trained reserve on ready call.

In its new mission of Hemisphere Defense, one of the first duties of the Mexican Army will be that of scouting and coast protection, particularly along the Pacific shore. Since the disembarkation of troops and material is one of the most difficult of all military operations, it is believed that comparatively small units could prevent it from taking place on Mexican shores unless invasion by large forces should be attempted. Furthermore, the physiography of Mexico, with its high coastal mountain ranges through which the roads are few and easy to defend, theoretically makes penetration into the heart of the country a difficult military problem. When the Mexican Army has been developed and expanded according to the present plan and equipped with the modern apparatus of war, and when the ports of Salina Cruz, Acapulco, Manzanillo, San Blas, Mazatlán, Guaymas and the islands of Santa Margarita and Ensenada are fortified with coast

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense artillery, and provided with an adequate patrol of aërial and light naval units, Mexico will be in a position to repel invasion from the Pacific, at least until effective help reaches her from the United States.

But this program of expansion will cost large sums and Mexico's financial resources are scarcely adequate for carrying the burden unaided. To put it into effect she will therefore need assistance from the United States. Provision for such assistance will very likely be included in the arrangements for military coöperation now being negotiated by the two governments. The fact that such negotiations were under way, though frequently rumored ever since President Ávila Camacho took office on December 1, was officially admitted only on March 4, 1941.[1] According to this announcement, the military talks were initiated under the terms of the Declaration on Reciprocal Assistance and Coöperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas, adopted at the Havana Conference on July 30, 1940. The concluding paragraph of this Declaration states:

> All the signatory nations, or two or more of them according to circumstances, shall proceed to negotiate the necessary complementary agreements so as to organize coöperation for defense and the assistance that they shall lend each other in the event of aggressions such as those referred to in this declaration.

The course these conversations will take may in part depend on the progress made by the negotiations for a final settlement of the other disputes outstanding between the two countries, notably that in regard to the oil expropriations.

It is too early to say whether the instrument chosen to carry out Mexican-American military coöperation will be similar to the Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense, as many have suggested. But whatever form it takes, its value to both nations will be obvious. For Mexico, it would mean financial backing to carry out the expansion of her Army and to install proper coast defenses. For the United States, it would represent a long step forward in the direction of insuring our own invulnerability and in furthering our policy of Hemisphere Defense.

[1] It is interesting to note that Foreign Minister Matsuoka of Japan declared in the House of Representatives at Tokyo on February 17 that he expected the United States and Mexico to complete a military agreement.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STALEMATE IN CHINA

By Owen Lattimore

NOW that the war in China is nearing the end of its fourth year we have settled down to the habit of thinking of it as not only a stalemate but a permanent stalemate. We may be wrong. Forces already at work in Asia, and forces hitherto latent but capable of coming into operation now that China and Japan are more and more being left to themselves, may break the stalemate in the Far East before the struggle is over in Europe.

The degree to which China and Japan are now being forced to test, develop and improvise from their own resources fixes the main outlines of the present picture. The Chinese and the Japanese fought each other to a standstill after several years in which both were able to draw on outside munitions and resources — the Japanese much more than the Chinese. Will the stalemate hold now that no outside Power can supply the finished munitions or war materials to enable either to force a decision in a few months? For the first time since 1937 no outside Power can do much more than urge the desirability of its own particular views or policies. Negative pressure can be applied. Decisive aid cannot be supplied.

For Japan this means an uneasy choice between using her accumulated but largely irreplaceable stocks in a prolonged war against China, or temporizing with China and proceeding to gamble her whole future in Southeastern Asia. A great deal, obviously, depends on China. Will she accept a compromise peace that would suit Germany, thereby enabling Japan to turn south against the Dutch East Indies and Singapore? Or will she split up in civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communists, which would incalculably increase the freedom of manœuvre of both Germany and Japan? Or will she endure indefinitely the stalemate, which would suit the present trend of Anglo-American policy? Or will she choose to find a way to break the stalemate on her own terms and primarily to her own advantage? These questions open up a range of possibilities that can best be understood if we first examine the strategic geography of China, her economic geography, her internal political tensions.

No conquest of the whole of China has ever succeeded without the conqueror having in his possession three strategic keys. This

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is as true of conquests by armies gathered within China as it is of invasions from beyond the Great Wall. The three keys are: the province of Shansi, the crossing of the Yellow River at T'ungkuan, and the Han River valley. As far as I know, American students of the war in China have failed to realize that after three and a half years of hostilities not one of these keys is held by Japan.

The three keys of strategic geography control China in the following ways:

The northern mountains of Shansi offer the only good "defense in depth" against an invasion of North China from Inner Mongolia, and by far the best base for a counter-attack against Inner Mongolia. The eastern mountains of Shansi dominate the North China plain, and are the only safe position from which either to defend or threaten that plain if Manchuria and Jehol are in hostile hands. The southern Shansi mountains flank the approaches to T'ungkuan, the second key of strategy. All of these mountains are held by Chinese forces, which are able to keep the Japanese garrisons in the central basin of Shansi under perpetual siege.

T'ungkuan stands at the great "elbow" where the Yellow River, after flowing almost straight from north to south, turns at right angles to the east. The crossing of the Yellow River at this point offers the only good passage between the major plain of North China and the inner basin of Shensi. Command of the T'ungkuan passage is absolutely necessary for the movement either of large bodies of troops or of economic transport on a large scale, if the deep hinterland of China is to be controlled. Only from Shensi can Szechwan, on the south, be invaded. The approaches are not easy, but they are beyond all comparison easier than an attack up the Yangtze gorges.

The Han River valley, from the southern mountains of Shensi to the Yangtze at Hankow, is the only way of turning the T'ungkuan position, as T'ungkuan is the only way of turning the Shansi position. The founder of the great Han dynasty won an empire by marching up this valley at the end of the third century B.C., while the Mongols turned the T'ungkuan position by marching down it in the thirteenth century. These comparisons are a sufficient commentary on the fact that major Japanese forces have failed in at least four determined attempts to advance up the Han valley in the past year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Against the importance of these three keys must be set the impressive but still not decisive successes of the Japanese. South of the Great Wall, in the fertile plains astride the lower Yellow River and the lower Yangtze, they have penetrated and partly occupied ten Chinese provinces. Here they have both coastal control and communication by land between their main lines of invasion. They also hold footholds in the three southern provinces of Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kuangsi; but here their garrisons cannot communicate freely by land as well as by sea. Though they have nothing like full control, the Japanese have deeply penetrated an area which compares formidably with the area left to Free China. Chiang Kai-shek has full control of only the five provinces of Szechwan, Shensi, Kansu, Kweichow and Yunnan, together with almost all of Kwangsi and — through the Eighth Route Army — the commanding strategic positions in Shansi. In addition he has authority, but not direct control, over the border regions of Ninghsia (the western extension of Inner Mongolia), Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan, and the three provinces into which Tibet is officially divided.

Japan also controls the four greatest cities of China, which in 1937 were the most prosperous ports and the centers of China's finance and nascent industry. These are Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow and Canton, with a total urban population of about seven million. (Peking, with nearly a million inhabitants, is not so important either strategically or economically.) Moreover the provinces most affected by the Japanese invasion are notable for their natural fertility, high agricultural production and dense population. Chekiang and Kiangsu, on the Yangtze, have densities of 554 and 813 inhabitants to the square mile, and Shansi and Hopei in the Yellow River drainage area have densities of 183 and 583.[1]

China has a total population of very nearly 440 million. Leaving out of consideration Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and the extreme southern provinces in which Japan has only footholds, the Japanese have penetrated and partly occupied, in the Yangtze and Yellow River valleys, about one quarter of China's territory, with a population approaching 250 million. Putting it very conservatively, and allowing for 40 to 60 million people who have fled to Free China, the area directly invaded contains about half of

[1] Warren H. Chen, "An Estimate of the Population of China," *XIX^e Session de l'Institut International de Statistique, Tokio, 1930*, Shanghai, 1930.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Chinese people. Japan does not control them all, for the wide guerilla areas must be taken into account. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the number of Chinese that Japan does control south of the Great Wall. In order to make due allowance for the magnitude of the problem faced by the Chinese in freeing their country, it would be best to work on the assumption that Japan has more control than the Chinese Government does over about 150 million people in China Proper. It is remarkable enough that China could suffer losses like these without being stunned. It is even more remarkable that Japan, supposedly a country of imperial stature, could win so much and still fall short of victory.

Japan's failure to make even a passable colonial conquest out of all the raw material of empire in the rich areas of China she has penetrated is only partly explained by the fact that she has been defeated in every attempt to grasp the three keys of strategy in Shansi, at the T'ungkuan crossing and in the Han valley. An important German criticism of Japan's military mistakes, obviously based on the opinions of the German military advisors withdrawn from China by Hitler in 1938, adds other details.[2] Instead of striking at China once for all with really overwhelming forces, Japan attempted in the summer of 1937 to finesse a cheap conquest. Enough men were sent to China for a break-through, but not enough to round up and annihilate the Chinese armies, which time and again evaded encirclement. The consequences of the original mistake multiplied by geometrical progression. Each time that reinforcements were brought in, the problem had already grown beyond the proportions that could be handled by the total Japanese forces in the field. The Japanese now have at least a million men in China — and they are enough only to maintain a stalemate. To double the number and attempt to break the stalemate would demand a prodigious effort. The men could be found — even trained men; but to equip and maintain them on the scale of a huge campaign would take the last ounce of Japan's reserve strength. So desperate an effort Japan is not yet prepared to make.

Even so, a military analysis does not explain everything. To attribute the mistakes and failures of Japan entirely to a second-rate general staff or gross over-confidence is inadequate. Some-

[2] See Wolf Schenke, "Vast Area as an Instrument of War," *Amerasia*, January 1939. (Originally published as "Raum als Waffe," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, September, 1938.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

thing else lay behind Japan's initial willingness to gamble on a quick, cheap conquest. Japan desperately needed success with the minimum loss of manpower and expenditure of money and material, because neither her wealth nor her industrial resources warranted a major war. Unconsciously, and perhaps to a certain extent consciously, the military experimentalists who gambled and won in Manchuria in 1931 and in Jehol in 1933 and in Inner Mongolia in 1935 had been living and planning and thinking in an atmosphere of taking chances and trusting to the luck of the Imperial Army.

When the analysis has been carried to this point it is easy to understand the interaction of economic and strategic geography. The part of China in which Japan holds areas of control and partial control is the part which has always yielded the largest revenues, because of its high agricultural development both in food crops and in technological crops like cotton, silk and soybeans. But Japan — more nearly self-sufficient in food than in anything else — did not need an agrarian empire. Even China's cotton and silk were not entirely satisfactory for Japan's needs, for technical reasons such as the unevenness of their quality.[3] What Japan needed therefore was to get hold of China's crops as cheaply as possible in order to convert them into free exchange on the world market. With this money Japan hoped to buy, in other markets, the raw materials needed for her existing export and munitions industries. With the surplus, she could gradually improve and standardize the quality of Chinese cotton and silk and purchase machinery both to round out and diversify Japanese industry and to establish a subordinate colonial industry in Manchuria and China. Only in this way could the raw material resources and horsepower capacities of the "Manchukuo-China-Japan bloc" be diversified enough to give Japan anything like an "autarchic" empire.

Such a program needed time, stability in China, and a tranquil world market. It was essential to carry out a stage-by-stage development in such a manner that each stage would be profitable in itself and help to finance the next stage. This explains both why Japan is hampered as well as benefited by a world war concurrent with the China war, and why the guerillas in the part of China that Japan has penetrated but does not control are even more important economically than they are militarily. They keep agri-

[3] North China cotton is rough in fiber and short in staple.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

culture down to a level which provides food for the farmers whom the guerillas organize, but not an exportable surplus for Japan. In spite of her net of garrisons Japan can neither draw a revenue of land tax and grain tax, like the conquerors of China in the past, nor set up a modern and profitable colonial economy of exchange between the raw materials of industry and the finished products of manufacture.

Invaded China and Free China must be studied in comparison, not in isolation. In parts of Szechwan, Yunnan and Shensi, Free China has an intensively developed irrigated agriculture. These areas provide the surplus of grain traditionally necessary to a strong Chinese government. Much greater areas, however, are eccentric to the traditional Chinese structure of heavy production per acre and close settlement per square mile, and permit only "extensive" or mixed or marginal farming, or grazing, or the exploitation of forests or minerals. Free China's mineral resources, though as yet only haphazardly worked, include tin, tungsten and at least a certain amount of oil, in addition to coal and iron in quantities much larger than are accessible to Japan in Invaded China.

Thus Japan, with a greater industrial capacity and a much larger force of skilled labor and trained technicians, has access only to that part of China with the highest agricultural potential and the lowest industrial potential, while China, which is critically short of skilled labor and technicians, holds by far the most important mineral and industrial reserves. When such conditions are part of the complex which in its military aspect is a stalemate, everything depends, in making comparisons, on whether it is assumed that the balance will be constant or that there are trends of change inherent in the balance. It need hardly be pointed out that a country like Japan, with a relatively high productive capacity but poor raw material resources, is extremely vulnerable to the dwindling of supplies for its industrial plant. On the other hand a country like Free China, with varied and ample raw materials, can always in time increase its inadequate industrial plant, even under the anxious conditions of a military stalemate.

It is important in this connection that the undeveloped areas of Free China, totalling hundreds of thousands of square miles, have always been underpopulated rather than overpopulated. Americans, who habitually think of all China within the Great Wall as overpopulated, are almost universally oblivious to this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact. Yet it is a key fact in the present situation. Refugees from Invaded China to Free China, estimated at from 40 to 60 million, are not burdening an overpopulated land but bringing needed labor to all kinds of latent opportunities. This is because the old China not only neglected mining and failed to develop industry, but avoided as far as possible any farming that could not be done with close cultivation and as much irrigation as possible. Failure to develop the thinly-peopled hinterland was mainly due to a strong social tradition with a fixed psychology of its own.

In this respect the present emergency is bringing about revolutionary changes. Though China is pitifully short of technically trained men, the ideas and possibilities of the Western world and the twentieth century have penetrated China much more deeply than actual machines and practices. When it is known that mining and manufacture are things that can be done, and that the traditional Chinese farming methods are not the only methods, men's minds and ambitions are stimulated. New ways of using land are especially potent in a time of invasion and emergency. They help to break up the old standards of land tenure and the rigid and often downright vicious landlord-tenant relationship which hampers the improvement of Chinese agricultural economy. Agricultural reforms, when the focus of attention is the changing of a social system established for centuries, are often resisted as politically subversive. The same reforms, when attention is focused on new kinds of profit, can be quite differently regarded — especially when the opprobrium for shattering the old social system is largely directed against a foreign invader.

Strategic and economic geography lead to political geography. From the deep hinterland, guarded by the three strategic strongholds of Shansi, the T'ungkuan crossing and the Han valley, Free China can harass the Japanese and make it impossible for them either to exploit the old agricultural economy of Invaded China or to create a new colonial economy. Within Free China, at the same time, the Chinese can begin what the Japanese cannot accomplish: they can diversify and modernize their own economy, make machinery, teach new methods of production, and create the social and political organization indispensable for the maintenance of modern armies and efficient governments. This will not happen suddenly in a series of miracles. It will be slowed up by political quarrels, social conservatism, lack of primary equipment, and the fact that millions and millions of people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are illiterate. Nevertheless a way out of the stalemate can be found in Free China and not in Invaded China, and this is bound to shape the future. Unskilled labor will be an especially potent factor. Labor, in the quantities in which it is available in China, can to a remarkable extent take the place not only of machinery but of capital. The Japanese cannot use Chinese forced labor efficiently, because this kind of labor has its own techniques of sabotage. The Chinese themselves can employ forced labor, however, because the usage is anciently accepted. They are a people who know how to coördinate human labor by the tens of thousands; they work well and smoothly at what they understand; and when their enthusiasm has been won, they work with a sustained devotion.

Finally, the China of today should not be divided simply into Free China and Invaded China. There is also a third category — Marginal China. The geographical focus of this Marginal China is in the guerilla areas where the Japanese have penetrated without winning control. It has also an economic focus in the margin between the traditional agriculture of China and all the new kinds of economic activity; a military focus in the margin between the conscript soldier and the guerilla volunteer; and a political focus in the margin between the official Kuomintang or Nationalist Party and such minority parties and groups as the Communists, the Moslems of the Northwest, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, the various guerilla formations, and others.

Indeed, the characteristics and issues of both Free China and Invaded China can be tested better by this scale of marginal values than in any other way. Economically, for instance, there is the question of the degree of China's dependence on the outside world. Which is the more important, the Burma Road or the Turkestan-Siberia Road? If both were cut, could China survive? If all values in China were fixed and unchanging, these would be decisive questions. Actually, they are questions whose urgency is qualified by time and the rate of change. Because change is at work, the ways in which China is dependent on communications with the outer world are variable, and so is the degree of dependence in every case. The Industrial Coöperatives now being formed in Free China are, for instance, intermediate between state enterprise and private enterprise, and at the same time marginal both to the old handicraft manufactures of China and to the former functions of foreign trade. They are being organized

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

partly to provide employment for refugees, partly to set to work again machinery salvaged from cities abandoned to the Japanese, partly to decentralize industry because of the bombing danger, and partly to prevent Japan from "invading" China with goods the Chinese desperately need. As they spread, they alter not only the magnitude but the nature of many problems, by modifying the demand for the kinds of things that have to be imported over the Burma Road and the Turkestan Road.

Freedom from complete dependence on imported munitions and supplies tends to break down the stalemate between the Chinese and Japanese armies and increases the amount of offensive power which Free China can develop within her own territories. Strategically, again, the guerilla armies are marginal both to the regular armies of the National Government and to the Eighth Route Army of the Communists, which also has its nucleus of trained and disciplined veteran regulars. There is a close link here between military and political problems. At times the hostility toward the Communists of some at least of the Government armies is acute. This would be extremely dangerous for China as a whole if Free China were in fact sharply divided between a major area fully controlled by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and a minor area dominated by the Communists. Fortunately for China, the cleavage is not of this kind.

In the first place, the Kuomintang, though larger than any other party, is by no means a true majority party. It is a carefully recruited "élite" party. In the second place, it is a mistake to assume that the guerillas are all Communists. There are Communist organizers and even units at work among them, but in the main they are local peasants, fighting locally to defend their homes. Thus between the Kuomintang as the largest organized political party and the Communists as a much smaller organized party there spreads the vast majority of the Chinese people. Some of them have other organizations of different kinds — regional, political, religious or national, like the Kuangsi Faction of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Tsung-hsi, the Moslems, the Mongols, and so on. But the most important thing is that hundreds of millions of people are not members or even direct adherents of any party, though they are united by the idea of national independence and a democratic republic.

Both Kuomintang and Communists are for this reason obliged to compete not so much in asserting unquestioned control over

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the majority that lies between them as in winning the confidence and support of as many people as they can. The necessity for winning assent and support and the inability to enforce obedience without assent are in themselves guarantees of essential democratic processes. It is in the light of this kind of competition that the recent attack of Chinese government forces on the Fourth Route Army should be judged. This army, unlike the Eighth Route Army, never had more than a minority of Communists. The attack on it, bringing back in a time of acute national danger the shocking idea that Chinese could still fight and kill Chinese, was probably the greatest mistake made on the Chinese side in the course of the war.

Nevertheless, the very nature of the incident shows that the situation may supply its own remedy. If the Communists continue to appeal for support by persuasion, while such reactionary generals as Ho Ying-chin simply demand unquestioning obedience and attempt to enforce it by shedding Chinese blood, there will undoubtedly be strong movements in favor of the Communists within the marginal groups between the Communists and the Kuomintang. It is therefore not impossible that Ho Ying-chin may yet turn out to be the military equivalent of Wang Ching-wei the politician; for like Wang Ching-wei he was closely linked with the Japanese even before 1937. It should also be remembered that the climactic point in the career of Chiang Kai-shek was his release after the "Christmas kidnapping" at Sian in 1936. Demonstrations throughout China then showed that Chiang Kai-shek had won a popularity greater than ever before; but they were partly, also, demonstrations of approval and relief at the settling of a great crisis by negotiation and without civil war. It should be remembered also that at that time both Ho Ying-chin and Wang Ching-wei urged that Sian be bombed, even if it meant risking the life of the Generalissimo. Many Chinese disapproved of this fervor, since it was quite clear that if the Generalissimo had been harmed Ho Ying-chin and Wang Ching-wei would probably have divided between them military and political control of the Kuomintang.

In short, the marginal and unorganized majority is probably becoming as much a political determinant to China's future democracy as the highly organized Kuomintang and Communists. There are comparable marginal values in the international relations of China. Because China is a rapidly changing country,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

because the changes that are going on are potentially capable of breaking the military stalemate against Japan, and because the position of China in the world is of steadily growing importance, no country in the world can plan its policy toward China simply according to its own desires and needs. China's desires and needs, the trends of change within China, and those "marginal" values which modify the position and aims of the recognized political parties, must also be considered and accommodated. This is as true for the United States, lying across the Pacific, as it is for Russia, the only Great Power with a non-colonial land frontier on China within reach of major railway systems.

From this analysis conclusions emerge which are quite at variance with what one may call the "orthodox" view of China. Most Americans, like most Europeans, are still inclined to think of an "unchanging China." This idea involves the basic assumption that China is a static quantity, and that the dynamics of such change as takes place must be supplied by the policies of Powers interested in China. If this were true, even the "policies" of Chinese parties would be secondary and subordinate to the direction, pressure or suggestion of foreign sympathizers or backers. Indeed, it is probably not too much to say that most people outside of China really assume in their thinking — whether they are conscious of it or not — that the Kuomintang "represents" the democracies of America and Great Britain, while the Communists "represent" the Russian Communists, and Wang Ching-wei and the other puppets "represent" the Japanese. If this were true, it would again follow that the future of China depends on which — the democracies, the Communists, or the Fascist Axis — backs its "representatives" most effectively.

But are these assumptions necessarily true? Given the indisputable changes that are actually going on in China, and the still greater potential changes that can be foreseen, it would seem that the "orthodox" view and its implications are much too rigid. What of "marginal" China? Its geographical focus includes thousands of square miles and millions of people in the guerilla areas where none of the supposed "representatives" are definitely ascendant — neither the Kuomintang nor the Communists, and certainly not the Japanese invaders and their puppet régimes. Here changes are taking place which are unmistakably Chinese in character — mutations of the "unchanging China," influenced

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but certainly not controlled by the various contestants. What is taking place in the focal guerilla areas radiates its own influences far into the foreland actually controlled by the Japanese as well as into the hinterlands of actual Kuomintang and Communist (Eighth Route Army) control. The fringes of "marginal" China are immeasurable.

Who is to win them? Not to conquer and *assert* control of them, at a time when all foreign intervention is increasingly limited, but to *win* them?

Probably not the Japanese, for in recent years they have shown that their political inflexibility is — from the point of view of their own interests — appalling. As between the great democracies and Russia, however, there is a possibility which most Europeans and Americans would have considered absurd a few years ago, though there is evidence that the Russians have been aware of it ever since the days of Sun Yat-sen. The foreign Power whose interests will in the end win out will be the one which is most ready to identify its interests primarily, not with those of its own supposed "representatives" in China, but with those of changing China as a whole. The only symbol of this changing China which has vitality and a survival value is the United Front. It represents the people as a whole more than it represents a compromise between organized forces. To give moral and material support to any one of its component parties would split China — which is the hope of both Germany and Japan. Only by supporting the United Front as such — whether the support comes from Russia or from the democracies or both — can Japan be defeated and China kept whole and independent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE I.L.O. IN WARTIME AND AFTER

By John G. Winant

THE International Labor Organization in wartime still serves its member countries, and it is prepared to help constructively in strengthening the democratic processes which, when the war is over, must determine the foreign and domestic policies of all nations if the peace is to last. Today its key personnel have been transferred temporarily from Geneva, Switzerland, to Montreal, Canada, in order to ensure it freedom of speech and action in the service of the free peoples of the world. After eighteen months of war we are in a position not only to reassess the prewar achievement of the Organization but to examine its wartime activity. In this way the experience which it has gained in the practical application of the ideals of world democracy can be taken into full account in planning for postwar reconstruction.

The I.L.O. was created in 1919 in response to the conviction of peoples everywhere that foreign policy could not continue to disregard the world's underlying social issues. Its machinery was designed to furnish a broader base for the conduct of foreign affairs, so that greater consideration could be given to the needs of the diverse economic and social groups within nations. The Organization itself was intended to promote social justice and to prevent differences in labor standards from becoming factors in international trade rivalries.

In its twenty-one year span of life the Organization has grown from a novel and untried instrument into an effective agency through which the free citizenry of over 40 nations have drawn together in search of social justice. It has adapted its program and its methods to the changing demands of prosperity and depression, peace and war. Its strength stems partly from the enduring validity of its objectives, partly from its unique composition.

Governments, employers and workers of the member nations are responsible in equal measure for the functioning of the Organization as a whole. Employer and worker representatives have a full part in every phase of the work, and have coöperated closely with representatives of governments in ensuring that the con-

Editor's Note. This article was written before Mr. Winant's resignation from the post of Director of the International Labor Office, which took effect on February 15, 1941.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clusions reached are put into effect. In the annual session of the International Labor Conference, delegates from the "most representative organizations" of employers and workers sit alongside the government representatives and vote independently of them. In the Governing Body of the Office eight employers chosen by the employers' delegates at the general Conference and eight workers chosen by the workers' group are elected to share executive and administrative responsibility with the representatives of sixteen governments. Thus, every measure which has been advocated by the Organization, whether adopted formally as a Convention or Recommendation of the Conference or accepted by the Governing Body as part of the continuous program of work of the technical services, must first have undergone the critical scrutiny of the representatives of employers and workers as well as of the member governments.

The annual Conference has provided many opportunities for three-sided discussion of such labor and social issues as are international in character; and labor and social treaties among nations have supplemented political treaties and made them more meaningful. Each Conference takes as the basis for discussion an annual report on social and industrial developments during the year, submitted by the Director of the International Labor Office. The result has been an interchange of views and experience which has frequently clarified both national and international social and economic policies. But while this discussion is frequently the most dramatic part of the sessions, the principal achievement has been the creation of a body of international standards and obligations covering most of the main topics of labor and social legislation.

The obligations take the form of the 67 Conventions adopted by the Conference in the course of its 25 sessions. A Convention is adopted by a two-thirds vote of the delegates present at any given session. Each member nation has four votes, two being cast by the government delegates, one by the employer delegate and one by the worker delegate. When a Convention has been adopted, each member nation is under obligation to submit it to the competent national authority for ratification within 18 months at most. If a Convention is ratified, the standards included in its provisions become a treaty obligation of the ratifying country. If a Convention is rejected, there is no further obligation on the part of the nation rejecting it. When the war began on September 1, 1939, a total of 853 ratifications had been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

registered from over 50 countries and 46 Conventions had come into force for member nations. Ratifications have continued during the war, bringing the total to 879 as of January 1941. The United States during its brief membership has ratified five of these labor treaties, all of them determining labor standards for men at sea, including their hours of work, leave with pay, age of entrance, employers' liability and officers' competency.

The influence of the Conventions has not been limited to the ratifying countries. They have played a considerable rôle throughout the world as internationally-approved standards of social policy representing a broad measure of agreement among governments, employers and workers. The influence was especially great in countries which had been members of the Organization for the greater part of its existence and which had come to look upon it as a source of inspiration in the development of their social legislation.[1] Nor did the Organization's usefulness as an agency for defining standards stop with the adoption of Conventions. The 67 Conventions are supplemented by 66 formal Recommendations which have likewise influenced national standards.

Together, the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the annual Conferences embody provisions relating to placement services and public works; unemployment; minimum wage-fixing machinery; the regulation of hours of work; weekly rest periods; annual vacations with pay; age of admission of young people to employment in industry, commerce and agriculture; vocational training and apprenticeship; employment at night for young people; maternity protection; limitations on night work for women; health precautions in various industrial processes; safety standards; workmen's compensation for accidents and industrial diseases; sickness insurance; old-age and survivors insurance; labor inspection; a wide range of maritime labor legislation; basic standards for colonial labor policy; and protection for migrant workers.

The formal standards hereby set up are further supplemented by the conclusions formulated by numerous special meetings of experts convened to discuss specific questions of labor and social policy. Much of the most valuable work done by the Organization in the field of social insurance, for instance, has taken the form of

[1] In some of the smaller European countries, for example, and (especially during the latter half of the period) in a number of the Latin American countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

standards of policy framed at meetings of experts. The questions dealt with in this way include the economical administration of medical and pharmaceutical benefits under health insurance; guiding principles for preventive and curative action by pension insurance schemes; the evaluation of permanent incapacity under workmen's compensation and invalidity insurance schemes; and the investment of the funds of social insurance institutions. The standards determined by expert committees range from the relatively formal Standard Code of Industrial Hygiene [2] to the resolutions adopted at successive sessions of the advisory committees of the Governing Body, such as the committees on salaried employees and professional workers. The United States has been particularly interested in the conclusions adopted by two expert gatherings which have discussed the problem of silicosis. International standards for the compilation of comparable labor statistics (the subjects covered include statistics of employment and unemployment, wages and hours of work, cost of living index numbers, real wages, and migration) have been developed through the work of the Office and of expert committees.

In addition to these general international standards, regional standards have been established covering certain particular problems. In the Americas, for example, regional labor conferences were held at Santiago, Chile, in 1936 and at Havana, Cuba, in 1939. These were especially concerned with problems of social security and the conditions of employment of women and young persons. At the 1939 meeting, particular attention was given to the question of migration to the American Continent, from the point of view both of the problems presented to the countries of immigration and of the measures needed to protect immigrant workers and their families.[3] Similarly, factory inspection problems have been discussed on a regional basis.

In summarizing the normal peacetime accomplishments of the I.L.O. one may say with justifiable pride that an International Labor Code has been built up over the past twenty-one years which stands today as the first stage in planning for future international action in respect to labor and social problems. Though it is impossible to foresee in detail the extent to which, and the

[2] Another example is the Code of Safety Regulations for Underground Work for Coal Mines which would have been adopted by the Conference before now but for the outbreak of war. The compilation and recommendations of the experts have, however, been submitted to member governments.

[3] Discussion on this question was initiated largely at the behest of the South American republics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

manner in which, these standards and obligations will require modification in the light of changed conditions, and though there are many respects in which the component parts of the Code have been inadequate and incomplete, yet the standards and the obligations already laid down do provide a point of departure for the future.[4]

The function of the I.L.O. as a center for the collection and distribution of information and as a technical service equipped to give advice and assistance to member countries in connection with the preparation and administration of labor and social legislation has been greatly extended in recent years. I.L.O. experts have been called in to advise on social insurance, labor inspection, industrial hygiene, migration and other specific problems and even to draft complete labor codes. Such work has been undertaken in a wide range of countries — Argentina, China, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, Venezuela, Great Britain, Canada and the United States. In Great Britain, the Office was asked to submit to a Royal Commission evidence on workmen's compensation systems in other countries; in the United States the Social Security Board sought I.L.O. advice when setting up an administrative organization; and the Canadian Government recently requested information on social security measures. In general, it may be said that the technical staff of the Organization now possesses the essential qualifications for sifting material and suggestions relating to social and labor policy, and that it is prepared to contribute toward the solution of the new social problems that may arise as a result of the present war.

II

Many of the ordinary activities of the I.L.O. were sharply interrupted by the outbreak of the war. The Organization was determined, however, to continue its work to the greatest extent possible and also to undertake a considerable amount of advance planning. Its policy and program in this most critical period have been inspired by the same faith and spirit in which the Organization was founded. They also have drawn on the experience

[4] The preparation of a codified and annotated edition of the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conferences, with appendices embodying the other standards of social policy framed under the auspices of the I.L.O., from 1919 to 1939, has been completed and the volume will be issued as soon as possible. It is hoped to follow this Code with a Digest of the Constitutional Practice of the Organization over the same period. Code and Digest together will be useful tools for all concerned with the activities of the I.L.O.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and techniques which it has acquired in the interval between wars.

As early as October 1938, immediately after Munich, the Governing Body of the Office faced the question of what its functions would be in wartime. After a full discussion, in the course of which stress was laid on the difficulty of the labor problems arising in time of war, and on the necessity of preserving a tripartite mechanism for dealing, on an international scale, with the problems of reconstruction which would have to be solved at the close of a war, the Governing Body decided unanimously that in the event of war the activities of the Organization should be maintained on the highest possible level. Early in 1939, an Emergency Committee was set up to suggest practical measures to execute this policy. Its report to the June Conference in 1939 pointed out that war would create new labor and social problems demanding urgent solution, and that the Organization must remain in a position to offer its experience as a guide in working out social policies in both belligerent and neutral countries.

Calls on the Office have, in fact, been more frequent since the war began than even in the preceding years of activity. The adaptation of its program of technical work to war requirements was necessarily gradual and continuous. But no sooner had hostilities started than the Office began studying certain important problems — for example, those of the organization of employment; the adaptation of social security programs to changed social needs; living costs and wages; and nutritional standards in wartime. In general, the Office has continued to serve as a world center for the comparison and analysis of the experience of various nations with regard to social problems, whether of war or of peace.

Meanwhile, at first, countries at peace and distant from the conflict carried on their own economic life more or less as usual, even though they were considerably affected by the disturbance in Europe. Those countries were naturally entitled to expect the Office to continue to render normal peacetime services to them. Consequently, the second American regional conference met, as had been planned, at Havana at the end of November 1939. The delegates treated regional questions within the broader framework of international action. A declaration was adopted unanimously urging the I.L.O. to serve during the war as a social liaison between American countries and democratic European nations, and stating the conviction of the delegates that it would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have an essential part to play in the postwar reconstruction. The delegates pledged the unwavering support of the governments and peoples of the Americas to the fulfillment of this purpose.

In February 1940 a meeting of the Governing Body was held in Geneva. This was its first meeting since the beginning of the war, and the last which it has been possible to hold in Geneva up to the present time. The fact that government representatives, employers and workers of some 16 countries could actually meet was important, for during the last war there was far too little discussion of social policy on an international basis. The tripartite groups, made up of nationals of belligerent and neutral countries, both European and non-European, found themselves, somewhat to their own surprise, in a large measure of agreement on general social objectives and policy in wartime, and the debates led to a considerable degree of mutual understanding. It was decided to go ahead with plans for a June Conference and to make methods of collaboration between government authorities, employers and workers the principal subject of discussion — one whose significance was soon to be still further demonstrated at a time when the very survival of the democracies was dependent on the achievement of national unity by consent of the governed.

At the time this February meeting adjourned, only 12 of the 30 members of the Governing Body were nationals of countries directly involved in the European war; 18 were neutral. By the middle of May, the figures at a similar meeting, had one been held, would have been just reversed. At the end of June, 10 out of the 30 would have been representatives of countries which had been occupied or defeated by Germany. The new situation obviously called for new measures. Expenses had to be cut and staff had to be drastically reduced to meet the losses in support. The annual Conference had to be postponed. The question of the location of the I.L.O. had to be reëxamined. The principal body of staff had remained at work in Geneva so long as the risk of armed invasion was the principal disadvantage. Now the problem became the moral and physical isolation of the Office from the chief sources of its democratic support. We could not run the risk that an organization which was the international expression of the social purpose of the free peoples throughout the world should become a tool for the totalitarian policies of aggressor nations. The danger that this might happen was averted by transferring the principal body of staff to the New World.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thanks to the coöperation of the Canadian Government and the generous hospitality of McGill University, a new working center has been established at Montreal. The process of reëstablishment has now been accomplished. Some 50 members of the staff, of 18 different nationalities, are at work there. The program of publications has been resumed, including the regular publication of the *International Labour Review* (in English, French and Spanish), the continuation of the *Legislative Series* (which carries on the work begun by the unofficial Basle Labor Office as early as 1906), and a number of special studies, reports and pamphlets. The work of technical assistance in the formulation and improvement of social and labor legislation has been intensified.[5] In preparation for the forthcoming International Labor Conference, a supplementary report on methods of collaboration between governments, employers and workers is in process, as well as a report analyzing social change during the war period.

Here, as at many other points, the current work of the I.L.O. is directed with a view to responsibilities which it must assume at the close of the war. The coöperation between governments and workers and employers which has proved indispensable in wartime will be no less indispensable in dealing with problems of reconstruction. The Organization, which is the international embodiment of such coöperation, will have a great part to play in rebuilding a democratic world. "My war aims," declared the British Minister of Labor, "are summed up in the phrase 'the motive of our life should be social security.'" The late Marquess of Lothian stressed that the provision of markets and employment for all should be the main purpose of postwar economic policy. President Roosevelt has said that the future of the world must be founded on freedom from fear and want. Similar declarations have been made by the statesmen of many other countries.

To provide the working arrangements for bringing social ideals into practice must be, in large part, the function of those who know industry intimately as employers and workers. That is why the International Labor Organization, an international institution which is responsive to the desires of both employers and workers, and in which they have learned to work together constructively during 21 years, has such a great opportunity and so high a responsibility.

[5] One result of this aspect of I.L.O. activity has been the creation of an Inter-American Committee to Forward Social Security, under the Organization's auspices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INDUSTRIAL POWER OF THE NAZIS

By Louis Domeratzky

IF the economic relations between nations were normal and rational, the position of Germany would be primarily that of a converter of foreign raw materials into manufactured goods for the world market. But since the First World War these relations have not been normal, and they have become even less so since the National Socialist régime put Germany's economy on a permanent wartime basis. A necessary part of Hitler's *Wehrwirtschaft* has been the attempt to make Germany as self-sufficient as possible of foreign, more particularly non-European, sources of supply. Yet despite the gains achieved by autarchy, through such devices as the intensification of agriculture and the development of *Ersatz* industries, the fundamental composition of Germany's foreign trade had changed comparatively little before the outbreak of the war. There was, however, a definite trend toward Latin America as a source of supply in order to counteract the exchange difficulties involved in trade with certain European countries and the United States. At the same time, the Germans were making a strong effort to develop their trade with Southeastern Europe, even though this region could meet only a relatively small part of their needs.

Taking Germany's imports as a basis for calculating the degree of her dependence on outside sources of supply, we find that for the first six months of 1939 (after April 1 these figures included Austria and Sudetenland) they were valued at about 2,750,000,000 marks. Of this amount foodstuffs accounted for a little over 1,056,000,000 marks; the remainder consisted of industrial products, predominantly raw materials and semi-manufactures. Among the industrial raw materials — of particular interest to us here — we must distinguish between those used for satisfying the consumption needs of the population, of only secondary importance in the Nazi economy, and those intended primarily for industries essential to war. Thus, the fact that cotton came almost entirely from territories now practically inaccessible to Germany is not particularly important, since for some years a large part of her gradually curtailed demand for textile raw materials has been satisfied by synthetic fibers made from domestic or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European raw materials. On the other hand, Germany before the war had to obtain many important industrial raw materials wholly or largely from overseas. Among these might be included cotton, jute, wool, hides and skins, rubber, petroleum and petroleum products (including lubricating oil), copper and copper ore, nickel, lead, tin, gums, mica, antimony and tungsten ore. In the case of many of these items originating in the colonies of other European Powers, the degree of dependence on overseas sources was considerably greater than would appear from the German import statistics, since they reached Germany by way of the mother countries in Europe.

In evaluating the increased resources that Germany is deriving from her territorial expansion over the Continent, we must remember that as a whole the countries now under German control are not large-scale producers of raw materials and that in some cases, such as that of the iron ore of Lorraine, what is involved is merely a shift from one European source to another rather than the replacement of an overseas product. Some of these countries are among the most industrialized in the world, and the addition of their industrial facilities to those possessed by Germany must be of considerable assistance, both direct and indirect, in carrying on the war as well as in supplying some of the underdeveloped countries of Europe with manufactured products in exchange for the foodstuffs and raw materials they are sending to Germany.

We must also keep in mind that Germany has control of the raw materials and production facilities not only of those countries under her military occupation but of those others over which by political and economic pressure she is able to exercise effective domination. It is only fair to add that in some of these countries certain important industries have been maintaining close economic relations with corresponding industries or organizations in Germany for a number of years and are, therefore, inclined to assume a "realistic" attitude toward German overtures for economic coöperation.

II

In order to obtain an approximately correct idea of the productive capacities of the German-controlled countries we must resort, in the absence of current statistics, to a survey of their economic status prior to the outbreak of the war. In so doing we should, of course, make allowance for whatever modifying factors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the German occupation has effected. On the whole, however, we can assume that the German Government has not yet had time to take any radical steps towards adapting the economies of these countries to its own war needs aside from diverting their trade and commandeering their raw materials, foodstuffs and industrial machinery to German uses. Let us take up these countries in the order of their conquest or occupation.

AUSTRIA

Austria's contribution to the economy of the Reich consists largely of iron ore, timber and magnesite. The famous iron-ore deposits of the Erzberg in Styria produced, before the Anschluss, about 2,000,000 tons a year; since then the Germans claim to have increased this figure. The ore is taken from an open-cut mine and contains a higher iron content than the Brunswick deposits which the Germans have been developing to supply the Hermann Goering Werke. The comparatively limited output and their distance from coal supplies make the Austrian deposits of relatively slight importance to the German iron and steel industry, especially now that the Lorraine deposits have been annexed and the accessibility of the far richer Swedish ores has been assured. Austria's facilities for iron and steel production at the time of the annexation were rather small and not very efficient, and the construction of the plant of the Hermann Goering Werke at Linz might be regarded primarily as an attempt to increase employment in the newly acquired country rather than to add to Germany's iron and steel supplies.

The timber resources of Austria are important, especially in view of the increased demand for wood pulp as a raw material for the German textile industry. It is estimated that about 38 percent of the area of Austria is in forests; before annexation the country exported timber, much of it going to Germany. According to latest reports, the extensive Swedish wood-pulp industry, the output of which is now at the disposal of Germany, is not only working at low capacity, but is even compelled to store a considerable part of its product, which Germany evidently is not in a position to absorb either for her own use or for that of the occupied countries. This would seem to justify the conclusion that the wood-pulp resources of Austria are not at present of prime importance.

Austria's magnesite deposits, famous throughout the world,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

yielded a considerable surplus for export before the Anschluss. Among the countries taking Austrian magnesite the United States was second only to Germany. The annexation has therefore affected the American rather than the German position.

As for industrial facilities, Austria cannot be regarded as making a substantial contribution to those of Germany. The most important Austrian industries were those engaged primarily in the production of articles of consumption, such as textiles, small metal articles, leather goods and articles of fashion. Many of them worked with imported raw materials which are now unavailable, and they depended to some extent on the tourist trade which has now virtually disappeared. Furthermore, the heavy industries, particularly the iron and steel plants, were not working very efficiently, and had a high cost of production. It should be remembered that in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bohemia and Moravia — and not Austria itself — constituted the industrial center, and that the economic conditions prevailing in Austria during the interval between the two world wars were not very conducive to large-scale industrial development.

THE SUDETENLAND AND THE CZECH AND SLOVAK AREAS

From the standpoint of industrial facilities, especially those available for the production of military supplies, the Sudetenland and the "Protectorate" of Bohemia and Moravia probably constitute the most important addition to Germany's resources among all the conquered territories. Taken together, the two areas form a large industrial region which under normal conditions depended to a very large extent on imported raw materials, the principal exception being lignite — of which Germany, however, has very large deposits. Among the industries, the iron and steel plants are the most important, although the highly developed chemical industry centering in Aussig is also of considerable military value. Most famous of these plants is, of course, the Skoda works, one of the largest of its kind in Europe. As a matter of fact, a German-dominated consortium had acquired a majority control of the Skoda works before the declaration of the Protectorate. In addition to being a highly integrated concern, with its own deposits of coal, ore and limestone, Skoda produces a very wide range of manufactures including not only arms and munitions but heavy industrial machinery, automotive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

products, aviation equipment, railroad material, special steels, tubes, etc. Skoda has its export organization and branches in a number of countries, some of them overseas. The Aussig chemical combine — now, of course, under German control — maintains close relations with the German I. G. and is reported to be producing chemicals for war purposes. There are a number of other large concerns engaged in the metal industries, as well as the extensive textile industry and large glass and china factories in the Sudetenland.

While some of these formerly Czech industries are of secondary importance, since they produce consumption goods and therefore represent a non-essential addition to Germany's extensive facilities, their output is nevertheless useful to Germany because she uses it directly or indirectly, to supply other European countries with manufactured products in exchange for the raw materials and foodstuffs which are essential to her. The German Government naturally publishes very little about the present volume of production in the industries of the Sudetenland and the Protectorate, or about the extent to which their facilities are used; but enough is known to indicate that very considerable progress has been made towards incorporating them into the German economy. In 1937, about 23 percent of Czechoslovakia's total exports went to Germany and Austria, while a very large proportion of their specialties — like textiles, leather gloves, glassware and articles of fashion — went overseas, especially to the United States. Though it is safe to assume that some of the industries in former Czechoslovakia have had to curtail their production for lack of raw materials, it is quite obvious that the heavy industries, working primarily with raw materials which Germany or the occupied countries can supply, represent an extremely important addition to the productive facilities at German command.

POLAND

The chief industrial value of Western Poland to Germany lies in its mineral resources, particularly coal, and in the extensive metal-working industries of Silesia. The coal-mining industry is of special importance at present. During the postwar period Poland had developed a very considerable coal-export trade to Italy and the Scandinavian countries; at present this trade constitutes one of the chief factors in the political and economic relations between Germany and those countries. Poland is also one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the large timber exporting countries in Europe. Furthermore, it has been a large exporter of pork products, particularly hams. Under normal conditions these went primarily to the United States; now however they are absorbed almost entirely by Germany. Poland's extensive textile industry will now be of chiefly local importance, unless Germany should succeed in utilizing it in her trade with the Soviet Union.

BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG

As in the case of Bohemia, Belgium's importance to the Reich lies primarily in her heavy industries, particularly iron and steel. This is the most important industry in Belgium and is practically the only one in Luxembourg. For many years the iron and steel industry of both countries has been closely connected with that of Germany, partly because it has participated in an international cartel in which the Germans have been very active, and partly because it has been to a certain extent dependent on German coal. The iron ore used in Belgium is obtained primarily from Lorraine, now under German control. Also, though Belgium is an important producer of coal, she must import additional quantities from Germany. In 1939, Belgium produced about 3,000,000 tons of pig iron and an equal amount of steel. The annual output of Luxembourg is somewhat over 2,500,000 tons. In both countries a very large part of the iron and steel output is used, directly or indirectly, for export purposes.

Since the German occupation, the iron and steel industries of the two countries have been concentrated into two organizations, primarily in order to assure closer coöperation with the German iron and steel industry. The new Belgian organization, Sybelac (Syndicat Belge de l'Acier), which came into existence on June 24, 1940, has replaced the Cosibel and exercises far greater control over the industry than the latter did. The new organization now controls the purchase of raw materials for its members, the distribution of the finished product and the fixing of prices; and it is expected to perform all those functions in closest understanding with the occupation authorities and the German iron and steel industry. The more important Belgian producers may express their wishes through an advisory committee.

The Luxembourg iron and steel industry was also coördinated after negotiations between the German iron and steel interests and the Groupement des Industries Sidérurgiques Luxembourge-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oises. Under the new agreement the Groupement, representing the Arbed, Hadir and Rodingen — which means practically the whole Luxembourg iron and steel industry — is to work in close agreement with the German Stahlwerksverband. It should be added that the most important Belgian iron and steel combination, the Ougrée Marihaye, which owns the Rodingen in Luxembourg as well as plants in the Longwy Basin in France, has recently established a joint selling organization with the important German firm of Otto Wolff under the name of Eisenausfuhr Otto Wolff-Ougrée, with headquarters in Cologne and Brussels.

Belgium also has an important heavy chemical industry with international affiliations, and is an extensive producer of heavy industrial equipment and railway supplies. These industries are now working for Germany, not only directly but also indirectly as a supplier of iron and steel manufactures to those countries from which Germany is obtaining raw materials and foodstuffs. Among the other important industries in Belgium, the extensive textile and glass plants, of little importance to Germany at present, are understood not to be very active. Belgium has also been for many years one of the largest producers and exporters of cement. While Germany is a very large consumer of this material, she has a very extensive cement industry of her own, and it is quite possible that, with the slowing down in the construction of fortifications, she is in small need of the Belgian product.

THE NETHERLANDS

The chief importance of the Netherlands to Germany is as a source of foodstuffs, particularly vegetables and dairy products. Nevertheless, the country has a number of industries which under normal conditions of international trade are of considerable value. However, these industries depended primarily on imported raw materials, which, because of Holland's liberal tariff policy and importance as a colonial Power, they were able to obtain at low and, in some cases, dumping prices. An abundance of capital and cheap labor, and an active merchant marine, have built up a number of industries, such as tin smelting, textiles and cement, which naturally have been disastrously affected by the war. The highly developed textile industry, having been used primarily to supply the colonial market, is naturally not very active at present. AKU, the important rayon holding company in which German capital was considerably interested before the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war, is understood to be under even greater German influence since the occupation. The important Philips concern, with its very large production of radios, electric bulbs and its extensive distribution facilities all over the world, is probably regarded by the Germans as of greater value to them after the war than during it. Very little, of course, is known about the German utilization of the aeroplane production facilities of the Netherlands.

FRANCE

By occupying the most industrialized part of France, Germany not only regained the important iron-ore deposits of Lorraine, but also those of the Briey and Longwy Basins which together form one of the largest sources of iron ore in the world. In 1937, France produced nearly 38,000,000 tons of iron ore, of which half was exported. But, though France was more than self-sufficient in iron ore, she was dependent on German or Belgian coke for the production of a substantial part of her iron and steel: under normal conditions the exchange of iron ore for coal was a very important factor in Franco-German trade. According to German reports, comparatively little damage has been suffered by the iron mines during the war, and the only obstacle to a full resumption of operations is the shortage of transportation and labor. A large proportion of the labor employed in the iron-ore mines of France has been foreign, mostly Poles and Italians. With the abundant iron ore of France now available to Germany, the plans of the Hermann Goering Werke will undoubtedly have to be modified for they were based primarily on the necessity of utilizing the relatively low-grade ore of Brunswick. But the solution of this problem, like that of the German and the Continental iron and steel industry as a whole, will probably have to await the outcome of the war.

The French output of iron and steel increased considerably after the First World War, and in 1937 reached about 8,000,000 tons each of pig iron and steel. In the occupied part of France there are in addition to the large iron and steel plants, the famous Schneider-Creusot armament works, large automotive and railway equipment plants, a highly developed agricultural implement industry, including branch plants of a prominent American concern, very extensive factories for the production of cast iron pipe and a machinery industry turning out a wide variety of products. The German press has claimed that the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

metal industry of France has not been greatly damaged; however, no precise information is available on this point under present circumstances.

The French aluminum industry, one of the pioneers in that field, is supported by large domestic bauxite deposits and abundant water power. While its output is not very great in comparison with that of Germany and the United States, it will furnish a welcome addition to the German aluminum supply in view of the increased war demand for that metal. The same is probably true of the highly developed French chemical industry. On the other hand, the acquisition of the Alsatian potash deposits is merely of academic interest at present, due to the inaccessibility of Germany's largest market — the United States — as well as to the development of the potash resources of Spain, Palestine and the United States itself.

Of relatively slight direct value to the Germans at present will be the well-known Michelin rubber-tire works with its world-wide distribution system. In view of the unavailability of natural rubber and the insufficient production of synthetic rubber, Germany's greatest benefit from the French industry so far has probably been the acquisition of whatever reserves of natural rubber were on hand at the time of the armistice. The same applies to the woolen industry, which probably had considerable stocks on hand since France is normally not only an important producer of finished woolen fabrics, but also has an extensive wool-processing industry.

The textile industry — in peacetimes one of the most important in France, especially because of its connection with the highly developed fashion trade — is located largely in the occupied part of the country. This industry has not only lost its important overseas markets but its raw materials, most of which like silk and cotton come from outside of Europe. The industry is now said to be turning its facilities to rayon and staple fiber. This means that for the present the Germans will control the industry's raw material by virtue of their control over the Scandinavian supply of wood pulp. Since Germany is already a large producer of textiles, and because of the shortage of natural raw materials, we may doubt whether the French textile industry is of immediate value to the Reich except perhaps as a source of supply for certain European countries in which Germany is particularly interested.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Of the two Scandinavian countries occupied by Germany, Denmark is important primarily for its food resources: mostly meat, dairy products and eggs. Though Denmark also has a number of industries, particularly shipbuilding and machinery, they depend on imported raw materials, semi-manufactures and fuel, and are therefore unable to operate on the same scale as before the war.

The industrial resources of Norway are of a wider range and thus of greater value to Germany. Norway produces a number of important minerals and metals, like aluminum, saltpeter, pyrites and molybdenum. It also has a very extensive electro-chemical industry engaged primarily in producing ferro-alloys, based on abundant water power, metals and ores that for the most part are imported. Most of the Norwegian metal industries are geared primarily for the export market: before the German invasion a large proportion of the ferro-alloys went to England. In 1939 the aluminum industry, in which there is considerable American capital, yielded about 25,000 tons for export. The forest-products industries also worked primarily for export, largely to British markets, and turned out large quantities of lumber, newsprint paper and wood pulp. Norway also has a highly developed electro-chemical industry and produces large quantities of carbide. The large shipbuilding plants, likewise largely dependent on imported materials, normally provided not only for the very extensive Norwegian merchant marine but also for export.

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria cannot be regarded as "conquered" countries in the same sense as Poland or Belgium. Yet at the moment of writing they are under effective German military occupation. The fact that they submitted to German domination without fighting and have nominally become "allies" of Germany does not mean that their economic resources will be appreciably less under her control than are those of the countries which fought before losing their freedom. Even before the war, and particularly after the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland, Germany had been taking an ever growing share of the trade of Southeastern Europe. At present she holds an almost monopolistic position in the countries mentioned, as well as in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

Jugoslavia, whose political and military fate is still, as these lines are written, uncertain.

While the resources of the Southeast European countries are primarily agricultural, they also include a few minerals of considerable importance to Germany, notably the petroleum of Rumania, the bauxites of Hungary and Jugoslavia, and the copper and other non-ferrous metals, including chrome ore, of Jugoslavia. The latter's production of copper, lead and zinc, largely financed by French and British capital, is now being turned over to Germany. The same, of course, is true of Rumanian petroleum production, except that Germany has to share a small part of this with Italy and some of the Southeast European countries themselves. No information is available as to the actual mineral production of those countries, but the 1941 agreement between Germany and Rumania calls for the delivery of 3,000,000 tons of petroleum. In 1939 Jugoslavia exported about $16,000,000 worth of mineral products, of which crude copper was valued at a little over $10,000,000 and lead ore at over $3,000,000; the remainder consisted of iron ore, bauxite, zinc, lead and chrome ores, as well as crude lead. In 1939 Rumania exported a little over 4,000,000 tons of petroleum products.

SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND

In addition to the countries occupied by Germany, either as defeated enemies or as compulsory allies, there are two others — Switzerland and Sweden — which are almost entirely cut off from trading with the non-European world and have therefore been obliged to confine their economic intercourse to the Axis Powers. Both are highly developed industrial countries, and each possesses a large metal industry. Sweden has supplied Germany for many years with much of her iron ore. Sweden's large forest resources provided the basis for her extensive wood-pulp production. In manufacturing, she is particularly renowned for fine steels, machinery of all kinds, ball bearings, armament and explosives. One of the specialties of the famous Bofors works is anti-aircraft guns. Switzerland also has a highly developed machinery industry and is well-known for her precision tools. She also has a relatively large aluminum production, with exports of over 30,000 tons in 1939. Her chemical industry has specialized along coal-tar lines and has for some time maintained more or less close relations with the German chemical industry.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ITALY

In view of Italy's high degree of dependence on Germany for some of the most essential commodities in carrying on military operations — especially coal and the heavier products of the iron and steel industry — we need not include her among the European countries of industrial value to Germany. But even Italy can contribute to Germany's war effort. She can send her fruits and vegetable products that are undoubtedly appreciated as adding variety to the present German diet. She also can furnish the mercury her ally needs, for Italy is one of the world's largest producers of that mineral. Italy probably does not have a surplus of aluminum. Her chemical industry, however, is probably of considerable use to Germany.

III

To summarize, then, what has been the net increase in German industrial capacity since the outbreak of the war? In striking such a balance we shall have to confine ourselves to the really important items and must naturally leave out of account whatever damage the R.A.F. has done to industry within Germany.

The most substantial increase is that which has taken place in the iron and steel industry as a result of its large acquisition of ore, and facilities for producing raw metals and finished products, particularly armaments and machinery, in the various occupied or dominated countries. According to a recent German calculation, the steel production capacity of what is now regarded as the German customs area (Austria, Upper Silesia, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Luxembourg and Lorraine) is from 35,000,000 to 37,000,000 tons. By including the capacity of the Belgian plants and those in France outside of Lorraine, another 9,000,000 tons is added. This means that the capacity under German control is now half of that possessed by the United States, and is thus second in the world. In facilities for producing armament the German bloc would probably occupy first place, and a very high rank in the production of machinery. Incidentally, industries of this type possess a large equipment of machine tools. The German press has reported that a considerable proportion of the metal industries in the occupied and dominated countries is now being utilized by the Reich.

Germany has also acquired control over large coal supplies in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Poland, Belgium and France. As some German writers have pointed out, coal is now Germany's best substitute for free exchange — in fact, it is even superior, since free exchange would not make it possible for a neutral country like Sweden or Switzerland to obtain British coal under present conditions. What the German economists do not mention, however, is that coal also enables Germany to bring pressure on her neutral neighbors and constitutes an extremely important factor in the economic subordination of her Axis partner, Italy. Before the war Poland exported one third of her annual production of 40,000,000 tons. As far as increasing her coal exports is concerned, Germany's greatest gain has therefore been the acquisition of the Upper Silesian coal fields. Under present conditions Germany has a virtual monopoly over the coal supply of every continental country that must rely in whole or in part on imports, and she is making good use of this position when negotiating clearing agreements and in carrying out other aspects of her policy.

The facilities of France, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland for aluminum production are of considerable value to Germany in spite of the fact that she claims to be the largest aluminum producer in the world, with an output of over 200,000 metric tons in 1939. In the same year the combined production of Norway and Switzerland was 59,000 metric tons. The importance of aluminum for the aviation industry and as a substitute for copper and other non-ferrous metals is obvious. The rich bauxite deposits of France are undoubtedly also welcome to Germany, although she also has at her disposal the deposits of Southeastern Europe.

The zinc resources of Poland are next in importance to its contribution of coal. Jugoslavia's output of copper and other non-ferrous metals constitutes only a small proportion of Germany's demand, yet it cannot be left out of consideration. Official German statements attach much importance to the petroleum resources of Rumania; we nevertheless lack any exact information as to how much oil the Germans are obtaining in that country.

The shift in the textile industry of Germany and Italy toward a synthetic base, as a part of the totalitarian policy of self-sufficiency, has given wood pulp an important position as a raw material. Germany has now at her disposal the abundant wood-pulp production facilities of the Scandinavian countries, with the exception of Finland which is still able to make some overseas shipments. Before the war Scandinavian wood pulp went largely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to England and the United States. Through her control of the Continent's wood-pulp production Germany has become a large exporter of staple fiber to the various European countries now cut off from their former supplies of natural fibers and this gives her an added means for dominating their textile industries. Furthermore, the large timber supply and the saw-mill facilities of the Scandinavian countries are naturally of great value to Germany for construction purposes and in mining.

The consumption goods industries of the occupied and controlled countries, while of secondary importance, are not altogether without value. In the first place, they are very useful in supplying the demands of other countries from which Germany is obtaining materials essential to the conduct of the war. In the second place, by using these consumption goods to supply the German market, German labor and industrial equipment are released for more important production.

German industry and agriculture have acquired a considerable addition to their labor supply in the form of prisoners of war, of whom the number is estimated at over 3,000,000. While a large proportion of the war prisoners is used for agriculture, an effort is now being made to divert the skilled workers among them to industry — where they will, of course, be paid only nominal wages. In addition to this prison labor there are the skilled workers recruited in the occupied countries where the shortage of raw materials and the destruction caused by the war have produced widespread unemployment.

In conclusion, it should be said, in order to prevent any misunderstanding as to the industrial resources gained by Germany through her territorial expansion, that valuable as they are, they do not — with the exception of petroleum from Rumania and some copper from Jugoslavia — include important quantities of any of the strategic raw materials that normally figure so prominently in Germany's imports from overseas, such as raw cotton, jute, rubber, nickel, tin, mica, antimony and tungsten. The Germans doubtless have seized a certain quantity of each of these in the countries they have occupied. But, however large or small these quantities may have been, sooner or later Germany will have used them up.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRITAIN'S COLONIES IN THE WAR

By W. E. Simnett

BRITAIN'S Colonies, no less than the Dominions and India, are contributing their share to the war effort of the Commonwealth. The spectacular activities of the Canadian airmen over Britain, of the Australians and New Zealanders in Libya, of the Indian division in Eritrea and of the South African troops in Ethiopia should not lead us to overlook the important rôle being played by the Empire's "junior partners" — the crown colonies, the protectorates and the mandated territories.

I

Before describing the part played by the British Colonies in the war, however, I should like to explain briefly just what they are. I found during a recent tour of the United States that there was considerable vagueness about the Colonial Empire even in otherwise well-informed quarters — which is perhaps not surprising, seeing that it is none too well known at home.

The British Colonial Empire comprises some forty separate territories, large and small, at greatly varying stages of political, social and economic development, scattered across the globe, covering a land area of three million square miles (exclusive of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) and containing a population — white, black, brown and yellow — of some sixty-five million people. The whites are in a small minority, for most of the colonies are tropical or sub-tropical and are therefore, unlike the Dominions, largely unsuited for white settlement.

Let us for a moment make a bird's-eye survey of this variegated Empire. Turning first to the Western Hemisphere we find numerous colonies off the coast of North America or clustered in the Caribbean — Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica and the other British West Indies, British Honduras and British Guiana — much in the news of late as a result of Britain's having granted the United States sites for naval and air bases on some of them. Further down in the South Atlantic lie Ascension, St. Helena, the Falklands — all useful *points d'appui* in Britain's control of the sea — as well as Tristan da Cunha, "loneliest isle," and a section of Antarctica.

But it is the vast continent of Africa that contains the great

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bulk of British colonial territory and population. In West Africa there are the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria (which alone has a population of over twenty millions), plus the two mandated areas in the former German colonies of Togoland and the Cameroons. To the east lie the million square miles composing the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a "condominium" in which the flags of Britain and Egypt fly side by side, though the practical job of administration is largely in British hands. Still farther east, near the "Horn of Africa," is British Somaliland, temporarily under Italian occupation. Below the Sudan comes a large British bloc comprising Kenya, Uganda, the mandated Territory of Tanganyika, Nyasaland, the Rhodesias, the island of Zanzibar under its native Sultan, and, embedded in the Union of South Africa, the protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swasiland, still under Imperial control. Southern Rhodesia, incidentally, is a self-governing colony, though it does not rank as a Dominion.

Along Britain's "short-cut" to the East through the Mediterranean and Red Seas are strung the colonies of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Aden (in which latter is included Britain's protectorate over the south coast of Arabia), as well as the mandated territories of Palestine and Trans Jordan. In the Indian Ocean lie the islands of Mauritius, the Seychelles and, at the toe of India, Ceylon — the premier colony, today self-governing. Burma, though politically quite separate and distinct from India, has the same status as its larger neighbor, and is therefore not a colony.

Farther east is British Malaya, a peninsula consisting of the Straits Settlements, with the great Singapore base, and the Federated and non-Federated Malay States under their native rulers. Malaya is the most prosperous of all the colonial areas, its wealth being derived largely from its tin and rubber, for which the United States is the principal customer. The island of Borneo, though mostly Dutch, contains British North Borneo, administered by the British North Borneo Company, and the protectorates of Brunei and Sarawak, the latter under its "white rajahs" out of the Brooke family. At the gateway of China stands Hong Kong, one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Out in the South Pacific lie many scattered islands such as Fiji, the Gilbert and Ellis groups, the British Solomons, the miniature Kingdom of the Tonga (or Friendly) Islands, ruled by Queen Saloti Tabou, and Pitcairn, still inhabited by descendants of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mutineers of the *Bounty*. In this part of the world are also the New Hebrides group, until lately an Anglo-French condominium, and the phosphate island of Nauru, an Empire mandate. Not to be omitted is the interesting experiment of Canton and Enderbury Islands, where a joint Anglo-American administration is now in force.

Though this list completes the roster of British Colonies, it does not include territories belonging or mandated to Dominions, such as South-West Africa, Papua, New Guinea and Western Samoa. Such a bare catalogue of names cannot, of course, give any hint of the rich diversity of the lands and peoples living under the British flag, or of their varied history. Any impartial study of this history will, however, reveal that for the most part the Home Government, far from pursuing a policy of "grab," was often reluctant to assume responsibilities that were thrust upon it by the force of circumstances, by the enterprise of individuals, by spontaneous and sometimes repeated requests for protection, or by the consequences and necessities of sea power. Had it been otherwise, the Colonial Empire would have become far more extensive than it is. Many opportunities for territorial expansion were refused or neglected, while in other cases the possessions of other Powers taken as the prize of war, such as the Dutch East Indies, were restored.

In any event, the "imperialism" of the nineteenth century is in Britain a thing of the past, and has been superseded by the policy of trusteeship. British Colonies are no longer regarded as "possessions" to be exploited primarily for the benefit of the mother country but as responsibilities or trusts held for the ultimate benefit of the colonial peoples themselves. The objective towards which the "junior partners" are striving is that already attained by the "senior partners" in the Commonwealth — self-government. The Secretary of State for the Colonies not long ago insisted in Parliament that there can be no separation of Imperial and Commonwealth policy, that it must be the same for the Colonies as for the Dominions and India. The more backward peoples are to be guided towards that stage of political, economic and social development where they can stand on their own feet and take charge of their own affairs. Some colonies have already nearly reached this goal; others are in varying stages of progress towards it.

That is why there can be no question of transferring or barter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing any British colony, protectorate or mandated territory to another Power except at the express wish of the inhabitants. For Britain to do otherwise would be to shirk her responsibilities. These territories are not disposable property; they belong, not to us, but to their peoples — British subjects or protected persons who for the most part are proud of that status and who certainly do not desire to exchange it for anything but independence, and even then would probably wish to remain associated with the British Commonwealth of free peoples.

II

Of this attitude, signal proof has been given ever since September 1939. Upon the declaration of war the Colonies at once ranged themselves at the side of the mother country and placed their resources in man-power, money and materials at Britain's disposal. As Mr. George Hall, Under Secretary of State for Colonies, declared in the House of Commons on November 20 of last year: "The outbreak of war was the signal for a unanimous and spontaneous outburst of loyalty and support from all parts of the Colonial Empire. The assurances which were given then have been more than fulfilled, and all calls for service have been enthusiastically answered. Indeed, during the past 14 months the loyalty of the Colonies has been demonstrated in an almost bewildering variety of ways. There have been gifts showing a degree of thoughtfulness and sympathy which I find very touching. . . . There have been gifts from such bodies as the trade unions in Fiji, chambers of commerce, municipal councils, and so on; gifts for the general conduct of the war, for fighters and bombers, gifts in cash and kind, gifts to war charities, to the Red Cross, to King George's Fund for Sailors, for every conceivable purpose. Up to date the amount subscribed has reached the wonderful total of no less than £17,000,000. . . . Every territory has made its contribution from Nigeria's 20,000,000 population to the 200 persons who occupy Ascension Island."

The field of voluntary money contributions is, of course, only one of those in which the Colonies are helping. Mr. Hall's figure of £17,000,000 — now grown to over £20,000,000 — represents only special gifts and does not take account of the considerable colonial expenditure on local defense, which has naturally increased greatly under war conditions, or the normal contributions to imperial defense made by the Colonies. For instance, Hong Kong

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alone contributes $3,000,000 a year to imperial defense in addition to an expenditure of $6,000,000 a year for local defense purposes. The Colonies took the lead in starting "Spitfire Funds" and in collecting money for canteens for air-raid victims in Britain — the first of these was a gift from the children of Mauritius to the children of London.

This was not the enforced action of subservient colonial governments, but the voluntary gesture of the peoples themselves and of their national leaders and representatives, who fully recognize that their future depends upon British survival, and that we fight for their freedom as for our own. Such a result could scarcely have followed upon "imperialistic exploitation" or "brutal repression." Nor must it be forgotten that this eager coöperation of the Colonies represents only the early stages of an effort which, with that of the Dominions and India, may well prove a decisive factor in the outcome of the war.

III

Let us look at the military side of the picture. For obvious reasons details cannot be given here, but it should be kept in mind that the Colonial Empire contains an immense reservoir of manpower, available not only for direct military service but also for labor. At the outset of the war the British Government made a significant decision: that for the duration of the conflict British subjects from the Colonies and British-protected persons, whether of European descent or not, should be placed, for the purpose of voluntary entry into the Armed Forces of the Crown in the United Kingdom, on precisely the same footing as other British subjects. In no sphere of activity have the Colonies shown more clearly and more insistently their desire to offer their services without stint. In Kenya, almost half the European population between the ages of 18 and 35 have enlisted in the armed forces, and it has been necessary to introduce compulsory service among Europeans throughout the Colonies, not for any lack of volunteers, but in order to make more rational use of the man-power available and to avoid interference with necessary production. As for the native peoples, there has been no need to apply compulsion since many more have offered themselves than can possibly be accepted. The limiting factor has not been the availability, still less the quality, of colonial troops, but our ability at present to supply all the necessary equipment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even before the war, the defense forces in many of the Colonies had been strengthened and new forces established where none had previously existed. Within the half year following the outbreak of war the local forces in East Africa, Malaya and Hong Kong had been increased threefold, while the number serving in West Africa had been doubled. Only lack of equipment prevented greater expansion. Units of the Royal West Africa Frontier Force, of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, and of the Southern Rhodesia Air Force are now coöperating in Ethiopia with contingents from the South African Army and Air Force and with the local forces in East Africa. In the Mediterranean, Gibraltar remains on guard, while Malta has already put up a splendid defense against constant air bombardment from Italian, and lately, from German planes. Thousands of Maltese have joined the Navy and other branches of the imperial forces. A pioneer unit from Cyprus had the honor of being the first colonial contingent to arrive in France for active service, and several thousand Cypriots are now serving in the newly-formed Cyprus Regiment in England. The contribution of the Cypriots towards the smashing British victory in Libya recently received especial praise from General Wavell. Pioneer units have also been raised in Palestine, Malta, Aden, Mauritius and Seychelles.

In Palestine, political differences have been adjourned, internal order and peace have been restored, and Arabs and Jews are now serving side by side in volunteer forces. In addition, large numbers of Palestinian Arab and Jewish companies have been attached to British battalions for combatant service in the Middle East. In short, the defense forces have been strengthened in all Colonies from the Falklands to Ceylon and Fiji. So far, combatant units have not been raised in the West Indies; but since West Indians have a long and honorable tradition of military service in other parts of the world, their turn may come. There is already a steady and increasing flow of colonial recruits for service in the Air Force as well as in the Army. Much study is being given to the problem of how the man-power resources of the Colonial Empire can be mobilized and used to the best advantage. And it should be emphasized that what has been done in the first eighteen months of the war is but an instalment of what the Colonial Empire is capable of contributing in men and materials.

Before leaving the problem of defense, something should be said of the West Indian bases. Leases on a basis of 99 years or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less are being granted to the United States Government "freely and without consideration" for air and naval bases on the Avalon Peninsula and the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and great bay of Bermuda. In exchange for naval and military equipment similar bases are to be set up on the eastern side of the Bahamas, the southern coast of Jamaica, the west coast of St. Lucia in the Windwards, in Antigua in the Leewards, on the west coast of Trinidad, and in British Guiana within 50 miles of Georgetown. In announcing the decision to grant these leases, Mr. Churchill emphasized that "there is of course no question of any transference of sovereignty — that has never been suggested — or of any action being taken without the consent or against the wishes of the Colonies concerned." This statement makes the position of the British Government quite clear and allays fears expressed by some West Indians that their status as British subjects might be affected or their land alienated. The colonial governments are necessarily parties to any agreements in which their rights are affected. On the other hand, this notable example of Anglo-American coöperation will not only contribute materially to Western Hemisphere defense but will probably add to the prosperity of the Colonies concerned.

IV

It is in the economic field that the colonial war contribution is, and can increasingly be, of the highest value. Being largely situated in the tropical and subtropical zones, the Colonies have immense resources in foodstuffs, raw materials and minerals, many of them complementary to those produced in other parts of the Commonwealth. Before the war, all these had been as freely available to other nations as to Great Britain. After the declaration of war the first step was to bring colonial trade under complete control in accordance with plans already devised. The purposes of this control were to prevent goods from reaching the enemy, to provide essential colonial supplies for Britain and her friends, to secure foreign exchange in return for exports, to limit imports paid for in foreign exchange, and to prevent the transfer of capital into foreign currency. All of these objects were successfully achieved with the utmost goodwill and active coöperation of the Colonies, even where some inconvenience was involved. In many cases the enemy has already been dealt heavy blows by our withholding colonial products necessary to his economy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Turning to the positive side, when war began the Colonies at once asked of Britain: How can we help you with our products; what do you want more of; what do you want us to send to you rather than elsewhere? These questions covered a great variety of products, as can readily be seen from the *Economic Survey of the Colonial Empire* issued annually by the Colonial Office. Broadly speaking, Britain's policy has been to buy up the total crop or the total exportable surplus of the principal foodstuffs and raw materials produced by the various Colonies, buying if necessary more than she needs. The purpose of this policy is to assure the maintenance of the Colonies' economic standards, to encourage self-sufficiency in home consumption, to facilitate the expansion of exports as a means of obtaining foreign exchange (such as rubber, cocoa and tin) and to help develop existing as well as new industries and resources.

In pursuit of this policy Britain has purchased, or contracted to purchase, at a fair and stable price, the Colonies' total crops or exportable surpluses of such products as cocoa, sugar, tea, coffee, flax, cotton, wool, sisal, oilseeds, copra and phosphates. The Colonies are also great suppliers of copper, tin, lead, zinc, bauxite, iron ore, gold, manganese, chromium, pyrites, potash, groundnuts, oil and other essential raw materials. The quota releases of rubber and tin have been greatly increased, so that these two commodities are now virtually unrestricted. Very large quantities of rubber have been purchased by the United States. The Colonies have thus been assured of a demand for all their products, and some indeed are opening up fresh markets. Economic councils or development committees have been set up in the principal Colonies, and several of these are exploiting fresh resources or expanding existing industries. For example, the bauxite industry in British Guiana is being extended; large bauxite deposits are also being opened up in Nyasaland. Flax factories are being erected in Kenya. Power alcohol and diesel fuel is being made in Uganda. Iron ore has been discovered in Ceylon; Trinidad is increasing her oil output; and an oil industry is being developed in British Guiana. Secondary industries are likewise being developed in many Colonies under the stimulus of war needs. Hong Kong, for instance, is busy building ships to carry empire goods.

Lack of space forbids our going into all the details concerning this wide range of production or our enumerating all the items

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

colony by colony. Merely to give a few examples: copper is available in large quantities from Northern Rhodesia; chromite, the source of chromium, is coming from Sierra Leone, in addition to increased quantities of iron ore and gold; manganese, as well as gold, comes from the Gold Coast; the whole of the West African cocoa crop is assured, as well as tea and coffee from Kenya, Nyasaland and Ceylon; sugar is available from Mauritius, the West Indies and British Guiana; Nigeria and Malaya export tin; Uganda alone in 1940 produced nearly 400,000 bales of cotton, and besides this, there is the Sudan product and Sea Island cotton from the West Indies. These examples are but a few of those that might be cited; but they are enough to show that the Colonies' resources constitute a very great reinforcement for the Empire's economic war effort.

Moreover, there now exist close economic links between the British Colonies and those of Belgium, Holland and Free France. Also, at Delhi a conference is now sitting more or less permanently at which the Dominions and all the Colonies east of Suez are represented and of which the purpose is to evolve a joint economic policy for all these territories in order to make them self-supporting, as far as possible, and to supply the British Forces in the Middle East. This is an important development which may have far-reaching consequences.

V

Despite its grave preoccupations, the British Government has been fully mindful of its colonial responsibilities. In the midst of war, it has added to the statute book the most important piece of colonial legislation in recent years: the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. This law provides for a vast program of economic, social and educational development to extend over a period of at least ten years and covering the Colonial Empire as a whole. It will entail an expenditure from the British Treasury of £5,500,000 a year. In addition, it has wiped out virtually the whole of colonial indebtedness, totalling well over £11,000,000. At the same time, the Government has issued the drastic recommendations of the Royal Commission on the West Indies, and has announced that these will be implemented as far and as soon as possible, and that a special sum will be allocated under this head, in addition to a due proportion of the Development Fund. Work has, in fact, already begun in the West Indies. It is esti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mated that this legislation will cost the British taxpayer in all, excluding the debt remission, a sum equivalent to some $280,000,000. To supervise the work, two important committees have been set up: a Development Committee under Lord Moyne, who was chairman of the West India Royal Commission, and a Research Committee under Lord Hailey. Preparatory work is being undertaken both at home and in the Colonies, though the full prosecution of the task must necessarily depend upon the progress of the war.

This legislation is in no sense to be regarded as a reward for good conduct, for it was drafted long before the outbreak of the war and is merely a necessary corollary of the British policy of trusteeship for colonial peoples.

In the sphere of medical, educational and social development, and in economic enterprise, the British Colonies have benefited considerably from American help and coöperation. Such bodies as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Phelps Stokes Fund, numerous missionary societies, as well as many commercial enterprises and private individuals, have all given liberally in money, expert advice and devoted personal service in such fields as medicine, public health, education and scientific research throughout Africa, in the West Indies, Malta, Palestine, Malaya, and other territories. American capital and initiative have greatly aided the economic development of various colonies, especially Northern Rhodesia, Cyprus and Palestine. One instance of this help is the financing, largely by the Carnegie Corporation, of the monumental survey of Africa carried out by Lord Hailey, which will probably form the foundation of future development in that vast continent. The great extent and variety of this valuable coöperation is not sufficiently appreciated by the American people.

Many Americans still suspect the British of imperialism in the old and bad sense, and in general, the American public does not understand the implications of our present colonial policy. If, as Mr. Churchill has said, the destinies of our two nations are in the future to be increasingly bound together, as certainly seems probable, it is highly desirable that the American people should fully understand, not only that the structure of the British Commonwealth is democratic, but that in this democratic system there is a place provided for the colonial peoples.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BERLIN TO BAGHDAD UP-TO-DATE

By Philip Willard Ireland

LITTLE fanfare attended the completion of the Baghdad Railway last summer, overshadowed as the event was by the Blitzkrieg and its aftermath. Yet when, on the night of July 17, 1940, the first through passenger train for Istanbul steamed out of Baghdad, the conclusion was at last written to one of the most dramatic of the stories of diplomatic and financial rivalry that have marked the last half century of European power politics. The Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway had now become a reality — though not, as originally intended, under the aegis of Germany. Constructed primarily for peaceful commerce, the line nevertheless is of high military importance, and its completion at this moment is significant.

I

Through passengers from Europe to points on the Baghdad Railway must transfer at Istanbul by ferry across the Bosphorus to Haydar Pasha, while at Baghdad they must change again — from the standard-gauge (4′ 8½″) line to the Baghdad-Basra metre-gauge (3′ 3⅜″) line. The Taurus Express, the Asiatic extension of the Simplon-Orient Express, makes the 1,636-mile journey from Haydar Pasha to Baghdad in three days. Basra, 353 miles beyond Baghdad, is reached in 14 hours by night express. From the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf is thus 1,989 miles, or as far as from Boston to Denver.

The Turkish State Railways operate the through trains from Haydar Pasha to Eskishehir, Ankara, Boghazköprü (near Kayseri), Ulukishla, through the Taurus Mountains to Adana, through the Amanus range to Meydanekbez on the Syrian border, a distance of 907 miles. In Syria, a French company runs the 103-mile section from Meydanekbez to Aleppo and back to the Turkish frontier at Chorbanbey (Çorbanbey), where one of the only two private railway companies in Turkey operates it as far as Nissibin on the Turco-Syrian frontier, a distance of 237 miles. At Nissibin, the French line again takes over for 48 miles to Tel-Kotchek on the Syrio-'Iraqi border. From that point the 'Iraqi Railways operate the 341 miles to Baghdad and the metre-gauge line down the Euphrates valley from Baghdad to Basra.

The actual construction of the railway began in 1904 under a concession, granted to the Germans by Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1902. The existing railway to Konya was now to be extended to Baghdad via Ulukishla, Adana, Aleppo, Nissibin and Mosul. However, completion was delayed by lack of funds, the outbreak of the Balkan and World Wars, and the difficult terrain in the Taurus and Amanus Mountains. Not until October 5, 1918, a few weeks before Turkey dropped out of the war, was through traffic sent from Haydar Pasha to Nissibin.

The Germans had also carried construction 74 miles northward from Baghdad by the time the British captured that city in March 1917. This line was pushed forward by the British in order to facilitate their advance against the Turks. By the end of October 1917 the railroad had reached Baiji, and was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

soon extended to Sharqat. Thus at the end of the war the two railheads, Nissibin and Sharqat, were separated by less than 200 miles, on which partial construction had been undertaken along 124 miles.

No further steps to complete the gap were taken until 1933. Indeed, the section from Sharqat to Baiji was torn up and, as a result of a decision by the British Government in 1919 to extend the metre-gauge line from Baghdad to Mosul by way of Kirkuk, it was expected that the remainder of the standard-gauge line would be pulled up back to Samarra. This decision was made for strategic and economic reasons, notwithstanding the fact that standard-gauge sleepers had been used in building the line from Basra to Baghdad in anticipation of the day when the line would be converted into standard gauge. The British Government apparently desired a break in the gauge at a point in northern 'Iraq because it preferred the construction of a new railroad from Haifa (on the Mediterranean) across the desert to Baghdad rather than the completion of the standard-gauge line from Constantinople to Basra. Several surveys were made for the trans-desert route, but the British were unable to induce the 'Iraq Government to pay £7,000,000 as its share of the cost.

The French company in Syria was the first to undertake to bridge the gap when in 1933 it built seven miles of track from Nissibin to Tel Zouan. This became the terminus of the Taurus Express, inaugurated in 1930 with connecting motor-car service to Kirkuk via Mosul. On May 15, 1935, service was opened to Tel-Kotchek on the Syrio-'Iraqi frontier, 41 miles from Tel Zouan. Beginning on this date also, the Taurus Express ran via Ankara instead of Konya. Under the terms of the Railway Agreement of April 1, 1936, the 'Iraqi Railways passed from British ownership to that of the Government of 'Iraq. As a result, the latter took upon itself the task of completing the line. Construction began in late 1936 from Tel-Kotchek to Mosul, but not until March 31, 1939, did the Taurus Express steam into Mosul. Upon the outbreak of the present war construction was also pushed northward from Baiji, a comparatively easy undertaking except for a section 30 miles south of Mosul where tunneling was needed. On May 24, 1940, the first train passed over the line to Baghdad and on July 17, 1940, the first passenger train went northward. Construction and the new equipment, bought in England, cost about £3,500,000, which was financed from revenue and from 'Iraq's first foreign loan, floated in London.

It was recently announced that the 100-mile gap between Diyarbakir and Mardin is to be filled in; construction is said already to have been begun. When this segment has been finished, the Baghdad line will be able to follow the route originally planned, in this way saving about 150 miles and avoiding the Taurus and Amanus ranges. It also has the advantage, from the Turkish point of view, of being much more easily defended.

II

With the intensification of the war the completed Baghdad Railway has become important as a means of supplying, from the port of Basra, those Near and Middle East regions now cut off by the closing of the Mediterranean to commerce. Traffic through Basra and on the Baghdad Railway is therefore steadily increasing. At Basra there now call every month five to eight ships

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from American ports, as well as numerous Japanese, Dutch, British, Greek and British Indian steamers. The facilities of the port, geared to handle about 5,000 tons daily, have been taxed to the utmost. Ships formerly had to lie in the Shatt al-Arab for several days before coming to the wharf; but this difficulty has been overcome by a reorganization of the port facilities.

Delays are also incurred in moving freight by rail to and from Basra because of the lack of adequate rolling stock. The metre-gauge line, built and equipped during the last war "with odds and ends from India," as a contemporary writer expressed it, in 1938 had 55 locomotives, 226 passenger cars and 2,543 freight cars of all types. Much of this equipment dates from the last war and is inadequate for main-line traffic. The broad-gauge line from Baghdad northward was even less well prepared to handle the new influx of traffic: in 1938 it had 11 locomotives, most of which had been captured from the Germans, 55 passenger cars and 525 freight cars, few of which were modern. Additional orders were placed in England, but not all this equipment has arrived.

The transit trade to and from Iran no longer accounts for its former large share of the foreign commerce of 'Iraq, although the closing of the Mediterranean ports has caused a renewal of commerce between Baghdad and western Iran. As yet the transshipment of goods to Syria and Palestine is far from having reached its full possibilities, largely because of the high cost of transport across the desert, added to the wartime maritime rates to Basra, the freight rates on the railway, port dues, transit dues ($3 per metric ton) and handling charges at Baghdad. Taken together, these charges tend to make the cost of many articles almost prohibitive in these countries. Under present circumstances, however, the rates on the railway are not excessive.

The greatest obstacle to an increase in traffic has been the freight rate for trans-desert truck transport. In early 1939, the rate per ton from the Mediterranean to Baghdad was about £5. It now stands at about £10. The increase seems to be due less to scarcity of gasoline or the high cost of trucks and tires than to the fact that the 'Iraqi operators, who alone can obtain licenses from the Baghdad Government to carry goods in 'Iraq, charge all that the traffic will bear. Syrian and Palestinian operators, who own more trucks than their 'Iraqi competitors, are excluded from 'Iraq. The rate to Aleppo and to North Syrian points has been kept down by the completion of the Baghdad Railway where through rates by rail run from £8 to £11 per ton.

Transportation to Turkey also is handicapped by high railway freight charges (from Basra to Istanbul the average rate per ton is $89 plus $3 for transit dues), by the necessity of transshipment at Baghdad from metre-gauge to standard-gauge, and by the lack of freight cars. At present, one freight train a day runs to and from Turkey. The Turkish Government, however, has taken steps to develop traffic. In July 1940, it sent a commission to Basra to investigate trade possibilities in the Persian Gulf; it also appointed a Commercial Attaché in Baghdad to facilitate customs and shipping formalities.

The use of the Baghdad Railway to reëstablish Turkey's exports would not only improve her foreign exchange position but would also provide nearly 1,000 tons of freight daily for Basra. The success of such a scheme would largely depend on the value of Turkish products in relation to shipping costs. Thus one of the most recent shipments over the railway was 4,000 tons of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Turkish tobacco for the United States. In the opposite direction, American moving picture films for distribution to all parts of the Balkans and Near East are being imported, as well as automobile parts, tires, optical instruments, cotton and woollen cloth, chemicals, dyes, coffee, tea and armaments. Only if the shipments now trickling through the Mediterranean from England become completely cut off, and if prices within Turkey and the demand for Turkish products abroad rise enough to cover the added cost of shipping via Basra, can there be a further expansion of traffic on this route.

III

The ever-tightening hold of Germany on Southeastern Europe has naturally stimulated speculation as to whether the Baghdad Railway may not serve either as a sort of Burma Road for sending British aid to Turkey, or as a highway for German expansion toward the oil fields of 'Iraq and Iran.

As a belligerent against Germany, Turkey would undoubtedly require large supplies of matériel — particularly machine guns, tanks, trucks and planes — since her present equipment is not adequate for her 750,000 fighting men. As long as Great Britain retains her dominant position in the Mediterranean, she may be able to provide convoys to Izmir (Smyrna). In case Izmir were cut off, Mersin and Alexandretta, both connected by short branch lines with the Baghdad Railway, might then serve as avenues of supply, though neither is well-equipped to handle heavy cargo. Ships must lie out at sea, particularly at Mersin where in rough weather loading and unloading are impossible. Thus it would seem that, if Istanbul and Izmir become impossible or too dangerous to use, supplies could best be shipped into Turkey via the Baghdad Railway.

The difficulties which would interfere with this use of the Baghdad Railway as Turkey's principal window on the world seem to be: the lack of rolling stock; the long distances involved, with a consequent long "turn around;" the change in gauge at Baghdad; the bottleneck at the port of Basra; and the fact that trains must pass through three different countries. In this last connection trouble might come from the French forces in Syria. However, in case such interference should take place, it seems probable that Turkey, with British support, would annex those parts of Syria, including Aleppo, through which the Baghdad Railway runs. In passing, it may be noted that there are no more than 20,000 French troops in Syria at the present time.

The scarcity of rolling stock would probably not become acute unless requirements, say at Ankara, exceeded 2,000 tons daily — a small amount for a fighting army. To keep 2,000 tons arriving daily in Turkey, about 4 trains of some 40 cars each carrying 12½ to 15 tons (full loading is seldom achieved) would have to be dispatched every day in each direction. Regular deliveries, allowing seven days for covering the 1,266 miles from Ankara to Baghdad at the average speed of 180 miles daily, plus two or three days "turn around" at Baghdad and at the Turkish destination, would require the constant use of between 90 and 100 trains, or about 3,600 to 4,000 cars and 100 to 120 locomotives, together with pusher engines for the mountainous regions. The total carrying capacity of these trains alone would equal about one-half of the average daily freight movement on all lines in Turkey in 1938. These requirements could probably be met at the expense of traffic on other lines. In 1939, the Turkish

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Railways owned 898 locomotives of all types, 16,331 passenger and freight cars, and a number of Wagon-Lits. Turkey has given large orders for rolling stock, including 129 heavy-duty locomotives and 200 freight cars from Germany, 58 similar locomotives and 300 ore cars from Great Britain, and 22 locomotives and 600 cars from France. Some of these have been delivered, but definite figures are not available.

Now for 'Iraq. In 1938, the most prosperous year yet experienced by the 'Iraqi Railways, a daily average of 1,680 tons of freight was moved over all lines. At present two trains run daily between Basra and Baghdad in each direction. They approximate the railway's estimated 2,000–2,500 tons capacity. The railroad could be supplemented by steamers on the Tigris; this service is now furnished by three companies which in normal times carry one-half of the total freight movement of 'Iraq.

The difficulties would become still more formidable if the British should decide to move additional troops into 'Iraq to protect the oil fields there and in Iran, for the task of supplying these troops would still further strain the combined resources of the railways and the rivers. Should Turkey enter the war against the Nazis, she would immediately be faced with the problem of how to protect the coal supply of her railways. The capture of her coal deposits, located principally on the Black Sea between Zonguldak and Ergeli, would almost irreparably cripple her railways. In 'Iraq the locomotives use oil as fuel. In Syria they operate with coal, and this would have to be supplied either by Turkey or from overseas through Basra.

IV

Will Hitler in the near future venture down the route of the Baghdad Railway? We of course do not know. But it is no secret that the Germans would be very happy to acquire the 16 to 20 million tons of oil annually produced in the oil fields of 'Iraq and Iran. They also have every reason for wishing to cut the British fleet off from this supply and to destroy British naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean as a prelude to the conquest of the Suez Canal. To attain these objectives the Germans would find control of the Baghdad Railway to be invaluable, since there are practically no roads suitable for military traffic through Anatolia, particularly in the Taurus and Amanus Mountains.

Even if the German Army should obtain control of the Baghdad Railway and force its way into 'Iraq and Iran, it would discover that possession of the oil wells in those countries would not in itself satisfy Germany's oil-hunger. There are no available means for moving the oil by rail to Istanbul or Samsun. Turkey probably owns fewer than 200 tank cars, while the 'Iraqi Railways have less than 40. The only way to get oil out of Mesopotamia is therefore through the pipelines to Tripoli and Haifa. Unless Germany expects to divert tank cars from Rumania, she cannot count on oil from the Near East until the British have been driven out of the Mediterranean.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MARSHAL PÉTAIN AND THE "NEW ORDER"

THE French censorship and physical difficulties of transatlantic communication have restricted the flow of French newspapers and periodicals to the United States. Thus it has come about that the full texts of many of the public pronouncements of Marshal Pétain, who on July 11 assumed full powers as Chief of State, are still lacking in the United States; while the reports of them transmitted by American correspondents have often been very meager. Among the most important "programmatic" statements by Marshal Pétain is one given by him to the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and printed by that periodical in its issue of September 15, 1940, under the title "La Politique Sociale de l'Avenir." It has been widely reprinted subsequently in the local newspapers of unoccupied France. We reproduce below several striking passages from this statement, taken from *La Nouvelliste de Lyon*, an old-established Royalist organ, of September 20.

Marshal Pétain, who addresses his statement to all Frenchmen, begins by saying that he wishes to discuss politics — not, however, the "barren and gloomy struggle of parties and factions" but politics as a science and art, "the art of governing men in conformity with their highest and most general interests." A strong State is an indispensable factor in good government. He says it is his intention to build such a State "on the ruins of the monstrous and flabby State which collapsed under the weight of its weaknesses and mistakes far more than under the blows of the enemy." He continues:

"Not being in vassalage to any individual interest or group of interests, the new French State has the freedom, the strength and, I may add, the will to play its rôle of arbiter, and by meting out stern and impartial justice to assure that triumph of the general welfare over individual rights which is so important for the maintenance of national unity.

"There was nothing more illogical, more incoherent, more contradictory than the economic system which, for fifty years or more, brought us chronic agitation, marked by violent clashes in which the strike and the lock-out competed in producing ruin.

"Liberty was perpetually invoked by the powerful, on whom she bestowed intolerable increases of power; and when the law intervened in favor of the weak, it did so with such clumsiness that in the end it tipped the scales against them.

"This is the pitiful story of the so-called 'social' laws of the Third Republic. They did not improve the conditions of the working class; they did not humble capitalist feudalism; they succeeded only in half-ruining our national economy. To what must we attribute so complete a failure? Not so much to the incompetence or wickedness of man as to the weakness of the State — the inadequacy of the governmental machinery."

At this point Marshal Pétain explains that he is in a more favorable position than his predecessors to approach social problems in a free spirit and with effective means of action. He describes the family as the core of the social structure. "In the new order which we are setting up," he says, "the family

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will be honored, protected, aided." He also considers the needs of youth. He then continues:

"When our young men and our young women enter life we shall not mislead them with lofty statements and illusory hopes. We shall teach them to open their eyes wide to reality.

"We shall tell them that it is fine to be free; but that real 'Liberty' can be attained only in the shelter of a protecting authority which they must respect and obey. We shall not be content to give them the liberty to die of hunger, even if this liberty confers on them the right to drop a ballot in a box every four years. We shall recognize their right to work — not, however, at any occupation they may choose, for in this domain freedom of choice will be limited within the possibilities of the economic situation and the demands of the national interest.

"We shall then tell them that 'Equality' is a beautiful thing on certain planes and within certain limits; but that, if men are equal in the face of death, if they are equal before God, if it is the business of civilized society to make them equal before the law and to give them an equal chance in life, these different kinds of equality must be fitted into a rational hierarchy, based upon diversity of functions and merits and regulated for the common good.

"Finally, we shall tell them that 'Fraternity' is a magnificent ideal, but that in the state of nature to which we here have fallen there can be true fraternity only in natural groups such as the family, the city and the Fatherland.

"We shall tell them that if it is normal for men to form into groups according to their trade affinities, their social level, their manner of life, and that if it is legitimate for these various groups to assert their interests and their rights against each other, then we shall tell them that the class struggle — which was considered such a great stimulus to universal progress — is an absurd concept which leads peoples to disintegration and death, whether by civil or by foreign war.

"We shall tell them that, if competition is the law of life and if the interests of employer and employee sometimes conflict, yet the general interest of their common occupation must dominate the clash of their individual interests, for it is but part of the still more general interest of production. Whence arises a triple necessity:

"The necessity of organizing the trade or profession on a corporative basis, wherein all the elements of an enterprise can come together face to face and reach an understanding.

"The necessity of having in each organized trade or profession a representative of the State with supreme power to arbitrate differences which otherwise would be irreconcilable.

"The necessity of having, outside and above the corporations or communities of enterprises, a State organism with power to orient national production in accordance with the capacities of the domestic market and the possibilities of foreign markets.

"Conceived in accordance with these principles, the new social order will not be 'Liberalism,' because it will not hesitate to combat violence which conceals itself under certain ostensible liberties, and to seek in certain legal restraints an indispensable instrument for liberation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"It will not be 'Socialism,' because in large measure it will respect individual liberty and will preserve the powerful motive of individual profit.

"It will not be 'Capitalism,' because it will put an end to the reign of economics and its immoral autonomy, and because it will subordinate the money factor, and even the labor factor, to the human factor.

"One of the great innovations of Christianity was to teach man to accept willingly the necessity of work, and to give the most humble work a spiritual value. We yearn with all our soul to restore that value, which in the last analysis rests on our respect for the human being.

"In conclusion I would like to emphasize that this conception of social life is purely and profoundly French.

"Liberalism, capitalism and collectivism are foreign products imported into France. France, restored to herself, rejects them quite naturally.

"She understands today that she was misled in trying to transplant to her own soil institutions and methods which were not at all meant for her sun and her climate. And when she examines the principles which made her enemies victorious, she is surprised to recognize in all of them a little of her own self, her purest and most authentic tradition.

"The idea of a concrete economy, defined by human will and submitted to the judgment of moral conscience, is the same idea which dominated her own traditional social system.

"We find little trouble in accepting the National Socialist idea of the primacy of labor, and of its essential reality in contrast with the fiction of monetary tokens, because it is part of our classical heritage — so much so that we find the idea expressed by the most French of our writers, the most national of our poets, the good La Fontaine." He then recalls the fable of "The Worker and his Children."

Marshal Pétain concludes:

"I could pursue this thought still further. It would lead us, by a variety of roads, to truths which were ours, which we have forgotten, and which we can recover without borrowing them from anyone, and, moreover, without disregarding the merit of those who have known better than we how to turn them to good account. And thus we shall see how — without in any way disavowing ourselves, but, on the contrary, by finding ourselves again — we can articulate our thought and our action with those which tomorrow will preside over the reorganization of the world."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

NOTE — FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 45 East 65 Street, New York City.

General: Political, Military and Legal

SHALL NOT PERISH FROM THE EARTH. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. New York: Vanguard, 1940, 159 p. $1.50.

A brief and lucid explanation of what the democratic way means, especially to Americans, and a call to defend it, by a professor of philosophy at Harvard University.

STATE OF THE MASSES. By EMIL LEDERER. New York: Norton, 1940, 245 p. $2.50.

An interpretation of Fascism as a form of social disintegration induced by the party-state in order to make the masses more homogeneous and therefore more easily controllable. The author, a German Socialist and economist, was dean of the "University in Exile" at the time of his death.

THE CITY OF MAN. By HERBERT AGAR AND OTHERS. New York: Viking, 1941, 113 p. $1.00.

"A Declaration on World Democracy" drawn up and issued by seventeen scholars and writers, including several European exiles.

OUT OF THE NIGHT. By JAN VALTIN. New York: Alliance, 1940, 841 p. $3.50.

This story of the career of a German Communist in the employ of the G.P.U. is one of the most amazing and depressing ever to be reduced to writing. It is one long tale of espionage, deceit, torture and betrayal by the secret police of the rival totalitarian Powers. If anything were needed to put an end to the "revolutionary" glamor of either Communism or Fascism, this book should do it.

NOT BY ARMS ALONE. By HANS KOHN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 161 p. $1.75.

Papers and articles forming a worthy sequel to the author's "Force or Reason" and "Revolutions and Dictatorships."

TO THE FINLAND STATION. By EDMUND WILSON. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 509 p. $4.00.

Essays on the revolutionary tradition of the last century.

WAR, PACIFISM AND PEACE. By ROBERT CORKEY. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 171 p. $1.25.

A discussion of the position of the Protestant Churches towards war — in particular this war. The author, a professor of ethics in Presbyterian College at Belfast, favors collective security as against absolute pacifism.

PROTESTANTISM'S HOUR OF DECISION. By JUSTIN WROE NIXON. Philadelphia: Judson Press, 1940, 154 p. $1.39.

National and world affairs viewed through Protestant eyes.

CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Scribner, 1940, 226 p. $2.00.

Essays opposing absolute pacifism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NON-VIOLENCE IN AN AGGRESSIVE WORLD. By A. J. Muste. New York: Harper, 1940, 211 p. $2.00.

A vigorous and sincere presentation of the pacifist case.

THE CHRISTIAN ALTERNATIVE TO WORLD CHAOS. By Luman J. Shafer. New York: Round Table, 1940, 208 p. $2.00.

As seen by the chairman of the International Relations Commission of the Foreign Missions Conference of America.

THE GREAT HATRED. By Maurice Samuel. New York: Knopf, 1940, 209 p. $2.00.

A passionate yet closely reasoned interpretation of anti-Semitism as fundamentally a movement to put an end to Christianity.

NA PUTYAKH K MIROVOY VOINE 1914–1918. By A. A. Mogilevich and M. E. Airapetyan. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 293 p. $1.50.

A study of the origins of the First World War, by two reputable scholars.

DIPLOMATIKE ISTORIA TES NEAS EUROPES. By George C. Christopoulos. Athens: 1939, 316 p. Dr. 150.

The recent diplomatic history of Europe seen through Greek eyes.

CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN. By Charles Howard McIlwain. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1940, 162 p. $2.50.

Six annotated lectures delivered at Cornell University by the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard.

AN ATLAS OF WORLD REVIEW. By Clifford H. MacFadden. New York: Crowell, 1940, 145 p. $1.95.

Seventy-five maps, with explanatory notes, illustrating current world problems of politics, strategy and economics.

THE PENGUIN POLITICAL ATLAS. Compiled by S. C. Johnson. New York: Penguin, 1940, 207 p. 25 cents.

Sketchy but convenient maps.

GLASS HOUSES. By Carleton Beals. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1938, 413 p. $3.50.

THE GREAT CIRCLE. By Carleton Beals. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1940, 358 p. $3.00.

Carleton Beals has managed to be on hand at a surprisingly large number of exciting events — the Fascist March on Rome, to cite only one example. These two books, which constitute the author's autobiography to date, give an entertaining word picture of numerous adventures in many parts of the world.

EYE WITNESS. Edited by Robert Spiers Benjamin. New York: Alliance, 1940, 306 p. $2.75.

Reportorial adventures by members of the Overseas Press Club of America.

MEN OF POWER. By Albert Carr. New York: Viking, 1940, 272 p. $2.50.

Vivid sketches of key leaders in modern history.

ULTIMA THULE. By Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 383 p. $3.50.

More unsolved mysteries of the Arctic, by the famous explorer.

SUR LES HAUTS PLATEAUX GROENLANDAIS. By E. Wyss-Dunant. Paris: Payot, 1939, Fr. 36.

Illustrated report on a scientific expedition to a strategic island.

TWENTIETH CENTURY WARFARE. By Lowell M. Limpus. New York: Dutton, 1940, 205 p. $1.75.

A précis of military information by a former editor of the *Army and Navy Journal.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BLITZKRIEG. By S. L. A. Marshall. New York: Morrow, 1940, 188 p. $2.00.
Its "history, strategy, economics and the challenge to America," outlined by a Detroit newspaperman.

WAR ON WHEELS. By C. R. Kutz. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 245 p. $2.00.
The historical evolution of the use of cars, trains and tanks in modern warfare, traced by a captain in the United States Army.

THE ARMED HORDE. 1793–1939. By Hoffman Nickerson. New York: Putnam, 1940, 427 p. $3.50.
A review of military history since the French Revolution in which is traced the rise and fall of the "mass army." The author, who opposes the concept of the "people in arms" for social reasons, is happy to observe the return to vogue of a professional, specialized and smaller army.

SCIENCE IN WAR. New York: Penguin, 1941, 140 p. 25 cents.
Some two dozen scientists have collaborated on this original little handbook.

ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Frederick A. Middlebush and Chesney Hill. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940, 498 p. $3.25.
A systematic, streamlined text, with useful bibliographies at the end of each chapter.

INTERNATIONAL LAW. VOL. II — DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY. By L. Oppenheim. Sixth Edition. Edited by H. Lauterpacht. New York: Longmans, 1940, 766 p. $17.50.
A timely revision of a standard source.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1941, 200 p. $2.50.
This standard reference volume, now in its fourteenth year, is more than usually valuable in view of the profound political changes which have taken place in the world during 1940 and the difficulty of obtaining accurate information regarding them. Revised as of January 1, 1941, it supplies detailed information on the governments, parliaments, programs and leaders of political parties, and the policies and character of the press of every country. An interesting sample is the section on France, which gives the decrees forming the legal basis for Marshal Pétain's régime.

General: Economic and Social

RECONSTRUCTION OF WORLD TRADE. By J. B. Condliffe. New York: Norton, 1940, 427 p. $3.75.
How can the growing control of economic processes within national states be reconciled with attempts to reëstablish international systems of trade and finance? This is the problem to which Professor Condliffe devotes his attention. He believes that if planning takes the form of detailed centralized management, its integration into systems of international coöperation will be practically impossible. If, however, the new types of national control take the form of regulation, international integration is not inconceivable, but will demand the invention of new international political and economic institutions. The author believes that in the event of a British victory world trade can be reëstablished on liberal lines only through coöperation with the United States. "If an international system is to be restored, it must," he writes, "be an American-dominated system, based on a Pax Americana."

THE ECONOMICS OF FORCE. By Frank Munk. New York: Stewart, 1940, 254 p. $2.00.
How the totalitarian state organizes its economy for conquest and why this carries dangers for the Americas, explained by a Czech refugee economist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CAPITAL EXPANSION, EMPLOYMENT, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY. By Harold G. Moulton and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 413 p. $3.50.

An investigation into the problems of idle money, factories and men.

DENEZHNYE KRIZISY (1821–1938). By I. Trakhtenberg. Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1940, 894 p. $7.00.

This study of monetary crises between 1821 and 1938 forms part three of a treatise on "World Economic Crises" prepared under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

GELD UND GOLD. By Hermann Höpker-Aschoff. Jena: Fischer, 1939, 246 p. M. 10.

Unorthodox ideas on money, by a former Minister of Finance in Prussia.

FROM MARX TO STALIN. By J. E. LeRossignol. New York: Crowell, 1940, 442 p. $3.00.

A critique of Communism by the Dean of the College of Business Administration in the University of Nebraska.

MARXISM: IS IT SCIENCE? By Max Eastman. New York: Norton, 1940, 394 p. $3.00.

Max Eastman dissects Marxism and finds that it is not a science but a religion.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY. Edited by Harry Elmer Barnes and Others. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 947 p. $5.00.

A factual survey, with notes and bibliography.

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE. By Harry F. Ward. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 293 p. $2.50.

A discussion of the problems involved in attaining and defending democratic forms, marred by the author's naïveté concerning the realities of Soviet Communism.

RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS. By Ruth Benedict. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 274 p. $2.50.

A popular survey by a social anthropologist.

The Second World War

NIGHT OVER EUROPE. By Frederick L. Schuman. New York: Knopf, 1941, 600 p. $3.50.

In this continuation of his synthesis of recent diplomatic history, initiated in "Europe on the Eve," Professor Schuman carries the story of Europe's descent into the abyss from January 1939 to the end of the Third Republic in the summer of 1940. The story is not a pretty one at best, and Professor Schuman's own pessimism as to the perfectibility of man and the vitality of Western civilization does not make it any prettier. But whether or not his despair is justified, his book certainly contains the most complete chronicle yet prepared of the immediate background and the early phases of the war.

SEVEN MYSTERIES OF EUROPE. By Jules Romains. New York: Knopf, 1940, 253 p. $2.50.

M. Romains is principally known for his gigantic *tour-de-force*, "Men of Good Will." The world was therefore considerably startled to learn, on the publication of the present book, that for a number of years prior to the outbreak of the current war M. Romains engaged off and on in amateur diplomatic negotiations with some of the principal political personalities of Western Europe, in an effort to avert another catastrophe like that of 1914–1918 on which he has written so much historical fiction. Among his confidants were such men as Otto Abetz, Henri de Man and Georges Bonnet. It is scarcely any wonder, then, that on almost every page the credulity of M. Romains is amply documented.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THIS SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. By William S. Schlamm. New York: Dutton, 1940, 260 p. $2.00.

Mr. Schlamm, formerly a journalist in Vienna, explains Hitler's success and in particular warns America against the "decomposing functions of intellectuals."

LA TRAGÉDIE TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE DE SEPTEMBRE 1938 À MARS 1939. By Pierre Buk. Paris: Sagittaire, 1939, Fr. 18.

An account by a high Czech official, based in part on the unpublished "White Book" of the Czechoslovak Government.

THE REVOLUTION IS ON. By M. W. Fodor. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 239 p. $2.75.

A vivid eye-witness narrative of the Blitzkrieg in the west and an attempt, not always convincing, to appraise its significance.

SUICIDE OF A DEMOCRACY. By Heinz Pol. New York: Reynal, 1940, 296 p. $2.50.

This is one of the better books on the background of the French tragedy. The author, a refugee German journalist living at that time in France, recites chapter and verse concerning the activities of the Fifth Column before and during the war. He also supplies enlightening information on the French concentration camps for alien enemies.

JUGGERNAUT OVER HOLLAND. By Eelco Nicolaas Van Kleffens. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, 195 p. $2.00.

A sober, documented account of how the war came to Holland, by the Foreign Minister of that country. Those who believe that the Nazis and civilized people can live peacefully together in the same world should read this book.

THE BELGIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE SURRENDER OF THE BELGIAN ARMY, MAY 10–28, 1940. Compiled by the Belgian American Educational Foundation. New York: Compiler, 1940, 85 p. 50 cents.

The object in publishing these documents and the accompanying comments by various Belgian and American statesmen is to explain more fully what happened in Belgium in May 1940, to put the tragic events of that time in their historical setting, and in this way to present the actions of the Belgian king and his army in a more favorable light.

TOUTE LA VERITÉ SUR UN MOIS DRAMATIQUE DE NOTRE HISTOIRE. By Jean Montigny. Clermont-Ferrand: Editions Mont-Louis, 1940, 157 p. Fr. 5.

A revealing little book by a French deputy long identified with German circles. The text contains an extended report on the private sitting of the National Assembly on July 10, including in particular M. Laval's speech.

POURQUOI ET COMMENT FUT DÉCIDÉE LA DEMANDE D'ARMISTICE. By Charles Reibel. Vanves: Imprimerie Kapp, 1940, 30 p. Fr. 3.

Light on the events of June 10 to 17, 1940, by a member of the French Senate.

BEHIND THE NAZI FRONT. By John McCutcheon Raleigh. New York: Dodd, 1940, 307 p. $2.50.

A correspondent of the *Chicago Tribune* in Germany recounts his adventures there and in occupied Poland during the first year of war.

WAR WITHOUT MUSIC. By Peter Muir. New York: Scribner, 1940, 262 p. $2.00.

An American ambulance driver's experiences during the Blitzkrieg in France.

EUROPE'S RETURN TO WAR, 1938–1940. By F. Lee Benns. New York: Crofts, 1940, 120 p. 75 cents.

This supplement brings the author's two well-known texts up to November 1940.

YANKEE SKIPPER. By Joseph A. Gainard. New York: Stokes, 1940, 265 p. $3.00.

The experiences of the captain of the *City of Flint*, the ship which helped rescue the survivors of the *Athenia* and was later boarded by a German crew and taken to Norway.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW WAYS OF WAR. By Tom Wintringham. New York: Penguin, 1940, 128 p. 25 cents.

This little brochure may turn out to have been one of the decisive factors in the war. It is the handbook being used today by the Local Defense Volunteers throughout Britain and it was written by their commander, a veteran of the First World War who later commanded the British Battalion in Loyalist Spain. The author not only gives a wide variety of practical advice on how to resist mechanized invasion — the chosen weapon is a home-made hand grenade — but tells *why* the British *people* must fight against Fascism whenever they encounter it.

WHY WE FIGHT: LABOUR'S CASE. By Arthur Greenwood. London: Routledge, 1939, 222 p. 5/.

A statement by one of the Party's leaders.

BRITAIN SPEAKS. By J. B. Priestley. New York: Harper, 1940, 263 p. $2.50.

An English novelist reports to the American people on the state of Britain during the summer of 1940.

REPORT ON ENGLAND. By Ralph Ingersoll. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 202 p. $1.50.

Graphic descriptions of life in London, and of England's war effort and defense needs, as seen by an American newspaper publisher who spent two weeks there in November 1940. There are some good sketches of Churchill, Bevin and others.

The United States

AMERICA'S LAST CHANCE. By Albert Carr. New York: Crowell, 1940, 328 p. $2.75.

Mr. Carr warns the American people that they must hurry if they are going to preserve their democratic way of life as well as their place in the world. To arouse the country and assure it victory he offers a detailed program of what it must do. A challenging, realistic book.

AMERICA NEXT. By Peter Markham. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 370 p. $2.75.

Mr. Markham pursues a line of reasoning similar to that of Mr. Carr, but with more attention to European precedents.

AMERICA'S DILEMMA: ALONE OR ALLIED? By Norman Angell. New York: Harper, 1940, 226 p. $1.75.

The author of "The Great Illusion" finally decides that, in view of Europe's recent history, isolation is no longer feasible, even for America.

BEYOND GERMAN VICTORY. By Helen Hill and Herbert Agar. New York: Reynal, 1940, 117 p. $1.00.

A hard-hitting tract telling Americans in plain language why to appease Hitler is to court disaster.

ZERO HOUR. By Stephen Vincent Benét and Others. New York: Farrar, 1940, 244 p. $2.00.

Six authors contribute chapters germane to the general theme that the American people had better wake up to the crisis in their national life before it is too late.

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By John Holladay Latané and David W. Wainhouse. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 1028 p. $6.00.

A revised edition of a standard text. The Odyssey Press publishes a student's edition at $4.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SPEAK UP FOR DEMOCRACY. By Edward L. Bernays. New York: Viking, 1940, 127 p. $1.00.

A useful source of facts and advice for those who believe the American way of life is worth saving.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: TRIAL AND FAILURE. By Charles G. Fenwick. New York: New York University Press, 1940, 190 p. $2.50.

Lectures in which an authority on international law explains why some of the popular American ideas about neutrality have failed because they were unrealistic.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN ENEMY PROPERTY. By James A. Gathings. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940, 143 p. $2.50.

A scholarly review of American practice and policy before and during the First World War, with a concluding chapter looking into the future.

AMERICA AND A NEW WORLD ORDER. By Graeme K. Howard. New York: Scribner, 1940, 121 p. $2.00.

Neither isolationism nor blind interventionism is a practical policy for the United States, according to the author. His own pattern for the world of tomorrow is based on a policy of "coöperative regionalism," which in effect means letting the totalitarian Powers divide the Eastern Hemisphere while we take over the Western.

THE TROJAN HORSE IN AMERICA. By Martin Dies. New York: Dodd, 1940, 366 p. $2.50.

This book is a further indication that Mr. Dies is rather more interested in promoting himself and his anti-New Deal and anti-"Communist" activities than in going after the Nazi and Fascist Fifth Columns, whether homegrown or imported.

FIFTH COLUMN IN AMERICA. By Harold Lavine. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 240 p. $2.50.

A very readable exposure of the activities of the various anti-democratic movements, foreign-born and native, operating in this country. The author is editorial director of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis at Princeton.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE NEW WORLD. By A. A. Berle, Jr. New York: Harper, 1940, 141 p. $2.00.

Essays on various aspects of American foreign policy, by an Assistant Secretary of State.

WARTIME CONTROL OF PRICES. By Charles O. Hardy. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 216 p. $1.00.

How to control American prices during the defense boom.

M-DAY: BANKING AND FINANCE. By A. Philip Woolfson. Cambridge: Brady, 1940, 116 p. $2.50.

Prognostications as to what may happen to American financial institutions if this country gets into war. The author, a lawyer and financial writer, bases his predictions on the experience of certain European countries and on our own legislation.

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN POPULATION POLICY. By Frank Lorimer and Others. New York: Harper, 1940, 178 p. $2.50.

Essays on social and economic aspects of our demographic problems.

THE AMERICAN IMPACT ON GREAT BRITAIN 1898–1914. By Richard Heathcote Heindel. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940, 439 p. $4.00.

This scholarly investigation is concerned with the whole complex of Anglo-American relations — economic, social, cultural as well as political.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PRESIDENT MAKERS. By Matthew Josephson. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 584 p. $3.75.

A readable review of the "reform" period in American history — 1896–1919.

MR. HOUSE OF TEXAS. By Arthur D. Howden Smith. New York: Funk, 1940, 381 p. $3.50.

A friendly portrait of Colonel House by a newspaperman and novelist associated with him for many years.

HOW MAINE VIEWED THE WAR, 1914–1917. By Edwin Costrell. Orono (Me.): University Press, 1940, 101 p. 50 cents.

A study based primarily on six Maine newspapers.

TOWARD A NEW ORDER OF SEA POWER. By Harold and Margaret Sprout. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, 332 p. $3.75.

This sequel to the authors' "The Rise of American Naval Power" carries the story from 1918 through the Washington Conference in 1922. A fine piece of scholarship and a valuable addition to postwar history.

BATTLE SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC. By Major Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 212 p. $1.50.

Criticisms of the present organization of the United States Army and concrete suggestions for remedy, by a cavalry officer with long experience both at home and abroad.

THE FLEET TODAY. By Kendall Banning. New York: Funk, 1940, 346 p. $2.50.

A popular introduction to the organization, activities and equipment of the United States Navy.

SPY AND COUNTERSPY. By Emanuel Victor Voska and Will Irwin. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 322 p. $2.75.

The dramatic story of how the Czechs in the United States carried on counter-espionage activities against German agents during the First World War.

THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By Arthur N. Holcombe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 304 p. $2.50.

Essays, in part previously printed elsewhere, on the decisive political rôle of the middle classes in American history. The author is professor of government at Harvard University.

THE OLD DEAL AND THE NEW. By Charles A. Beard and George H. E. Smith. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 294, p. $2.00.

This sequel to the authors' "The Future Comes" places the acts of the Roosevelt régime in their historical setting.

WE PLANNED IT THAT WAY. By Harold R. Malcolm. New York: Daniel Ryerson, 1940, 219 p. $2.00.

An opinionated blast against the New Deal.

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP. By Pendleton Herring. New York: Farrar, 1940, 173 p. $1.50.

A penetrating analysis of the relations between the Presidency and the other branches of government.

THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS. By Edward S. Corwin. New York: New York University Press, 1940, 476 p. $5.00.

A scholarly study, by a professor in Princeton University, in which constitutional law and custom are emphasized rather than political considerations.

THE PATTERN OF POLITICS. By J. T. Salter. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 246 p. $2.25

Colorful essays on American political folkways, by an associate professor of political science in the University of Wisconsin.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WITCH HUNT. By George Seldes. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 300 p. $2.75

One of America's most diligent muckrakers exposes the activities of the various individuals and organizations in the United States that make a business of "redbaiting."

THE NEWS AND HOW TO UNDERSTAND IT. By Quincy Howe. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 250 p. $2.00.

Mr. Howe distributes praise and blame among the various organs and personalities — newspapers, magazines, columnists, radio commentators and the like — which are at work forming American opinion. His guidance is sometimes more pungent than unprejudiced.

UNCLE SAM'S PACIFIC ISLETS. By David N. Leff. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940, 71 p. $1.00.

A historical review of American policy in Oceania.

ALASKA: EIN PARADIES DES NORDENS. By Herbert Tichy. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1939, 277 p. M. 7.50.

A vivid description calling attention to Alaska's strategic location.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, JULY 1939–JUNE 1940. Vol. II. Edited by S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1940, 875 p. $3.75.

The second annual volume of an invaluable compilation.

Western Europe

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO EUROPE. By Geoffrey T. Garratt. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 351 p. $2.75.

A British liberal examines recent European history and finds much to criticize among both the dictatorships and the "pluto-democracies."

LES MISSIONAIRES FRANÇAIS ET LE NATIONALISME. By R. P. Perbal. Paris: Librairie de L'Arc, 1939, 267 p. Fr. 48.

A scholarly historical work by a French monk.

NEDERLANDS AANDEEL IN DE ONTWIKKELING VAN HET ONZIJDIGHEIDS RECHT GEDURENDE DEN WERELDOORLOG. By F. J. A. Huart. Leyden: Brill, 1939, 373 p. Fl. 16.

The Netherlands' struggle to maintain its rights as a neutral during the last war.

I CHOSE DENMARK. By Francis Hackett. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 291 p. $2.50.

Life in pre-invasion Denmark as seen by an Irish writer who married a Danish woman.

THE RISE OF MODERN INDUSTRY IN SWEDEN. By G. A. Montgomery. London: King, 1939, 287 p. 10/6.

A useful summary of the country's economic history.

EUROPE AND THE GERMAN QUESTION. By F. W. Foerster. New York: Sheed, 1940, 474 p. $3.50.

The basic thesis of this book by a great German liberal is that Germany's rôle in history should have been to unite Europe in a Christian federation but that the rise of Prussianism caused her to take the fatally wrong road to national aggrandizement. Dr. Foerster therefore believes that Germany must be defeated and humiliated before she can regain her true place in Europe.

THE GERMAN CATHOLICS. By Robert d'Harcourt. London: Burns, Oates, 1939, 274 p. 7/6.

An ardent Catholic indicts the Nazi Government for its treatment of his Church.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOZIALPOLITIK IM DRITTEN REICH, 1933–1938. By Franz Seldte. Berlin: Beck, 1939, 274 p. M. 8.50.

The Reich Minister of Labor explains his aims and methods.

THE ART AND TECHNIQUE OF ADMINISTRATION IN GERMAN MINISTRIES. By Arnold Brecht and Comstock Glaser. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 191 p. $3.00.

A translation and annotation of Republican Germany's General Code of Administrative Procedure, of which Dr. Brecht was the principal author.

REFUGEE. Translated by Clara Leiser. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940, 308 p. $2.50.

The thrilling story of how two "Aryan" Germans escaped from the fatherland.

NEITHER LIBERTY NOR BREAD. Edited by Frances Keene. New York: Harper, 1940, 388 p. $3.50.

Some two score anti-Fascist Italian exiles contribute excerpts from previously published works to give a comprehensive picture of Mussolini's Italy. In the appendix there are biographical and bibliographical notes about each of the contributors.

LA MARINA MERCANTILE IN VENTI ANNI DI FASCISMO. By Giorgio Ricco. Rome: Edizioni "La Novissima," 1939, 359 p. L. 12.

A chronicle of expansion by a Fascist naval officer.

THE POPE SPEAKS. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 337 p. $2.75.

Pronouncements made by His Holiness between March 3, 1939, and September 4, 1940, with a short biography by Charles Rankin.

SA SAINTETÉ LE PAPE PIE XII. By Georges Goyau. Paris: Plon, 1939.

A very sympathetic biography by a French historian.

THE MEMOIRS OF EX-PRESIDENT AZAÑA. London: Butterworth, 1939, 15/.

The author was President of the Loyalist Government during the recent Civil War.

THE SPANISH TRAGEDY. By Jef Last. London: Routledge, 1939, 228 p. 7/6.

Notes by a Dutch Communist made on the Madrid front in 1937.

SPAIN, THE CHURCH AND THE ORDERS. By E. Allison Peers. London: Eyre, 1939, 219 p. 10/6.

A somewhat impassioned defense of the Catholic Church in Spain.

IL NON INTERVENTO IN SPAGNA. By Giuseppe Vedovato. Florence: Studio Fiorentino di Politica Estera, 1940, 3 v. L. 50.

A documentary history from the Fascist point of view.

Eastern Europe

WAR AND PEACE IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY. By T. A. Tarcouzio. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 354 p. $4.00.

A survey of Soviet foreign policy and an appraisal of it in the light of Communist doctrine. In particular the author throws much light on the background of the Soviet-Nazi rapprochement. This book, published under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College, is amply supplied with documentation, a bibliography and a subject index of Soviet treaties, agreements and conventions now in force.

VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA. By M. Tikhomirov. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 107 p. 25 cents.

A popular survey of Soviet foreign policy.

RUSSIA. By Sir Bernard Pares. New York: Penguin, 1940, 256 p. 25 cents.

A bird's-eye view of recent Russian history by a distinguished British historian.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POD IGOM POLSKIKH PANOV. By G. Minsky. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 96 p. 20 cents.

A justification of the Soviet annexation of eastern Poland.

THE SOVIET POWER. By Hewlitt Johnson. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 352 p. $2.50.

The Dean of Canterbury is favorably impressed by the great socialist experiment in Russia and he lets no inconvenient facts interfere with his belief in its soundness.

OSNOVNYE PROBLEMY GEOGRAFICHESKOGO RAZMESHCHENIYA TOPLIVNOGO KHOZYAISTVA SSSR. By A. E. Probst. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1940, 404 p. $3.80.

A scholarly study on the geographical distribution of the Soviet fuel supply and industry.

EKONOMIKA I PLANIROVANIE SOVETSKOI TORGOVLI. Edited by M. M. Lifits and G. L. Rubinshtein. Moscow: Gostorgizdat, 1940, 603 p. $3.00.

A detailed account of the planning and operation of Soviet trade.

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE WORLD WAR. By Olga Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940, 856 p. $6.00.

Documents on the origin of the Third International.

RUSSIA'S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY. By Harry Dorosh. New York: Savoy, 1939, 103 p. $1.25.

A history of the Constituent Assembly (1917–1918) based on Russian sources.

GESHICHTE DER UKRAINE. By B. Krupnyckj. Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1939, 324 p. M. 10.

Prepared for the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin.

SVANETIYA. By S. S. Anisimov. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 116 p. 40 cents.

A popular account of the development of one of the autonomous areas in the Caucasus.

JAHRE DEUTSCHER ENTSCHEIDUNG IM BALTIKUM. 1918–1919. By Claus Grimm. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 514 p. M. 14.

An account, based partly on unpublished material, of the struggle of the Germans in Courland and Southern Livonia.

BEITRÄGE ZUR EUROPÄISCHEN POLITIK. By Josef Beck. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 528 p. M. 8.

Speeches, statements and interviews by the former Foreign Minister of Poland.

DIE WEICHSEL. Edited by Richard Winkel. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1939, 445 p. M. 30.

Chapters on the geography, economics and cultural problems of Germany's Vistula *Raum*, prepared for the Danzig School of Technology before the conquest of Poland.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA. Edited by R. J. Kerner. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940, 504 p. $5.00.

Twenty-two American, British and Czechoslovak writers and scholars record the remarkable achievements of the republic during its brief span of life.

MUNICH: BEFORE AND AFTER. By Dr. Hubert Ripka. London: Gollancz, 1939, 523 p. 15/.

A careful, documented defense of the policies of Masaryk and Beneš.

BENEŠ OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA. By Godfrey Lias. London: Allen and Unwin, 1940, 303 p. 8/6.

A rather conventional biography.

DIE SLOWAKEI: DER JUNGSTE STAAT EUROPAS. By Michael Schwartz. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1939, 155 p. M. 3.

A sympathetic history of Slovakia's "struggle for autonomy" and a survey of some of its current problems.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940, 141 p. 5/.

An Information Department Paper concerning the political and economic situation of Hungary, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece. The area is treated collectively rather than country by country, as did a previous pamphlet with the same title issued by the Royal Institute in May 1939.

DES REICHES NEUE NACHBARN. Edited by W. Schneefuss. Salzburg: Pustet, 1939, 523 p. M. 6.80.

A geo-political survey of Southeastern Europe.

FIFTY YEARS OF WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS. By Count Carlo Sforza. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 195 p. $2.75.

For many years Count Sforza, as the Italian envoy to Serbia and later as Foreign Minister of Italy, followed at close range the career of Nicola Pašić and the movement for union among the Jugoslavs. In this interesting book he has woven his own recollections into the fabric of a half century of history along the Adriatic.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE. By Nicholas Kaltchas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 187 p. $2.00.

A posthumous publication, covering the last 120 years.

GREEK MEMORIES. By Compton Mackenzie. London: Chatto and Windus, 1939, 455 p. 10/6.

This very indiscreet book was originally published in October 1932 and then withdrawn at once due to official intervention. Though it now appears in a presumably somewhat expurgated version, it still contains a lot of dynamite in the form of revelations concerning the activities of the British secret service in Greece during the First World War, activities in which Mr. Mackenzie participated in an important way.

ALBANIEN. NEUES LAND IM IMPERIUM. By Richard Busch-Zantner. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1939, 217 p. M. 6.80.

A political and sociological survey of Fascist Albania.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

WINSTON CHURCHILL: A BIOGRAPHY. By René Kraus. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1940, 366 p. $3.00.

The adventurous life of one of the most colorful men of modern times told by a continental journalist.

SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. By Viscount Halifax. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 368 p. $4.00.

Fifty addresses, edited by H. H. E. Craster.

THE LIFE OF SIR PERCY COX. By Philip Graves. London: Butterworth, 1939, 15/.

A biography of one of Britain's outstanding pro-consuls — the man who assured her hegemony in 'Iraq and around the Persian Gulf.

ENGLAND WAS AN ISLAND ONCE. By Elswyth Thane. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 324 p. $3.00.

A novelist records her impressions of England between two World Wars.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? By Harold J. Laski. New York: Viking, 1940, 192 p. $1.75.

The fundamental purpose behind this tract by a leading intellectual of the Labour Party is to convince the British ruling class that a "revolution by consent" making England truly democratic is the only way Hitler can be defeated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY. By E. V. Francis. London: Cape, 1939, 391 p. 12/6.
This book, though it contributes little that is new, at least summarizes the economic policies pursued by the British Government over the last two decades. The author unintentionally proves that it was precisely "strategy" and a planned organization which Britain lacked when she entered the war.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN WARTIME GREAT BRITAIN, 1914–1918. By Waldo Chamberlin. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940, 239 p. $3.00.
"An annotated bibliography of materials in the Hoover Library."

SEVEN PERIODS OF IRISH HISTORY. Edited by Shaemas O'Sheel. Scotch Plains (N. J.): Flanders Hall, 1940, 120 p. 75 cents.
A typical example of the violently anti-British propaganda published by this firm.

GESCHICHTE IRLANDS. By Rudolf Bringmann. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1939, 195 p. M. 6.80.
Ireland's struggle for freedom.

CANADIAN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROBLEMS. Edited by J. F. Parkinson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1940, 292 p. $3.00.
Over a score of short studies by various experts.

CANADIANS IN AND OUT OF WORK. By Leonard C. Marsh. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1940, 503 p. $3.50.
A comprehensive social and economic study of the Canadian labor market.

THE MAORI PEOPLE TODAY. Edited by I. L. G. Sutherland. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 449 p. $4.00.
A description of the metamorphosis that has taken place in native life in New Zealand during the last century.

TOWARD FREEDOM. By Jawaharlal Nehru. New York: Day, 1941, 445 p. $4.00.
An abridged edition of one of the world's great autobiographies, that of the Indian Nationalist leader.

MOLODEZH INDII. By G. Kocharyants. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1940, 72 p. 10 cents.
A Soviet propaganda pamphlet about movements among the youth of India.

LAND OF THE EYE. By Hassoldt Davis. New York: Holt, 1940, 415 p. $3.00.
An entertaining travel book about Himalayan countries.

The Near East

ISLAM, EGO PROISKHOZHDENIE I KLASSOVAYA SUSHCHNOST. By G. A. Ibragimov. Moscow: Gaiz, 1940, 112 p. 5 cents.
A Soviet attack on Islam.

KAMÂL ATATURK'S LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN TURKEY. By August Ritter von Kral. London: King, 1939, 283 p. 7/6.
A revised and expanded edition of one of the better books on modern Turkey.

JEWISH FATE AND FUTURE. By Arthur Ruppin. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 386 p. $4.00.
A sociological study by a professor in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

SYRIENS FREIHEITSKAMPF. By Christoph Schultz-Esteves. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1939, 141 p. M. 2.85.
The postwar history of the French Mandate and of Syria's fight for independence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ALS DEUTSCHER GESANDTER IN AFGHANISTAN. By Kurt Ziemka. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 393 p. M. 10.

A German diplomat throws light on a little-known land.

Africa

EUROPA BLICKT NACH AFRIKA. Edited by Erwin Barth von Wehrenalp. Leipzig: Lühe, 1939, 356 p. M. 7.

Essays on the present state and future prospects of agriculture, stock-raising, forestry, mining and industry in Africa.

LA FORMATION DE L'EGYPTE MODERNE. By Bourgeois. Paris: Libraire Générale de Droit, 1939, 415 p. Fr. 60.

A legal study of Egypt's international status and how it has been modified in recent years.

THE ITALIAN COLONIAL EMPIRE. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940, 72 p. 2/.

A handy source of up-to-date information.

L'AVIAZIONE FASCISTA E LA CONQUISTA DELL'IMPERO. By Guido Mattioli. Rome: "L'Aviazione," 1939, 334 p. L. 25.

This volume, a sequel to the author's "L'Aviazione Fascista e la Conquista dell'-Impero," describes the rôle of the air arm in the "police" work that followed the conquest of Ethiopia.

LAVORO ITALIANO NELL'IMPERO. By Davide Fossa. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 571 p. L. 30.

What the Italians did to "civilize" and exploit Ethiopia, illustrated with abundant data and photographs.

TEN YEARS IN THE CONGO. By W. E. Davis. New York: Reynal, 1940, 301 p. $2.50.

A doctor's enlightening experiences in Belgium's colony.

The Far East

OUR FUTURE IN ASIA. By Robert Aura Smith. New York: Viking, 1940, 306 p. $3.00.

This is one of the best books on American policy in the Far East to appear in recent years. Mr. Smith, a newspaperman who knows the Orient well, gives a comprehensive picture of the problems we face, particularly in Southeastern Asia where America's economic and strategic interests are shown to be anything but negligible. Though isolationists will not like his suggestions as to what active steps this country should take to protect its position in the Far East, they will find it very hard to refute them.

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC, 1939. Edited by Kate Mitchell and W. L. Holland. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 299 p. $3.50.

The proceedings of the meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Virginia Beach late in 1939. The discussions covered a wide range of subjects.

I. P. R. INQUIRY SERIES. By Various Authors. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 9 v.

Further titles in this useful series, of which the first seven volumes were mentioned in the April 1940 issue of Foreign Affairs: "Japan Since 1931," by Hugh Borton (149 p. $1.25); "The Chinese Army," by Major Evans Fordyce Carlson (139 p. $1.00); "Far Eastern Trade of the United States," by Ethel B. Dietrich (116 p. $1.00); "Government in Japan," by Charles B. Fahs (114 p. $1.00); "British Relations with China;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1931–1939," by Irving S. Friedman (255 p. $2.00); "Canada and the Far East," by A. R. M. Lower (150 p. $1.25); "Japan's Emergence as a Modern State," by E. Herbert Norman (254 p. $2.00); "Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East," by Nathaniel Peffer (121 p. $1.00); "The Struggle for North China," by George E. Taylor (247 p. $2.00).

AUTHOR IN TRANSIT. By Lancelot Hogben. New York: Norton, 1940, 278 p. $2.50.

A scientist's keen comments on a trip he took through Russia and Japan.

CHUNG-KUO CHAN-SHIH CHING-CHI TEH-CHI. Edited by Yeh Hsiao-shan and Tung Wen-chung. Shanghai: 1939, 329 p.

A comprehensive economic survey of China at war.

THE PEOPLE'S WAR. By I. Epstein. London: Gollancz, 1939, 384 p. 7/6.

An eye-witness account of the early part of the war in China, by a journalist of pronounced Leftist persuasions.

CHANG KAI-SHEK. By Sven Hedin. New York: Day, 1940, 290 p. $3.00.

A eulogy by the well-known Swedish explorer.

MIN-KUO CHENG-CHIH SHIH. By Ch'ien Tuan-sheng and Others. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939, 2 v. $4.50.

A history of the political and legal organization of Chinese governments since 1910.

CHINA AND SOME PHASES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By L. Tung. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 210 p. $2.25.

High-grade legal and historical scholarship, by a former secretary of the Central Political Council of the Chinese National Government.

CHUNG-KUO T'U-TI CHÊNG-TSÊ. Edited by the Chinese Land Administration Society. Chungking: Independent Press, 1939, 239 p. 70 cents.

A symposium of seventeen papers on the land policy of China.

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF JAPAN AND MANCHUKUO, 1930–1940. Edited by E. B. Schumpeter. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 944 p. $7.50.

A voluminous study concerning the increasingly extensive and helpful rôle played by Manchukuo in the expansion of Japanese industry. The authors' picture of Japan's prosperity and economic invulnerability is probably too rosy, due to their excessive respect for not always reliable Japanese statistics.

BORBA ZA SOVETY V BURYAT-MONGOLII (1918–1920). Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 283 p. $1.00.

Memoirs and documents concerning the struggle for Buriat-Mongolia during the period of the civil war and foreign intervention.

Latin America

DOLLARS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Willy Feuerlein and Elizabeth Hannan. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1941, 102 p. $1.50.

This first of a new series of "Studies in American Foreign Relations" deals with the economic aspects of Latin American nationalism, and reviews the financial policy of the United States in Latin America in the light of the necessities of the economic defense of the Western Hemisphere.

PAN AMERICA. By Carleton Beals. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 545 p. $3.00.

A discursive book on American foreign policy and the resources of the Western Hemisphere. It suffers from the obtrusion of Mr. Beals' prejudices. His hatred of imperialism, for instance, leads him into finding Great Britain no better than Germany — an example of the intellectual abdication prevalent today among so many so-called "liberals." Even the sections of his book devoted to economic questions are superficial and display considerable *parti pris*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

WHO'S WHO IN LATIN AMERICA. By Percy A. Martin. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1940, 558 p. $5.50.

A new edition of an indispensable reference book enlarged by the addition of some 400 new biographical sketches.

NEUTRALIDAD. By Isidro Fabela. Mexico: Biblioteca de Estudios Internacionales, 1940, 325 p.

"An historical, juridical and political study, dealing with the League of Nations and the American continent before the war of 1939–40."

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: 1939. Edited by Lewis Hanke and Miron Burgin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 476 p. $4.00.

The latest annual instalment of an invaluable bibliography.

THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAS. Edited by Charles H. Wesley. Washington: Howard University, 1940, 86 p. $1.00.

Seven lectures, delivered at Howard University by as many authorities, concerning the status of the Negro in various parts of the Western Hemisphere.

MEXICO: A NEW SPAIN WITH OLD FRIENDS. By J. B. Trend. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 185 p. $2.50.

Mexican culture and politics as seen by a British professor.

MÉXICO ÍNTEGRO. By Moisés Sáenz. Lima: Torres Aguirre, 1939.

Essays on cultural and racial problems by a Mexican diplomat.

THE FIGHT FOR THE PANAMA ROUTE. By Dwight Carroll Miner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 469 p. $4.00.

An exhaustive history of the American acquisition of the Canal Zone.

PUERTO RICO: A GUIDE TO THE ISLAND OF BORIQUÉN. New York: University Society, 450 p. $2.75.

A new addition to the excellent W.P.A. guide series.

THE EUROPEAN POSSESSIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA. By Raye R. Platt and Others. New York: American Geographical Society, 1941, 112 p. $1.00.

A compilation of facts concerning their population, physical geography, resources, industries, trade, government and strategic importance.

ROUNDABOUT SOUTH AMERICA. By Anne Merriman Peck. New York: Harper, 1940, 359 p. $3.00.

A travelogue skimming over the whole continent.

VENEZUELA. By Henry J. Allen. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 289 p. $3.50.

This enthusiastic description of the country and its people, by a former governor of Kansas, makes no attempt to get below the surface.

VENEZUELA REPUBLICANA. By Avelino Sánchez. Caracas: Impresores Unidos, 1940, 193 p.

Essays on the government of President López Contreras.

A NOVA POLITICA DO BRASIL. By Getulio Vargas. Rio de Janeiro: Olympio, 1940, 7 v. Milreis 20.

The texts of speeches, interviews and reports made by the President of Brazil between January 2, 1930, and June 29, 1940.

SEVEN KEYS TO BRAZIL. By Vera Kelsey. New York: Funk, 1940, 314 p. $3.00.

Well-organized information for student and traveller.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ALIENS

AN ACT to amend an Act entitled "An Act to punish the willful injury or destruction of war material, or of war premises or utilities used in connection with war material, and for other purposes," approved April 20, 1918. Approved, November 30, 1940. Washington, 1940. 2 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 886, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10465.)

AN ACT to require the registration of certain organizations carrying on activities within the United States, and for other purposes. Approved, October 17, 1940. Washington, 1940. 4 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 870, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10094.)

INVESTIGATION of un-American propaganda activities in the United States . . . Report Pursuant to H. Res. 282, 75th Cong. and H. Res. 26, 76th Cong. Washington, 1941. 25 p. 23 cm. (H. Rept. No. 1, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.)

QUESTIONS and answers on alien registration. (Revised edition.) Washington, U. S. Department of Justice, Immigration and naturalization service, Alien registration division, [1940]. 22 p. 21½ cm.

BRITISH EMPIRE

AN ECONOMIC survey of the Colonial Empire (1937). London, 1940. 674 p. 33 cm. (Colonial No. 179.) £1 5s.

CANADA

REPORT of the Royal commission on Dominion-Provincial relations. [Ottawa, King's Printer, 1940.] 3 v. 29½ cm. $1.00.

Book I, Canada, 1867–1939; Book II, Recommendations; Book III, Documentation.

COMMERCE

EXCHANGE of notes between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Kingdom of Greece regarding commercial relations. Canberra, February 29, 1940/ Sydney, March 7, 1940. London, 1940. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 28 (1940), Cmd. 6243.)

TRADE agreement between His Majesty's Government in Canada and the Guatemalan Government. Guatemala, September 28, 1937. [Ratifications exchanged at Guatemala, December 15, 1938] London, 1940. 9 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 25 (1940). [Reprint of Canadian Treaty Series No. 3 (1939)]; Cmd. 6240), 2d.

WARTIME control of ocean freight rates in foreign trade; a world survey, by Albert E. Sanderson . . . Washington, 1940. 47 p. 23 cm. (U. S. Bureau of foreign and domestic commerce, Trade promotion series, No. 212.)

EGYPTIAN DEBT

CONVENTION relative to the abolition of the "Caisse de la dette publique égyptienne," [with Egyptian declaration and procès-verbal of signature] Cairo, July 17, 1940. London, 1940. 10 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 29 (1940), Cmd. 6244.) 2d.

FINANCE

FOREIGN long-term investments in the United States 1937–39, by Paul D. Dickens. Washington, 1940. 75 p. 23 cm. (U. S. Bureau of foreign and domestic commerce, Economic series No. 11.) 15c.

THE BALANCE of international payments of the United States in 1939, by Paul D. Dickens and August Maffry. Washington, 1940. 87 p. 23 cm. (U. S. Bureau of foreign and domestic commerce, Economic series No. 8.) 15c.

FINANCIAL characteristics of American manufacturing corporations. Washington, 1940. 442 p. 23 cm. (Temporary national economic committee, Investigation of concentration of economic power. A study made [by Charles L. Merwin, jr.] . . . Monograph No. 15.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

NAVAL and air bases; arrangement between the United States of America and Great Britain effected by exchange of notes signed September 2, 1940. Washington, 1940. 4 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 181.) 5c.

INTER-AMERICAN financial and economic advisory committee: organization and activities. Washington, Pan American Union, 1940. 28 cm. Mimeographed.

LABOR

1940 YEAR-BOOK of labour statistics. Fifth year of issue. Geneva, 1940. 175 p. 24½ cm. (International Labour Office.) $2.00.

LATIN AMERICA

A SELECTIVE list of periodicals of general interest published in Latin America. Washington, Division of intellectual coöperation, Pan American Union, 1940. 28 numb. l. 28 cm. Mimeographed.

STEPS taken by the Pan American Union in fulfillment of the resolutions adopted at the eighth international conference of American states and other inter-American conferences . . . Washington, Pan American Union, 1940. 37 numb. l. 27 cm. (Congress and Conference Series No. 31.)

ANNUARIO estadistico, 1938 . . . [Managua, D. N., Talleres nacionales de imprenta y encuadernación, 1939.] 442 p. 28 cm. (Nicaragua, Dirección general de estadística.)

ANUARIO estadistico de la Republica Dominicana del año 1939. Cuidad Trujillo, Editorial La Nacion, 1940. 685 p.

BRAZIL, 1939/40; an economic, social and geographic survey. Rio de Janeiro, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1940. 383 p.

COMÉRCIO exterior do Brasil. Foreign trade of Brazil. Commerce extérieur du Brésil. N. 6 e 6 A. Janeiro a Junho 1936 a 1940. Rio de Janeiro, 1940. 31 p. 26 cm. (Serviço de estatística econômica e financeira. Ministério da Fazenda.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BUDGET for the twenty-third financial period (1941). General budget of the League and Part I — Secretariat. Geneva, 1940. 21 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.153.M.140.1940.X.)

MEXICO

EL PETROLEO de Mexico; recopilación de documentos oficiales del conflicto de orden económico de la industria petrolera, con una introdución que resume sus motivos y consecuencias. México, D. F., Govierno de México, 1940. 925 p. 34 cm.

TRIBUNALES extranjeros reconocen el indiscutible derecho con que México expropió los intereses petroleros; documentación relacionada con los incidentes surgidos. México, Talleres gráficos de la Nación, 1940. 94 p. 22½ cm. (México, Secretaría de relaciones exteriores.)

SECOND WORLD WAR

STUDIES in war economics. Montreal, 1941. 199 p. 23 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series B (Economic conditions) No. 33.)

THE COMPENSATION of war victims; medical aid, Compensation and war pensions. Geneva, 1940. 91 p. 23 cm. (International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series E (The Disabled) No. 6.)

U. S. TARIFF COMMISSION. War and its effect on United States imports. Washington, Author, 1940. 2 v. Processed. Free.

DOCUMENTS relating to the administration of occupied countries in eastern Europe. No. 1. The German exploitation of Polish forests. New York, Polish information center (1941). 19 p. 21 cm.

INDIA and the war; a summary of India's contribution. New York, British library of information [1940]. [7] p. 23 cm.

SPEECH by the late Marquess of Lothian, his majesty's ambassador at Washington. London, 1940. 10 p. 24½ cm. (United States No. 2 (1940), Cmd. 6239.) 2d.

SPEECH by the Prime Minister Mr. Winston Churchill on war problems facing Britain. Delivered in the House of Commons, November 5, 1940. New York, British library of information, 1940. [7] p. 22½ cm.

SPAIN — UNITED KINGDOM

LOAN agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Spanish Government, Madrid, March 18, 1940 [with exchange of notes of August 1, 1940], London, 1940. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 23 (1940), Cmd. 6230.) 2d.

TRADE and payments agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spanish Government, Madrid, March 18, 1940. London, 1940. 35 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 22 (1940), Cmd. 6229.) 6d.

STATISTICS

STATISTICAL year-book of the League of Nations, 1939/40. Geneva, 1940, 285 p. 24½ cm. (League of Nations, 1940.II.A.3.)

STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS

EXCHANGE of notes regarding the establishment of a reserve of Australian wool in the United States of America. London, December 9, 1940. London, 1940. 6 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 27 (1940), Cmd. 6242.) 1d.

THAILAND — UNITED KINGDOM

TREATY of non-aggression between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the King of Thailand. Bangkok, June 12, 1940. Ratifications exchanged at Bangkok, August 31, 1940. London, 1940. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 26 (1940), Cmd. 6241.)

An identic treaty with France was not ratified; but a simultaneous one with Japan entered into force.

UNITED STATES

PAPERS relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1925. Washington, 1940. 2 v. 23½ cm. (Department of State Publication, Nos. 1518, 1519.) $3.50.

TREATIES submitted to the Senate, 1935–1939. Procedure during 1935–1939 on certain treaties submitted to the Senate, 1923–1939, and status thereof on December 31, 1939. Washington, 1940. 22 p. 26 cm. (Department of State Publication, No. 1516.) 10c.

FIFTH report of the National munitions control board for the period Jan. 1, 1940 to June 30, 1940. Washington, 1940. 177 p. 23 cm. (House Doc. No. 876, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

Commerce

TWENTY-FOURTH annual report of the United States Tariff commission, 1940. Washington ,1940. vi, 61 p. 23 cm.

TWENTY-EIGHTH annual report of the Secretary of Commerce, 1940. Washington, 1941. 128 p. 23 cm. 20c.

EXPORT prices and export cartels (Webb-Pomerene associations). Washington, 1940. 310 p. 23 cm. (Temporary national economic committee, Investigation of concentration of economic power. A study made [by Milton Gilbert and others] . . . Monograph No. 6.)

Defense

LEND-LEASE bill. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 1776. . . . January 15–29, 1941. Washington, 1941. 692 p. 23 cm.

TO PROMOTE the defense of the United States. . . . Report to accompany H. R. 1776. Washington, 1941. 11 p. 23 cm. (H. Rept. No. 18, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.)

Part II, Minority report by Mr. Fish.

TO PROMOTE the defense of the United States. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 275. . . . Pt. 1, Jan. 27–Feb. 3, 1941. Pt. 2, Feb. 4–10, 1941. Pt. 3, Feb. 11, 1941. Washington, 1941. 2 v. 23 cm.

PROMOTING the defense of the United States. . . . Report to accompany H. R. 1776. Washington, 1941. 23 cm. (S. Rept. No. 45, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.)

Part II, Minority report by Mr. Johnson.

THE NATIONAL defense advisory commission, functions and activities. Washington, Author, 1940. 16 p. 20 cm.

OUR FOREIGN policy and national defense; address by Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State before the Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland, September 28, 1940. Washington, 1940. 17 p. 22½ cm. (Department of State Publication, No. 1511).

UNITED STATES — CANADA

GREAT LAKES-St. Lawrence waterway; agreement between the United States of America and Canada. Effected by exchange of notes. Signed October 14 and 31 and November 7, 1940. Washington, 1941. 3 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 187.)

THE ST. LAWRENCE Survey. Washington, 1941. 7 pts.

UNITED STATES — HAITI

HAITIAN finances; supplementary agreement between the United States of America and Haiti further modifying the agreement of August 7, 1933. . . . Signed September 27, 1940. Effective October 1, 1940. Washington, 1941. 2 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 183.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED